Title of Dissertation: national renewable energy policy

Academy of Management Review
27, no. 
2 (2002): 222-247.
59
Fligstein, Neil. 
The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-first-
century Capitalist Societies
. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. 
60
Battilana, Julie, Bernard Leca, and Eva Boxenbaum. "2 how actors change institutions: 
towards a theory of institutional entrepreneurship." 
The Academy of Management Annals
3, no. 1 (2009): 65-107. 
61
Greenwood, Royston, Roy Suddaby, and Christopher R. Hinings. "Theorizing change: 
The role of professional associations in the transformation of institutionalized fields." 
Academy of Management Journal
45, no. 1 (2002): 58-80.
62
Maguire, Steve, Cynthia Hardy, and Thomas B. Lawrence. "Institutional 
entrepreneurship in emerging fields: HIV/AIDS treatment advocacy in Canada." 
Academy of Management Journal
47, no. 5 (2004): 657-679.
63
Lounsbury, Michael, Heather Geraci, and Ronit Waismel-Manor, “Policy Discourse, 
Logics, and Practice Standards: Centralizing the Solid-Waste Management Field,” in 

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46 
Institutional entrepreneurs motivate cooperation and mobilize alliance by using 
political tactics and strategies. Fields are alignments of forces, and the tensions between 
them provide rooms for strategic agency.
64
From this perspective, institutional 
entrepreneurs are strategic actors rather than dominant actors with much resource. 
Lawrence, Hardy, and Phillips suggested interorganizational collaboration can initiate 
institutional changes even with a lack of resources and power.
65
Institutional 
entrepreneurs are embedded in fields; thus, their strategies are influenced by field 
characteristics and other actors. 
The studies on institutional change have focused on the interactions between 
institutions and actors. Regulatory capture theory has more focused on the effect of 
private interests on regulations rather than interactions between them. Since the interest 
of this research is the effect of industry on national policies, it would be benefitted from 
reviewing the literature on regulatory capture. 
Regulatory capture 
Broadly, regulatory capture is the process that special interests influence state 
intervention.
66
Regulatory capture is possible because special interests, especially firms, 
have private information that is not shared with political representatives and citizens. The 
Organizations, Policy, and the Natural Environment
, ed. Andrew Hoffman and Marc 
Ventresca (California: Stanford University Press, 2002): 327-342. 
64
Levy, David, and Maureen Scully. "The institutional entrepreneur as modern prince: 
The strategic face of power in contested fields." 
Organization Studies
28, no. 7 (2007): 
971-991.
65
Lawrence, Thomas B., Cynthia Hardy, and Nelson Phillips. "Institutional effects of 
interorganizational collaboration: The emergence of proto-institutions." 
Academy of 
Management Journal 45,
no. 1 (2002): 281-290. 
66
Dal Bó, Ernesto. "Regulatory capture: a review." 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 
22, no. 2 (2006): 203-225. 

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47 
type of regulation capture can be various including a direct subsidy, controlling over 
entry by new rivals, controlling substitutes and complements, and price-fixing.
67
This can 
be costly to society. For instance, the costs of the rents caused by “political” firms ranged 
from 0.3 to 1.9 of the GDP in Pakistan.
68
Stigler showed that regulation is acquired by an industry and is operated for its 
benefits by using several cases.
69
The statistical analysis of the pattern of weight limits on 
trucks has influenced by the agricultural interests, railroads, and the public concerns. He 
also showed that the licensed occupations have higher incomes and the membership of 
the licensed occupation is more stable.
To explain interest group politics, Laffont and Tirole suggested a three-tier 
hierarchy model with firm, agency, and the Congress.
70
The model showed that the 
agency’s discretion to determine the level of regulation was reduced when interest groups 
were better organized. The characteristic of regulations has an effect on the political 
power of interest groups. An interest group has more political power if its interest is in 
inefficient rather than efficient regulation, since the agency’s discretion is for hiding 
information from Congress, and this asymmetry makes regulation less efficient.
Regulatory capture happens in multiple ways. Etzioni categorized the types of 
regulatory capture and showed the evidence of each type of regulatory capture in the real 
67
Stigler, George J. "The theory of economic regulation."