Others, on the contrary, set Kant's ideas in opposition to those of
Lobachevsky. Thus, Roberto Bonola, in
Non-Euclidean Geometry,
says that
Lobachevsky's view of space is opposed to that of Kant. He says:
The Kantian doctrine considered space as a subjective intuition, a necessary
presupposition of every experience. Lobachevsky's doctrine was rather allied to
sensualism and
the current empiricism, and compelled geometry to take its place
again among the experimental sciences!*
Which view is correct and in what relation do Lobachevsky's ideas stand to
our problem? The most correct answer would be: in no relation. Non-
Euclidean geometry is not
metageometry,
and non-Euclidean geometry stands
to metageometry in the same relation as does Euclidean geometry.
The results of all
non-Euclidean geometry, which revalued the fundamental
axioms of Euclid and found its fullest expression in the works of Bolyai,
Gauss and Lobachevsky, are expressed in the formula:
The axioms of a given geometry express the properties of a given
space.
Thus, plane geometry accepts all
three Euclidean axioms, i.e.:
1 A straight line is the shortest distance between two points.
2 Any figure may be transferred to another place without interfering with
its properties.
3 Parallel lines do not meet. (This last axiom is usually formulated
differently according to Euclid.)
In the geometry of a sphere or a concave surface only the first two axioms
are true, for the meridians, parallel at the equator, meet at the poles.
In the geometry of an irregularly curved surface only the first axiom is true;
the second (about the transfer of figures)
no longer holds good, for a figure
taken from one place of an irregular surface may change when transferred to
another place. And the sum of the angles of a triangle may be more or less
than two right angles.
Thus,
axioms
express the difference in the properties of different kinds of
surfaces. A geometric axiom is a law of a
given
surface.
* Roberto Bonola,
Non-euclidean Geometry, a Critical and Historical Study of its
Development,
Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, 1912, pp. 92 and 93.
But what is a surface?
Lobachevsky's merit lies in the fact that he found it necessary to revise the
fundamental concepts of geometry. But he never went so far as to revalue
them from Kant's point of view. Yet at the same time,
he never argued
against Kant in any sense. For Lobachevsky, as a geometrician, a
surface
was
merely a means for the generalization of certain properties upon which one or
another geometric system was built, or the means for
generalizing the
properties of certain given lines. He probably never thought at all about the
reality or the unreality of a surface.
Thus, on the one hand, Bonola is quite wrong in ascribing to Lobachevsky
views opposed to those of Kant, and approaching 'sensualism' and 'the current
empiricism';
while on the other hand, there are grounds for thinking that
Hinton is quite subjective in ascribing to Lobachevsky and Gauss the
inauguration of a new era in
philosophy.
Non-Euclidean geometry, including Lobachevsky's geometry, bears no
relation to
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