RUSSIA
RUSSIA
IRAN
IRAN
ISRAEL
ISRAEL
KAZAKHSTAN
KAZAKHSTAN
SUDAN
SUDAN
CHAD
CHAD
BULGARIA
BULGARIA
ROMANIA
ROMANIA
ITALY
ITALY
UKRAINE
UKRAINE
POLAND
POLAND
Mediterranean Sea
Mediterranean Sea
Black Sea
Black Sea
Arabian
Arabian
Sea
Sea
Caspian
Caspian
Sea
Sea
RUSSIA
IRAN
ISRAEL
TURKEY
KAZAKHSTAN
SUDAN
CHAD
BULGARIA
ROMANIA
ITALY
UKRAINE
POLAND
Mediterranean Sea
Black Sea
Arabian
Sea
Caspian
Sea
Turkish Sphere of Influence 2050
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ers. They will drive on to Budapest, although their ultimate military goal
will be the Carpathian Mountains in Slovakia, Ukraine, and Romania. If
they take the Carpathians, Romania and Bulgaria will be isolated and col
lapse, turning the Black Sea into a Turkish lake. Hungary will be occupied,
and Poland isolated and facing a threat from the south. If, however, the
Poles decide to concentrate on the Hungarian plain to protect Budapest,
and therefore attempt to hold the bloc together, Turkish airpower would
likely destroy the bloc’s forces.
The Poles will request American air support so they can engage Turkish
forces as they advance into Croatia, but the United States will have no air-
power to give them. The Turks, as a result, will capture Hungary in a matter
of weeks and occupy the Carpathians soon after. The Romanians, isolated,
will ask for and receive an armistice. Southeastern Europe, to the Polish bor
der and Ukraine, will be in Turkish hands. All that will remain will be Poland.
Turkish forces will proceed toward Krakow, with air strikes ripping apart
the Polish military. The United States will become concerned that the Poles
will be unable to resist and may be forced to sue for peace. The U.S. strategy
will be to buy time to rebuild its strategic assets and then launch a sudden
global strike on Turkey and Japan. The United States will not want to dissi
pate its strength to support tactical combat in southern Poland. At the same
time, it will not be able to risk losing its Polish ally, as that will end the game
against Turkey. In order to get the Poles to carry on, the United States will
have to seriously harm the Turks.
In February 2051, the United States will launch a substantial portion of
its remaining air force, including some new aircraft with advanced capabili
ties, striking at Turkish forces everywhere from southern Poland to logistics
centers back in Bosnia and farther south. It will take serious losses from the
Turkish air force, but the Turkish army will suffer serious losses as hundreds
of armored infantrymen are killed along with the destruction of large num
bers of robotic systems and supplies. Turkey will be far from crippled, but it
will be hurt.
The Turks will soon realize that there is no chance of their winning the
war. Their inability to reenter space, plus the Americans’ ability to create a
new air force quickly, would, in time, defeat them. They also will realize
that the Japanese won’t be in a position to help them because they will be
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tied down with their own problems in China. The great gamble will fail,
and with that failure it will be every man for himself. The United States will
be clearly focusing on Turkey before Japan, so Turkey will need to knock
Poland out of the war fast. But Turkish ground forces will by then be spread
around a vast empire. Concentrating on Poland will mean stripping forces
from elsewhere, and that will, in the long run, not be a viable option. The
Turks would be deeply exposed to rebellion from Egypt to Central Asia.
Before the beginning of the war, the Coalition will have wanted Ger
many to join in the attack on Poland, but the Germans will have declined.
This time when the Turks approach them, they will offer quite a prize. In re
turn for helping Turkey in Poland, Turkey will retreat into the Balkans after
the war, retaining only Romania and Ukraine. Turkey will build its power
around the Black Sea, the Adriatic, and the Mediterranean, and the Ger
mans will have a free hand from Hungary north, including Poland, the
Baltics, and Belarus.
From the German point of view, what had been a Turkish pipe dream
before 2050 will now be a very practical proposal. The Turks would be a
Mediterranean and Black Sea power and would need the Balkans to secure
their hold. The Turks would have no interest north of there, as such involve
ment would soak up forces needed in these areas. The Germans, like the
Poles and Russians, will be exposed on the northern European plain, and this
new arrangement would secure their eastern flank. Most important, this
arrangement would reverse the trend that had been running against Ger
many and Western Europe since the collapse of Russia. The Eastern Euro
peans would finally be put back in their place.
