Tourism, Security and Safety From Theory to Practice

Tourism
Risk Management for the Asia Pacific Region
written by Professor Jeff Wilks and
supported by several other tourism scholars. Wilks heads the Centre for Tourism
and Risk Management at the University of Queensland. Professor Wilks’ report
adopted a broad and well-structured approach to the major risk management and
security issues affecting tourism in SE Asia.
During the second half of 2003 it was clear that the convergence between the
priorities of SE Asian governments and the tourism private sector was manifested
by an increasingly cooperative approach to the restoration marketing of tourism in
the region. From July 2003 the overwhelming regional priority for SE Asian
tourism was the rapid implementation of demand recovery for the inbound tourism
market. This regional priority would be complemented by the market recovery
campaigns of the individual countries within SE Asia.
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Case Study 1. Singapore Roars 2003
Singapore has earned an outstanding reputation for success in SE Asian tourism
since the 1980s. The opening of Changi International Airport 22 km north of the
center of Singapore in 1982 greatly enhanced Singapore’s capacity to handle a
massive growth in airline capacity. Singapore’s inbound tourism numbers in 2000
with 7.69 million arrivals represent an all-time record. By comparison, Singapore’s
inbound tourism level was only 6 million arrivals in 1992. However, it must be
noted that tourism in Singapore is dominated by short stays and a high proportion
of stopover tourism. The average length of stay in 2001 according to the Singapore
Tourism Board was only 3.19 days. Although not counted in tourism statistics,
transit passengers remaining at the airport or passing through Singapore en route
to other destinations may contribute financially to Singapore, but not to its hotel
revenues (Singapore Tourist Board Statistics, 2004).
Singapore’s reputation as a tourist attraction is based on its shopping facilities, a
concentrated range of tourist attractions, the high quality of its cuisine, hotels, and its
image as being safe, clean, law abiding, free of health concerns, and tourist-friendly,
are among the key attractions for visitors. According to Joan Henderson, tourism to
Singapore in 2001 contributed US$5.3 billion or approximately 10% of Singapore’s
GDP. Consequently, tourism’s contribution to Singapore’s economy and employment
creation is significant by world standards. Singapore’s tourism experienced a minor
downturn of 2.2% in 2001 compared with 2000, primarily due to the global downturn
in long haul flights following September 11, 2001, which affected inbound tourism
during the final quarter of 2001. Most of Singapore’s major markets remained stable
during that year with the only notable downturn from Japan, the United States, and
Taiwan. Singapore was largely perceived as relatively immune from the threat of
Islamic terrorism and geographically removed from the epicenter of America’s “war on
terrorism” being fought in Afghanistan during 2001 and early 2002 (Henderson, 2003).
During 2002 inbound tourism to Singapore continued to decline, although this
was concentrated within the period immediately following the Bali bombing in
October 12, 2002. Singapore became a classical collateral victim of the Bali ter-
rorist incident. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Bali attack focused world
attention on the potential threat of Islamic terrorism in SE Asia. This was not a new
phenomenon; but the scale of the Bali attack, the fact that the majority of victims
were tourists from Western countries, and the intense media coverage of the inci-
dent had regional implications. In Singapore, days after Bali, the US, British, and
Australian intelligence services claimed to identify a Jemayal Islamiya/Al Qaeda
plot to attack several Western diplomatic legations in Singapore. Several suspects
were arrested by Singapore police and documents and videotapes were produced
to support these allegations. The foreign ministries of several of Singapore’s main
source markets including Australia, United Kingdom, United States, and Japan
issued travel advisories to defer nonessential travel to Singapore. Although this
level of warning remained in force relatively briefly, the advisories aroused outrage
throughout Singapore, especially in its tourism industry. Singapore was not the
only SE Asian country subjected to negative travel advisories following the Bali
bombing. However, the very concept of a highly regulated and ordered society
such as Singapore being defined as a tourism security risk was considered by the
political and business elite of Singapore as a diplomatic insult and a loss of face.
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The first confirmed case of SARS in Singapore was identified in mid-March
2003. According to the Singapore Ministry of Tourism, a Chinese doctor visiting
Hong Kong in late February unwittingly infected several hotel guests, including a
number of Singaporeans who carried the disease home to Singapore. At its zenith,
by late May, a total of 238 people in Singapore were diagnosed with the virus, of
whom 33 died. A further 930 people were placed under preventive quarantine. As
Joan Henderson correctly observes, the crisis surrounding SARS was one of fear
rather than of substance. This is not to suggest the very real concern generated by
SARS, especially among those unfortunate enough to have contracted the condi-
tion. In global epidemiological terms, the SARS outbreak in Singapore was rela-
tively minor compared to the 1980s Hong Kong Flu. The overwhelming media
coverage of SARS accompanied by the widespread dissemination of World Health
Organization warnings in the media and government travel advisories created a
global impression that Singapore was a latter day leper colony. The psychological
fear of a looming pandemic quickly descended on neighboring countries. Travelers
were instilled with dread about visiting or transiting Singapore or even flying in
aircraft that might travel in the general direction of Singapore (Henderson, 2003a).
