xxii •
Editor’s Introduction
manufacturing is solely a matter of detail, these little things develop, when
added together, into very big things.
Myriad forms of waste that were previously invisible become imme-
diately obvious to anybody who has learned the Ford thought process.
Recognition of waste or muda (Japanese for futility, uselessness, idleness) is
a prerequisite for its removal, and the Ford culture
apparently taught all its
workers how to recognize waste on sight. Many if not most waste reduction
projects resulted from workers’ identification of waste, and this reinforces
the need for worker engagement and buy-in. Norwood (1931, Chapter X)
uses the phrase “it worried the men,” with “it” being material waste, such as
chips from machining operations, more than once
to describe the process
of “converting waste into millions.” The millions were in the money of the
early 1930s, when dollar coins were still made from silver.
Bennett (1951, pp. 32–33) meanwhile describes how Ford himself pointed
to rust in a pile of slag and objected immediately to the waste of valuable
iron. Ford noticed something, in this case rust, that was seemingly very
trivial, but that actually indicated a significant loss of money.
This story
anticipates the modern concept of dumpster diving, or examination of
everything that the factory throws away, to identify waste.
Ford’s Holmesian powers of observation, which are easily teachable to
an entire workforce, also apply to waste of time. Consider Ford’s statement
about railroads in Chapter 16: “A car on a siding is … a great big question
mark.” A rail car that is not in motion is either adding lead time to its
cargo or
is else an idle capital asset, but how many people pay attention
to rail cars on sidings? How many people pay attention if a factory worker
walks to get parts, or bends over at the waist? Ford, or anybody who had
worked for a few weeks in one of his factories, would on the other hand
notice the waste motion immediately. The same
applies to the accumula-
tion of parts on a conveyor or a work slide; this indicated a stoppage at the
subsequent workstation. The Ford workforce could even recognize activi-
ties that a value stream analysis would call “processes” and, therefore,
value-adding, but were actually 100% rework.
This kind of thinking, in turn, resulted in enormous reductions of
cycle time and inventory. Ford even went so far
as to do successfully what
Goldratt and Cox (1992) showed to be impossible; he operated a balanced
factory at close to 100% capacity. Chapters 5 and 10 will demonstrate that
he achieved this through the suppression of almost all variation in pro-
cessing and material transfer times.
Editor’s Introduction • xxiii
Meanwhile, it is useful, again because Ford and his co-author Samuel
Crowther did not organize their material like
that in a modern business
book or textbook, to cite the most important chapters and their content.
The purely autobiographical material is interesting, but the reader can
probably skip it without missing anything vital. Other portions of the
book, and especially those that illustrate Ford’s universal code, deserve
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