The Germans will know that the Americans will eventually refocus on
the region, but it will take the Americans a while to come back. There will
be a genuine window of opportunity for the Germans to seize. Self- absorbed
and risk averse, they won’t be as adventurous as the Turks. But the alterna
tive will be a Turkish force to their east or, worse, the defeat of the Turks and
an even more powerful Polish and American force facing them. The Ger
mans will not be risk takers in general, but this is a risk they will have to
take. They will mobilize their forces, including their older but still capable
air force, and strike the Poles from the west in late spring of 2051, while the
Turks will relaunch their attack from the south. The Germans will recruit
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the French and a handful of other countries into the exercise, but their par
ticipation will be more political than military.
Britain, on the other hand, will be appalled at what is happening. Even
though there will be a giant game of global power politics going on, the
British will still be deeply concerned with the local balance of power. They
will once again be facing the possibility of a German- dominated continent,
however awkwardly achieved by Germany and however dependent on Turk
ish underpinnings. The British will recognize that if this happens, any neglect
toward Europe on the part of the United States, any cyclical retreat into isola
tion, could mean catastrophe. Britain will have had no intention of getting in
volved in this war. But at this point it will have no choice, and it could bring
something valuable to the table: a small, intact air force that, when coupled
with U.S. intelligence, could seriously damage the Germans and the Turks. In
addition, its advanced air defenses to protect against Turkish and German air
strikes will make Britain a secure base of operations. Britain will appear to
hold back, while stealthily redeploying a substantial portion of its air force to
the United States, where air defenses and warning time will be even greater.
In the end, Poland will be attacked on two sides, from the west and
south. The attacking forces will advance geographically as invaders have be
fore, but the technology will be quite different. It won’t be the massed in
fantry of Napoleon or the armored formations of Hitler; the force that will
attack will be quite small in terms of actual troops. The human force will
consist of armored infantrymen, fanned out as infantrymen usually are, but
with clear and overlapping fields of fire—and these fields now will measure
dozens of miles. Linked together by computer networks, they will com
mand not only the weapons they carry but also robotic systems and hyper
sonic aircraft thousands of miles away that they can call on as needed.
The robotic systems will live on data and power. Cut off either, and they
would be helpless. They need a constant stream of information and instruc
tions. They also need a steady flow of power to keep them going. Since the
space- based systems of the Turks are gone, the Turks will substitute un
manned aerial vehicles hovering, swooping, and flying around the battle
space to give them information. The information will always be incomplete,
as the UAVs will constantly be shot down. The United States will have
much better data but will lack the air force to decimate the attackers.
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Providing enough power for the infantrymen’s armored suits and robots
will also be a problem. These suits will be electrically driven and will need to
be recharged or have their massive batteries swapped out every day or so.
Tremendous advances will have been made in the storage of electrical power,
but in the end the batteries will still run out. A key resource, therefore, will
be the electrical power grid tied to electrical generation plants. Destroy the
power generation plants, and the attackers will have to ship in massive,
charged batteries from wherever there is power and then distribute them
around the battlefield. The farther the troops advance, the longer the supply
line will become. If the defenders are prepared to shut down their own
power grid and, when necessary, destroy their power plants—a scorched-
earth strategy—the attack would be slowed by lack of power. Everything
will depend on the tactical delivery of electricity.
At a secret meeting of American, British, Chinese, and Polish com
manders, a strategy will be worked out: the Poles will resist, and slowly re
treat under the pressure of the Coalition forces. The two geographic thrusts,
one from the west and one from the south, will converge on Warsaw. It will
be agreed that the Poles will resist, fall back, and regroup endlessly, buying
as much time as possible for the allies to rebuild their air forces. The Poles
will be reinforced by several thousand American troops flown over the
North Pole to St. Petersburg and deployed with the Polish troops in their
delaying action. As the situation becomes more desperate, in late 2051,
available airpower in Britain will begin to be released to further slow the ad
vancing Turkish armies. The Herculean American industrial effort will be
under way, as thousands of advanced hypersonic aircraft are built, capable of
traveling twice as fast as prewar systems, and with a payload double in size.
By mid-2052, the American force will be available for a massed and devas
tating strike that, when coupled with major improvements in space- based
systems, will devastate Coalition forces worldwide. Until then, the rule will
be hold, retreat, and buy time.