IATA temporarily relocated its Asia Pacific Crisis Communications headquar-
ters from Tokyo to Singapore in order to focus its attention on reassuring airline
passengers of the negligible risk of contracting SARS on airlines and in transit
lounges in Singapore or other SE Asian transit points. Tony Concil, IATA’s Asia
Pacific Manager of Crisis Communications, sent daily media releases about the
SARS situation as it impacted on airlines and airports. Concil recalled the many
occasions he fielded journalists’ questions and issued media releases detailing the
precautions airlines had taken to minimize the risk of the spread of SARS among
airline passengers (interview: Concil, 2003).
During the height of the SARS crisis in the period of March–June 2003,
Singapore’s government committed SID$230 million to support the travel and
tourism industry during a period in which tourist arrivals to the island state fell by
70% over the corresponding months of 2002. A portion of these funds was devoted
to maintaining employment levels in a wide range of tourism enterprises including
hotels, attractions, tour operators, and the government-owned airlines. A push mar-
keting campaign was initiated to inform and reassure the travel industry and con-
sumers in key markets that Singapore had adopted a range of measures to
minimize the threat of SARS. Many hotels and attractions were identified as com-
plying with a series of measures which declared them “SARS safe.” This was con-
ducted under the slogan COOL Singapore Campaign (Henderson, 2003a).
By June 2003 Singapore was declared SARS free by the WHO, enabling the
Singapore Tourism Board to instigate its major post-SARS marketing recovery
campaign. Singapore Roars referred to the national Merlion symbol and the
explicit connection with tourists “roaring” back to Singapore. The Singapore
Tourism Board was granted a SID$50 million budget increment devoted to mar-
keting Singapore toward a post-SARS recovery. The primary message communi-
cated, of Singapore being SARS-free, incorporated a range of inducements and
discounts designed to encourage travel agents to sell and promote Singapore to
their clients. Travelers visiting Singapore were made aware of an extensive range
of discounted and value-added deals on tours, hotel accommodation, access to
attractions, etc. Promotions targeted at the travel industry in specific source
markets incorporated the Singapore Roars campaign as part of a cooperative
Three SE Asia Tourism Recovery Campaigns
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marketing exercise with campaigns to visit Malaysia, Thailand, Hong Kong, and
the Philippines. This strategy was part of a broader ASEAN and PATA approach to
tourism recovery. The Singapore Roars campaign marked the first occasion for
Singapore’s tourism industry in which a destination-specific recovery campaign was
conducted in conjunction with a broader regional tourism recovery campaign. The
significant downturn of tourism to most of SE Asia irrespective of the prevalence
or even presence of SARS was a common factor prompting a cooperative
approach. Operational and budgetary benefits derived from sharing the costs
between government and private sector stakeholders communicating a common
regional message to the trade and consumers in key source markets were persua-
sive reasons to cooperate.
The Singapore Roars campaign involved concerted media coverage in major
source markets, some of it subsidized by CNN as part of a broader SE Asian regional
Project Phoenix campaign coordinated along with PATA. A consortium of 270 pri-
vate tour operators, hoteliers, attractions, shopping outlets, and airlines contributed
marketing funds and offered a range of special deals to expand incentive arrange-
ments designed to reactivate tourism demand for Singapore. By November 2003, it
was clear statistically that the recovery process was achieving success. November
2003 arrival figures for Singapore were 7.3% up on the preceding year. However, it
must be recalled that November 2002 figures were historically low due primarily to
the impact of the Bali incident on SE Asian regional tourism. The impact of SARS
was pronounced on the annualized figures for Singapore’s inbound tourism, which
suffered a 19.04% drop in 2003 compared to 2002 or 6.127 million tourists in 2003
compared to 7.293 million in 2002 (Singapore Tourist Board Statistics, 2003).
The relative speed and success of Singapore’s recovery exemplify the best ele-
ments of a professionally managed restoration marketing campaign. Singapore
Roars was coordinated and centralized by the Singapore Tourism Board involving
a high level of cooperation with national carrier Singapore Airlines, the private
sector of Singapore’s tourism industry, especially hoteliers, major attractions, and
inbound tour operators. Singapore’s advantage in this achievement is largely due
to the fact that it is a highly regulated and compact city-state and there is univer-
sal recognition in Singapore that tourism is a strategically and economically
significant industry.