The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective

government while enjoying its special autonomy. Such a notion of ‘under the 

direct governance’ (直辖) is not novel in the unitary system. Municipalities 

‘under the direct governance’ exist in the mainland according to Article 31 of 

the 1982 Constitution. As zhi xia shi (直辖市), they are of national importance 

and equal to provinces in legal status and practical conditions, including area 

and population. The history of this type of institution in modern China can be 

dated back to the ‘special municipalities’ (特别市) established by the Beiyang 

Government during the 1920s. Now, there are four in total: Beijing, Tianjin, 

Shanghai and Chongqing. They are authorised to have more powers than 

ordinary cities under provinces, this includes, for example, the power to legis-

late their own municipal laws and administrative regulations. This authorised 

power is not considered autonomous in China’s constitutional law.

89

 In the 

analogical reasoning of the Chinese unitary system, ‘under the direct govern-

ance’ indicates that Hong Kong, as the SAR under the OCTS, still ranks on 

the same level as provinces, autonomous regions and zhi xia shi under the 

whole unitary system of China. 

Early constitutional controversies rose from Hong Kong’s independent 

judicial power and the Standing Committee of the NPC’s authority, which 

resulted in the ‘dual track system’ in interpreting the Basic Law of the Hong 

Kong SAR.

90

 With the maintenance of the pre-1997 common law system, the 

87 

Article 11(3), 

ibid.

.

88 

Ever since the Joint Declaration signed by Chinese and British governments, the promise of 

Hong Kong’s ‘high degree of autonomy’ captured the major research concerns towards Hong 

Kong’s fate towards and after 1997. This trend arose even after the Basic Law of Hong Kong 

SAR was approved by the Seventh National People’s Congress of China in 1990, for it takes the 

same wording from the Joint Declaration.

89 

Article 63 the Legislative Law (2000; rev. 2015).

90 

See  Dai  Yaoting and Wang  Xiaonan, ‘The Constitutional Review in Hong Kong’ in Tang 

Dezong and Wang Pengxiang (eds.), Legal Developments in Two Coasts and Four Areas vol. 1 

(Taipei: Institutum Iurisprudentiae, Academia Sinica, 2007) 143–85. [戴耀廷、杨晓楠：”香

港的违宪审查制度

”,  汤德宗、王鹏翔《两岸四地法律发展（上册）》（台北：中央研

究院法律学研究所，

2007），第143–185页。]

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The ‘Invisible Constitution’ seen Realistically 

423

Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR leaves significant scope for judicial inde-

pendence. The explicit limitation on judicial power is only in Article 19, which 

excludes state acts from the jurisdiction of Hong Kong courts. Therefore, the 

Standing Committee of the NPC has the final say on the interpretation of the 

Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR.

91

 In early controversial cases, the Court 

of Final Appeal actively probed the scope of its judicial autonomy through 

judicial review of laws made by the preliminary legislative council, resulting 

in unavoidable friction during the post-transition period between the Hong 

Kong SAR and the central government.

92

 Independent judicial power is con-

sidered to be a challenge to the central governance and a means of safeguard-

ing the spirit of rule of law in Hong Kong.

93

As time has passed, constitutional disharmonies between Hong Kong and 

Beijing have turned their focus to the post of Chief Executive for complex 

economic and social reasons. As the core ‘joint’ of the relationship between 

the Hong Kong SAR and the central authorities, the Basic Law of the Hong 

Kong SAR provides Section 1 of Chapter IV on the Chief Executive, but it 

only defines the political function of the Chief Executive as ‘accountable to 

the Central People’s Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative 

Region’ in accordance with the provisions of the Law.

94

 The Chief Executive’s 

accountability to the central government appears logical and substantially 

echoes central governance in Article 12 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong 

SAR. However, this accountability remains vague in the Basic Law. How does 

it apply to ‘the Hong Kong SAR’? If it refers to the Hong Kong people, then 

this vagueness left by the drafters of the Basic Law is understandable for fur-

ther amending towards electoral reform, according to Annex 1, which shall 

be proposed from the central authorities. Since the Chief Executive should 

be appointed by the central government, it can also be assumed that even if 

universal suffrage of the Chief Executive were realised, without a nomination 

committee substantially controlled by the central authorities and no matter 

who is elected by what amended procedure, the central authorities have the 

final say on the appointment; namely, they can deny the appointment, though 

in practice, this may result in a constitutional crisis.

95

Compared to the over-cooperative interactions between the legislature 

body and the Chief Executive in Macao, the political structure of Hong 

91 

Article 158, Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR (1990).

92 

Two typical cases are Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration [1999] 1 HKLRD 315; Chong