The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective

Albert H. Y. Chen and P. Y. Lo

The net effect of the coming into force of the HKBL in July 1997 and the 

HKSAR courts’ interpretation of its judicial review power under the HKBL 

and of article 39 is that the grounds on which legislative and executive actions 

may be challenged by way of judicial review have been broadened compared 

to the post-1997 era. After 1991 but before 1997, it was possible to launch such 

a challenge on the basis of the provisions of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, 

which are identical to those provisions of the ICCPR that are applicable to 

Hong Kong. After 1997, a challenge may still be launched on this basis, but 

in addition a challenge may also be based on other provisions of the HKBL, 

particularly those which confer rights that are not expressly or adequately pro-

vided for in the ICCPR, such as the right of abode or the right to travel.

33

 In 

the following text, we will review several leading cases on constitutional judi-

cial review and on the application of proportionality analysis.

The first case on constitutional judicial review in the HKSAR was the deci-

sion of the Court of Appeal on 29 July 1997 – less than one month after the 

HKSAR was established on 1 July 1997 – in HKSAR v. Ma Wai Kwan.

34

 This 

case was famous, largely because of what the court said about its lack of com-

petence to review acts of the national legislative organs in Beijing. For our 

present purposes, the case is significant because it also concerned the power 

of Hong Kong courts to review acts of the Hong Kong legislature. In this case, 

the Court of Appeal agreed with the Solicitor General who represented the 

HKSAR government, that since Hong Kong courts had before 1997 enjoyed 

the power to review the constitutionality of local legislation, and art. 19 of 

the HKBL enabled them to retain their former jurisdiction, the courts of the 

HKSAR have the ‘power to determine the constitutionality of SAR-made laws 

vis-à-vis the Basic Law’.

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 The proposition that Hong Kong courts have this 

power has never been challenged by any party in subsequent cases. Thus Ma 

Wai Kwan paved the way for subsequent decisions by the Hong Kong courts 

exercising the power of judicial review of SAR laws alleged to be inconsistent 

[2015] 1 WLR 1591 (UKSC). See generally, Mark Elliott and Hanna Wilberg, ‘Modern Exten-

sions of Substantive Review: A Survey of Themes in Taggart’s Work and in the Wider Literature’  

in Hanna Wilberg and Mark Elliott (eds.), The Scope and Intensity of Substantive Review: 

Traversing Taggart’s Rainbow (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015) 19–40; and Jeffrey Jowell, ‘Pro-

portionality and Unreasonableness: Neither Merger Nor Takeover’, in 

ibid

., 41–59.

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As well as on the basis that the impugned legislation in question had been repealed by the 

Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance Section 3 in 1991, the non-adoption of that provision by 

the NPCSC under the Decision of 23 February 1997 notwithstanding; see HKSAR v. Lam 

Kwong Wai (2006) 9 HKCFAR 574, [59] (per Sir Anthony Mason NPJ).

34 

[1997] HKLRD 761, [1997] HKC 315.

35 

[1997] 2 HKC 315 at 351.

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The Constitutional Orders of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ 

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with the HKBL. The Ma Wai Kwan case may thus be regarded as the Marbury 

v. Madison of the constitutional history of the HKSAR.

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The judicial power to strike down statutory provisions determined by the 

HKSAR court to be unconstitutional was exercised for the first time in the 

landmark decision in January 1999 of the CFA in the case of Ng Ka Ling v.