Lawrence B. Solum, “The Fixation Thesis: The Original Meaning of the Constitutional Text”
valid syllogistic version could easily be stated.
Originalism and the Invisible Constitution
63
for the real issues at hand. The United States does not have an unwritten con-
stitution in the same sense that the United Kingdom does; no one seriously dis-
putes that claim (if it is understood narrowly). And even the United Kingdom
has a constitution comprised largely of writings, although the writings are not
an integrated document but are instead a collection of statutes, royal proc-
lamations, and many other texts. Opponents of the idea of an unwritten or
invisible constitution in the American context do not dispute the existence of
judicial decisions that create or articulate rules of constitutional law. In one
sense, the United States obviously has an “unwritten” constitution: not all of
the content of constitutional law is explicitly stated in the constitutional text.
In another sense, the United States does not have an “unwritten” constitution:
there is an integrated writing that is conventionally called “the Constitution
of the United States of America.” Framing the issues in terms of the notion
of an “unwritten constitution” or “invisible constitution” obscures rather than
illuminates the questions that are at stake.
In this chapter, I will use an alternative vocabulary to describe the set of
issues raised by the evocative phrases “invisible constitution” and “unwritten
constitution.” The phrase “extra-textual sources” will be used to designate
sources of constitutional law that are outside the text of the United States
Constitution (as amended).
11
One incomplete version of the written text is
under glass in the National Archives; complete versions with the amend-
ments can be found in the United States Code and on the Internet. Extra-
textual sources include judicial opinions, the Articles of Confederation, the
Declaration of Independence, the ethos of the framing era, theories of justice,
the Northwest Ordinance, the historical practices of the institutions of govern-
ment and the American people, and many other things as well.
Here is the plan. In Section
3.1
, I will attempt to concisely formulate the
core of originalism as a constitutional theory. Section
3.2
will address extra-
constitutional sources, laying out a typology of the sources themselves and
the roles that they can play in constitutional interpretation and construction.
Section
3.3
will then examine several categories of extra-textual sources from
an originalist perspective. The conclusion articulates the thesis that textual
sources of constitutional law should have primacy in constitutional interpre-
tation and construction.
11
See Tribe, Supra note 1, 6 (discussing the relationship between “invisible constitution” and
extra-textual sources).