Tourism, Security and Safety From Theory to Practice

SE Asian Tourism: A Regional Approach to Tourism Recovery
Regional marketing of SE Asia, especially to long- and medium-haul source mar-
kets including North America, Europe, Australasia, and Japan was an important
feature of tourism marketing during the 1980s. However, as the economies of SE
Asian countries modernized and diversified, the major tourism destinations and
stopover points in SE Asia increasingly sought to differentiate their marketing
identities, resulting in a tendency toward competition and limited cooperation.
Intense competition ensued among Hong Kong, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and
Singapore as airline hub and spoke points that influenced their relative positions
for stopover traffic. Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia (especially Bali), the
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Philippines, and Vietnam all regarded tourism as strategic fulcrums for national
economic expansion.
Consequently, their government-dominated tourism marketing bodies sought
inbound tourism at the expense of neighboring nations. The highly competitive
nature of tourism during the 1990s was simply not conducive to regional tourism
cooperation as each destination assiduously sought to maximize its own share of a
growing international market. The ASEAN tourism marketing body, a product of
late 1980s government policies, technically remained in existence, but in every
practical sense was moribund by 2000.
During the 1990s the tourism industry’s private sector had a very different set
of priorities. Airlines, multinational hotel chains, cruise and tour operators serv-
icing multiple destinations, and global financial institutions were far more
amenable to regional destination marketing than the private sector during the
1990s. The major regional travel industry association PATA was, until the 1990s,
primarily oriented towards America. The relocation of its headquarters from San
Francisco to Bangkok in 1998 represented the realization of its organizational
evolution from an America-centric association in its early years to an Asia-centric
organization by the mid-1990s. PATA took over the role of regional SE Asian
tourism marketing abandoned by ASEAN during the 1990s (Chuck and Lurie,
2001). Although IATA’s global headquarters remained in Switzerland, it main-
tained a high-profile presence in Asia (interview: Concil, 2003). By 1997, SE
Asian tourism growth was increasingly sourced from within Asia. During the
1990s Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (the so-called Tiger
Economies) had become significant SE Asia source markets. The Asian economic
collapse resulted in a 2-year hiatus to this growth. The emergence of India and the
People's Republic of China as rapidly growing tourism generating markets prom-
ised long-term tourism growth for SE Asian tourism destinations. The quantum
growth of mass Chinese outbound tourism exacerbated competitive pressures
largely due to the PRC government policy of limiting approved destinations for
Chinese nationals. The criteria for a country to become an approved destination
for Chinese citizens included operational and political elements. Murray Bailey’s
report on the Chinese outbound market commissioned by PATA in 2001 provides
a detailed guide to the growth forecasts and the specific qualifications for
approved destination status (Bailey, 2001).
The prevailing dissonance between the private and the government sector’s
approach to regional tourism marketing in SE Asia during the 1990s and the early
years of the twenty-first century was radically affected by the Sari Club bombing
of October 12 , 2002, and the SARS scare of March–June 2003. The two events
put a sudden end to the divergence between the two approaches and resulted in a
rapid new convergence.
Regional focus on the actual and potential threat of terrorism directed at
tourists highlighted by the Bali bombing presented a common threat to the
regional tourism industry requiring a coordinated response. The perceived threat
of terrorism was compounded by a sudden upsurge in media-driven speculation
concerning the potential threat to tourist security. Global media networks includ-
ing CNN, BBC, Deutsch Welle, and Australian ABC covered this issue exten-
sively. Simultaneously the governments of many economically significant source
markets including the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Germany, and
Japan issued travel advisories recommending their citizens defer travel to several
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SE Asian countries. From the perspective of these governments, most of which
had citizens who were victims of the Bali attack, enhanced caution was not only
deemed justified but their own societies demanded it. SE Asian countries, includ-
ing Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, publicly criti-
cized these negative travel advisories and treated them as a diplomatic affront.
Although government travel advisories have been issued since the September 11,
2001, attack their global media profile and public visibility has been substantially
enhanced. Outspoken former Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir
Mohammed, Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri, and Philippine
Tourism Secretary Richard Gordon (who would be elected as PATA Chairman in
mid-2003) were scathing in their condemnation of negative Western and Japanese
government travel advisories. The Australian government was the most frequent
target of criticism partially due to Australia’s position as a country that assidu-
ously courted inclusion within Asia while being perceived as a hostile mouthpiece
of the United States (Wilks, 2003).
