The Next 100 Years

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P R E P A R I N G F O R WA R 
T
he war in the mid-twenty-first century will have classic origins. One 
country, the United States, will place tremendous pressure on a coali­
tion of two other countries. The United States will not intend to go 
to war, or even to seriously damage Japan or Turkey. It simply will want 
these two countries to change their behavior. The Japanese and Turks, to 
the contrary, will feel that the United States is trying to destroy them. They 
also will not want war, but fear will compel them to act. They will try to ne­
gotiate with the United States, but while the Americans will view their own 
demands as modest, the Turks and Japanese will see them as existential 
threats. 
We will see the collision of three grand strategies. The Americans will 
want to prevent major regional powers from developing in Eurasia and will 
be concerned that these two regional powers would merge into a single 
Eurasian hegemon. Japan will need a presence in Asia in order to deal with 
its demographic problems and to get raw materials; for that it will have to 
control the northwest Pacific. And Turkey will be the pivot point of three 
continents that are all in various degrees of chaos; it will have to stabilize the 
region if it is to grow. While Japanese and Turkish actions will cause anxiety 

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for the United States, Japan and Turkey will feel they cannot survive unless 
they act. 
Accommodation will be impossible. Each concession made to the United 
States will bring new demands. Each refusal by Japan and Turkey will in­
crease American fears. It will come down to submission or war, and war will 
appear to be the more prudent option. Japan and Turkey will have no illu­
sion that they could destroy or occupy the United States. Rather, they will 
simply want to create a set of circumstances in which the United States 
would find it in its interests to reach a negotiated settlement guaranteeing 
Japan and Turkey their spheres of influence, which in their view will not af­
fect fundamental American interests. 
Since they won’t be able to defeat the United States in a war, Turkey and 
Japan’s goal will be to deal the United States a severe setback at the opening 
of the conflict in order to put the United States at a temporary disadvan­
tage. This would be intended to generate a sense in the United States that 
the prosecution of the war would be more costly and risky than accom ­
modation. It will be Turkey and Japan’s hope that the Americans, enjoying a 
period of prosperity, and vaguely uneasy about Mexico’s resurgence, will de­
cide to decline extended combat and accept a reasonable negotiated settle­
ment. Japan and Turkey will also understand the risks if the United States 
doesn’t agree to settle, but will feel they have no choice. 
It will be a replay of World War II in this sense: weaker countries trying 
to redefine the balance of power in the world will find it necessary to launch 
sudden, preemptive wars before the other side is ready. The war will be a 
combination of surprise attack and exploitation of that surprise. In many 
ways, war in the mid-twenty-first century will be similar to war in the mid-
twentieth century. The principles will be the same. The practice, however, 
will differ dramatically—and that is why this conflict will mark the dawn of 
a new age in warfare.