The Rules of Sociological

particular precious stone rather than to another, to a particular 
kind of furniture or style, etc. Influence is also felt in another way. 
Rates of pay depend upon a basic standard which corresponds to 
the minimum amount of resources needed for a man to live. But 
this standard, in every era, is fixed by public opinion. What was 
regarded yesterday as a sufficient minimum no longer satisfies the 
requirements of the moral conscience of today, simply because we 
are more affected than in the past by certain feelings of humanity. 
There are even forItls of production which are tending to become 
general, not only because of their objective productivity, but by 
reason of certain moral virtues that public opinion ascribes to 
them: such, for example, is co-operatism. 
From this viewpoint, the relationships between the science of 
economics and the other social sciences present themselves to us in 
a 
different light. Both deal with phenomena which, at least when 
considered under certain aspects, . are homogeneous, because in 
some ' respects they are all matters of opinion. Then one can 
conceive that moral, religious and aesthetic opinions can exert an 
influence upon economic opinion, at least equal to that which 
economic opinion exerts upon them. This emerges clearly from the 
examples already quoted above. Political economy therefore loses 

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232 Writings of Durkheim on Sociology and its Method 
that predominance which was once attributed to it, to become a 
social science like the others, closely linked to them in a solid 
relationship, without however being able to claim to direct them. 
Yet, from another aspect, political economy does assume again 
a sort of primacy. Human opinions emerge from the midst of social 
groups and partly depend upon what these groups are. We know 
that opinion differs as between populations densely packed 
together and those which are dispersed, as between town and 
country, 
as 
between large and small towns, etc. Ideas change 
according to the density of the society, whether it is numerous or 
sparse, according to whether its communications or transport 
networks are numerous and rapid. But it seems certain that 
economic factors have a profound effect upon the wa
y 
in which the 
population is distributed, its density, the form that human settle­
ments take, and consequently upon the way tha:t these factors 
often exert a profound influence upon the various states of 
opinion. It is above all in this indirect way, the speaker concludes, 
that economic facts act upon moral ideas. 
Villey had no intention of speaking in this discussion. But he 
was, he stated, something of an economist and of a lawyer and, in 
this dual capacity, he felt somewhat shocked by certain of the 
assertions that he had heard made. 
Durkheim had said that law was a matter of opinion, that 
political economy and value were matters of opinion and that, for 
example, among Jews, pork ought to have very little value. Villey 
believes that Durkheim had got himself into a muddle. Opinion 
has a very great influence in the conception of the law and the 
sanctions it imposes. But it does not shape the law. It has a very 
great influence upon the conditions of the market, which affect 
value, but it does not determine value, which is determined by 
rigorous laws of nature. 
, 
Opinion has much influence upon the conception of the law and, 
for example, it. is ceitain that some institutions have sometimes 
been considered to be in conformity with the law that are 
a: 
clear 
violation of it, such as slavery. Opinion has influence upon the 
sanctions of the law; thus such and such an action which was 
prohibited in the past, is allowed today, and vice versa. This is 
because social needs are not always the same. But to conclude 
from this thatJaw is a matter of opinion, is quite simply to deny the 
law, to make it a pure conce.pt of the mind, essentially fluctuating 

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Debate on Political Economy and Sociology (1908) 233 
and fanciful, and this is to, deliver over the fate of societies to the 
caprices of the pilot whom chance has given them. 
Again, in the same way opinion has much influence upon 
market conditions. This is why pork may have been depreciated in 
Jewish territory, just as fish must be sold dearer on Fridays in 
Catholic territory. But it is always the "law of supply and demand, 
completely independent of opinion, which regulates the price of 
things, just as it determines all values. 
As for the question - perhaps a little theoretical - which had 
been posed, this is, according to the speaker, what one could 
reply. Social science is the science of m4n living in society; social 
life, like all life, may be analysed according to certain rules in 
relation to a certain 'movement'; this 'movement', which consists 
of the unfolding of all individual activities, isthe object of political 
economy; the rule, which consists in the limitation of individual 
activities, is the object of law, from which the speaker does not 
distinguish. morality, since law is none other than morality in its 
application to social relationships; thus political economy and law 
appear to be th� two essential branches of social science. 
Durkheim cannot make sense of the view felt and expressed by 
Villey. He had taken care to state that he was not dealing with the 
entirely metaphysical questi0n of knowing whether morality ex­
isted, or an ideal law, inscribed in the nature of man, valid for all 
ages and all countries. He had spoken solely of law and morality as 
they existed, as they had been at any moment in history. Now it 
was absolutely clear that a people had never put into practice any 
moral and juridical ptecepts other than · those which the public 
consciousness, that is to say, opinion, h"ad recognised as such. If 
that opinion ceased to feel the weight of their authority, then that 
authority would be as if it no longer existed; it would no longer act 
upon the conscience; the precepts would no longer be obeyed. 
That is all the speaker [Durkheim] meant; 
We had to be on our guard against the derogatory sense which is 
often given to the word 'opinion'. It almost seems as if it were 
synonymous with mindless prejudices or fanciful feelings, etc. This 
is to view opinion from only one of its aspects. It is to forget that 
opinion is also the end result of the experiences of peoples over the 
centuries - and that has imparted some authority to it. The 
speaker feels at least as much respect for a moral rule when he 
consiqers it to be the fruit of peoples' expenence over the 

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234 
Writings of Durkheim on Sociology and its Method 
centuries as when he conceives it as the result of the dialectical 
constructs of the jurist and the moralist. 
It is argued that opinion changes. But this is because morality 
changes also, and does so legitimately. Durkheim does not believe 
that many historians exist today who would admit that the 
Romans, for example, could have pr�ctised a morality comparable 
to our own. The respect that we have for the human person could 
not have found a place in Rome without encompassing the 
dissolution of Roman society. Fustel de Coulanges long ago 
showed this . to be true. The variations through which moral 
opinion passes are therefore not the product of mere aberrations 
but are founded on the changes which have occurred simul­
taneously in living conditions. 
As 
for economic matters, the speaker did not state in any way 
that they were completely a matter of opinion, but that they too 
derived some