The Coalition will massively underestimate U.S. industrial capacity. It
will think it has several years to battle the Polish forces. At first, the Coali
tion will choose not to attack Polish electrical generation systems, not want
ing to have to rebuild them after the war and needing their power to fight
after they’ve captured them. The Poles, on the other hand, will destroy their
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grids as they retreat, wanting to complicate the Coalition advance and forc
ing the Germans and the Turks to divert resources to shipping heavy electri
cal storage units to the battlefield. Those lines of supply are exactly what will
be most vulnerable when the counterattack comes in the summer of 2052.
When the American armored infantrymen arrive on the battlefield, with
their sophisticated, space- linked systems, the Coalition will realize that
Poland is not going to fall quickly. The Coalition will also see that the elec
trical generation plants are the foundation of allied power and that unless
they are taken out—and the Americans reduced to shipping electrical stor
age units to the battlefield from their own country—the United States will
be victorious. Therefore, in the summer of 2051, the Coalition will begin to
destroy the Polish electrical system, hitting plants as far east as Belarus.
Poland will go black.
The Coalition will wait for two weeks, forcing the United States and its
allies (the Alliance) into continual combat to make them use up available
electricity. Then they will attack on all fronts simultaneously, expecting Pol
ish and American troops to be out of power and out of luck. Instead, they
will not only meet intense resistance but also find that the U.S. troops are
calling in air strikes that are devastating Coalition lines. Allied command
will send British air forces into combat, and the superbly coordinated space-
based reconnaissance systems—coupled with a new, more sophisticated Bat
tle Star management system—will identify, target, and destroy the German
and Turkish armored infantry.
It will turn out the United States will have learned not to put all its eggs
in one basket militarily, particularly in terms of space- based systems. Before
the war begins, the United States will have another Battle Star—a next-
generation system—built but not yet launched due to a lack of funds. Con
gressional inaction will for once be a godsend. The station will be secret,
and on the ground. It will be launched into space just months after the sur
prise attack and the destruction of Japan’s lunar base. The jury- rigged archi
tecture created immediately after the war began will be replaced by one
centered around the new Battle Star, stationed near Uganda but capable of
rapid maneuver to new points along the equator as needed, as well as tacti
cal maneuvering to avoid attacks such as those that destroyed its three pred
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ecessors. The United States will restore its command of space—to a degree
that will far surpass its space dominance of several years before.
The Turks and Germans will be stunned by one thing. Having decided
to destroy Polish electrical generation and distribution, they will expect re
sistance to weaken dramatically, as their own forces run out of juice. Yet the
Polish and American armored infantry will be going full blast. It will seem
impossible that the Americans are flying in enough batteries to maintain the
troops. The question will be, where is the power coming from?
The Japanese won’t be the only ones experimenting with the commercial
uses of space. During the first half of the century, a consortium of American
entrepreneurs will have spent a great deal of money both developing the in
expensive, plentiful launchers the Americans will be using and trying their
hand at electrical generation in space, beaming energy to earth in micro
wave form, then reconverting it to usable electricity. As the U.S. military
commanders game out the problem of defending Poland, they will under
stand from endless war games that the problem will be maintaining electri
cal power. When the Turks take only a few weeks to overrun southeastern
Europe, the United States will realize that defeating them depends on the
supply of electrical power to Alliance forces and the destruction of Coalition
electrical supplies. The key to victory will be keeping Poland supplied with
electricity.
The core technology will have been developed. The space launchers will
be able to be built quickly, as will the solar panels and microwave beaming
systems. The real challenge will be to get the receivers built and out to the
field, but once again, with unlimited budget and motivation, the Americans
will be able to perform miracles. Unknown to the Coalition, the new Battle
Star will have been designed for two purposes: battle management and man
aging the construction and operation of enormous arrays of solar panels and
their microwave radiation systems. Mobile receivers will have been delivered
to the battlefield.
When the switch is flipped, thousands of receivers on the Polish side of
the front will begin receiving microwave radiation from space and convert
ing it to electricity. In a way this will be like cell phones replacing landlines.
The entire architecture of power will change. That will be important later.
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For now, it will mean that the resistance facing the Turks will not decline, as
their enemies inexplicably will have far more electricity than Turkey expected.
The Coalition won’t be able to take out the power generation system in
space or identify the microwave receiving stations. There will be too many
solar panels in too many different places, and they will be moving around.
Even if they could be taken out, they would be replaced faster than they
could be destroyed, given the Coalition’s capabilities.
The Coalition won’t be able to break the Polish- American force through
logistics. The defenders will survive because the Coalition will have inade
quate reconnaissance, having lost its satellites early. Now, its command of
the air will slip as well, as the smaller Allied air forces will have enormously
better intelligence—and will therefore be infinitely more effective.
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