The Next 100 Years

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n geopolitics, major conflicts repeat themselves. France and Germany, 
for example, fought multiple wars, as did Poland and Russia. When a 
single war does not resolve an underlying geopolitical issue, it is refought 
until the issue is finally settled. At the very least, even without another war, 
tension and confrontation are ongoing. Significant conflicts are rooted in 
underlying realities—and they do not go away easily. Keep in mind how 
quickly Balkan geopolitics led to a recurrence of wars that had been fought 
a century earlier. 
Russia is the eastern portion of Europe and has clashed with the rest of 
Europe on multiple occasions. The Napoleonic wars, the two world wars, 
and the Cold War all dealt, at least in part, with the status of Russia and its 
relationship to the rest of Europe. None of these wars ultimately settled this 
question, because in the end a united and independent Russia survived or 
triumphed. The problem is that the very existence of a united Russia poses 
a significant potential challenge to Europe. 
Russia is a vast region with a huge population. It is much poorer than 
the rest of Europe, but it has two assets—land and natural resources. As 
such it is a constant temptation for European powers, which see an oppor­

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tunity to increase their size and wealth to the east. Historically, though, Eu­
ropeans who have invaded Russia have come to a disastrous end. If they are 
not beaten by the Russians, they are so exhausted from fighting them that 
someone else defeats them. Russia occasionally pushes its power westward, 
threatening Europe with the Russian masses. At other times passive and ig­
nored, Russia is often taken advantage of. But, in due course, others pay for 
underestimating it. 
The Cold War only appeared to have settled the Russian question. Had 
the Russian Federation collapsed in the 1990s and the region fragmented 
into multiple, smaller states, Russian power would have disappeared, and 
with it the challenge Russian power poses to Europe. Had the Americans, 
Europeans, and Chinese moved in for the kill, the Russian question would 
have been finally settled. But the Europeans were too weak and divided at 
the end of the twentieth century, the Chinese too isolated and preoccupied 
with internal issues, and after September 11, 2001, the Americans were too 
distracted by the Islamist war to act decisively. What actions were taken by 
the United States were insufficient and unfocused. In fact, these actions 
only served to alert the Russians to the great potential danger from the 
United States and ensured they would respond to it. 
Given the simple fact that Russia did not disintegrate, the Russian geo ­
political question will reemerge. Given the fact that Russia is now reenergiz­
ing itself, that question will come sooner rather than later. The conflict will 
not be a repeat of the Cold War, any more than World War I was a repeat of 
the Napoleonic wars. But it will be a restatement of the fundamental Russ­
ian question: If Russia is a united nation- state, where will its frontiers lie 
and what will be the relationship between Russia and its neighbors? That 
question will represent the next major phase in world history—in 2020, 
and in the years leading up to it.