A relatively unrecognized development that arose from the Bali bombing
involved the international travel insurance industry. With few exceptions, prior
to the Bali bombing it was almost axiomatic that commercial travel insurance
coverage for passengers was linked to the wording of government travel advisories.
Most insurance providers automatically excluded coverage for loss or injury from
such acts as “politically motivated violence, civil disobedience, war or terrorism.”
The insurance industry’s term for this exclusion was “the general exemption.”
After September 11 there was growing consumer and stakeholder pressure placed
on insurers to provide coverage for unforeseen events (exemplified by
the September 11 attack) and some insurers relaxed their adherence to the
general exemption to provide coverage on a case-by-case basis. The high number
of fatalities in the Bali bombing placed the spotlight on insurance companies.
There was intense media pressure applied on travel insurers to assist victims of
the bombing. Since the Bali attack several major travel insurers gradually
abandoned the general exemption and either provided coverage on an individual
basis or factored in terrorism as optional premium coverage. Concurrently
there has been an erosion of the linkage between government travel advisories and
insurance coverage. Until the September 11, 2001, attack it was a common
(though not universal) practice for insurers to deny regular travel insurance
coverage for travelers visiting destinations for which governments had issued
an advisory to defer travel. The increased incidence of governments issuing
negative travel advisories since the advent of the “war on terrorism” has led
insurers to treat them less seriously as a commercially valid assessment of
tourist risk and determine their coverage based on independent statistical risk
assessments.
The combination of negative media coverage from the West and the need to
respond to what was widely perceived in SE Asia as diplomatic attacks (in the form
of travel advisories) from the West spurred the governments of SE Asia to present
a united front to defend regional tourism. On November 4, 2002, just over three
weeks after the Bali incident, a summit of ASEAN heads of states gathered in
Cambodia to sign a tourism marketing accord pledging a coordinated ASEAN
approach to tourism marketing, effectively marking the rebirth of ASEAN tourism.
ASEAN tourism cooperation following the Bali attack would also be reinforced
and amplified during the 2003 SARS crisis.
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Three SE Asia Tourism Recovery Campaigns
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By sheer coincidence, the executive of PATA was in Bali on the night of the
bombing (October 12, 2002) for the wedding of PATA Vice President Peter
Semone. The reception was due to be held at the Sari Club but the explosion
occurred while they were en route to the club. The presence of the senior execu-
tives of PATA at the scene of the bombing meant that PATA was able to directly
assist with the recovery and crisis communication process. PATA played a signifi-
cant role in mobilizing private tourism industry support for the victims of the
bombing and for the Balinese tourism industry. PATA also pledged its cooperation
with the Indonesian tourism industry to assist with marketing recovery and
adopted a supportive approach to regional tourism recovery in SE Asia (interview:
Semone, 2004).
In early 2003 PATA sponsored a task force of tourism recovery experts to assist
and report to the Indonesian government and the Balinese tourism authorities. In
April 2003, during a period in which SARS was already exerting a significant
impact on tourism in SE Asia, the annual PATA conference was held in Bali.
Although venues for PATA’s annual conferences are determined at least 3 years in
advance, the 2003 conference was a most propitious opportunity for the
Asia/Pacific travel industry to express solidarity with their Indonesian and
Balinese colleagues. PATA prepared a crisis-management manual for the use of its
members and affiliates (Winning Edge, 2003). In July 2003 following the SARS
scare, PATA launched their major tourism market recovery campaign, Project
Phoenix, which included several major elements. It involved the Tourism
Ministries of most SE Asian countries, media organizations (notably CNN), air-
lines, hoteliers, and major tour operators. The campaign’s message was intended to
reassure travelers that SE Asia was clear of SARS and welcoming visitors. The
positive messages were reinforced by a series of pull marketing incentive programs
designed to lure tourists. Project Phoenix included broad regional promotion of SE
Asia combined with destination-specific promotion. Effectively, Project Phoenix
was a private sector initiative involving a high level of public sector support from
the tourism ministries of the major SE Asian tourism destinations.
During the SARS scare, IATA relocated its Asia Pacific Crisis communications
headquarters from Tokyo to Singapore where it coordinated and communicated the
preventative activities of airlines servicing and transiting the region in response to
the SARS crisis.
PATA, in conjunction with the World Tourism Organization and the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation, jointly commissioned an extensive report entitled