Title of Dissertation: national renewable energy policy

The Bell Journal of Economics 
and Management Science
(1971): 3-21. 
68
Khwaja, Asim Ijaz, and Atif Mian. "Do lenders favor politically connected firms? Rent 
provision in an emerging financial market." 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
(2005): 
1371-1411. 
69
Stigler, George J. "The theory of economic regulation." 
The Bell Journal of Economics 
and Management Science
(1971): 3-21. 
70
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jean Tirole. "The politics of government decision-making: 
A theory of regulatory capture." 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
(1991): 1089-1127.

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48 
world.
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Special interests involve in drafting legislation, but even if a regulation has 
already drafted, special interests still dilute and weaken the regulation. They are also able 
to weaken the enforcement of a regulation without changing the regulation. With the 
decreasing public concern, special interests can affect repealing a regulation. Sometimes, 
they switch regulators if they could not affect existing regulations. Special interests also 
involve in setting rates and prices, which are higher than the market sets. To prevent 
these engagements, Etzioni suggests restricting the role of private money in public life. 
According to him, legislators are dependent on special interests due to funds. Thus, 
reforming campaign-finance law would be helpful to reduce regulatory capture.
Previous studies on regulatory capture focused on the relationship between the 
regulatory authority and interest groups. They tend to focus on the game between 
government and firms. Although the theory of regulatory capture well explains the effects 
of interest groups on governmental policy, it is limited in showing the political contexts 
of policymaking. In this sense, Spiller and Tommasi pointed out the importance of 
institutional environment for the behaviors of actors in policymakings.
72
They suggested 
several conditions for cooperation for a stable and flexible policy. The conditions include 
small number of key actors, strong intertemporal linkage between the actors, observable 
political moves. This shows that regulations are difficult to be understood as a pure game 
of government and firm.
71
Etzioni, Amitai. "The capture theory of regulations—Revisited." Society 46, no. 4 
(2009): 319-323. 
72
Spiller, Pablo T., and Mariano Tommasi. "The institutions of regulation: An 
application to public utilities." in 
Handbook of New Institutional Economics
, ed. Claude 
Menard and Mary M. Shirley (Springer, 2005). 515-543. 

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49 
Embeddedness of multinational corporations 
Current globalization of industries is raising doubts on the concept of an 
organizational field. A number of studies have suggested that an organizational field 
operates in different ways for multinational corporations (MNCs). Although 
neoinstitutional models consider endogenous changes by adopting the institutional 
entrepreneurship, they still focus on external institutional pressures, which come from 
fields. As MNCs operate across diverse national institutions and are consist of multiple 
subsidiary units, organizational fields of MNCs are hard to be defined. In other words, 
the institutional environments of them are multiple, fragmented, and conflicting each 
other rather than granted and static fields.
73
Therefore, institutional pressures for MNCs 
are weak and diverse. Under multiple institutional environments, MNCs select to what 
extent they will be embedded in the environments in which they operate.
74
In this sense, for MNCs, social environments are evolving rule system, which are 
“products of a continuous process of sensemaking, enactment, and negotiated political 
interactions”.
75
Legitimacy is constructed by political processes, and power plays an 
important role in the dynamics of institutions. Powerful business and financial 
organizations can change the relationship between institutions and organizations. These 
organizations can “reverse-legitimate” institutions like institutions legitimate 
73
Kostova, Tatiana, Kendall Roth, and M. Tina Dacin. "Institutional theory in the study 
of multinational corporations: A critique and new directions."