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4.3. The Basmachis after Enver
The Basmachi resistance did not cease after Enver’s death. Although it lost its
efficiency and continued to maintain the resistance in low-density after 1924, it
succeeded in existing until the early 1930s. For a while, Haji Sami, a Turkish official
and a friend of Enver, continued to lead the Basmachi units after Enver’s death and
after a while, he left Turkistan. Although the advantage of rebels was to be able to
266
Ibid, 179.
267
Allworth, Edward et al.,
Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule
, ed. Edward Allworth,(New
York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 252.
268
Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans.,
Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in
Central Asia
, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 179.
269
Ibid, 179.
103
pass across Afghan border and collect power to launch anti-attack, their strategy
collapsed after the Afghan revolution in 1928. The new Afghan regime allowed the
Soviets to operate across the border to sweep the rebels. With the capture of Ibrahim
Lakai Beg, the prominent Basmachi commander in 1931, the movement received an
irreparable wound and quickly weakened.
270
In addition Junaid Khan had to give up
the fight. Although he resisted for more than 8 years from his withdrawal to the
Karakum desert in January 1920 to September 1928, he was forced to withdraw to
Iran. Then, he had to pass to Afghanistan due to the Iran’s pressure for his guards to
disarm.
271
He was not captured but he was almost eighty-year old when he was
retired somewhere near Herat in Afghanistan, so he did not get into any operating
action anymore.
272
Towards the end of 1920s and early 1930s, the Soviet regime took
a range of efficient precautions against revolts in Fergana and Bashkiria. For
instance, Bashkurds were exposed to artificial famine and disease and they were
forced to leave their lands to Russian settlers. Many of them were driven to
mountains and the Steppe. The Soviet regime punished them in the peace era more
heavily than in the era of war.
273
In addition, different methods in terms of military
struggle were applied for the suppression of the movement. For example, the war
prisoners were sent to Turkistan region for being used against resistance. According
to Hayit, the Red army in Turkistan including war prisoners consisted of 106,000
soldiers in 1918-19. The war prisoners, named as internationalist legions comprised
% 16 of the Soviet army in Turkistan.
274
In 1920, Muslim soldiers were also
270
Caroe, Olaf,
Soviet Empire:
The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism,
(New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1967), 127.
271
Andican, Ahad,
Cedidizm’den Bagimsizliga Haricte TURKISTAN MUCADELESI
, (Istanbul:Emre
Yayinlari, 2003), 214.
272
Ibid, 214.
273
Caroe, Olaf,
Soviet Empire:
The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism,
(New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1967), 129.
274
Hayit, Baymirza
, Basmacilar: Turkistan Milli Mucadele Tarihi (1917-1934),
(Turkiye Diyanet
Vakfi Yayinlari, 1997), 310.
104
recruited in Turkistan by force. This policy of recruitment of Muslim soldiers was
implemented to gain superiority upon Muslim resisting Basmachi groups
.
275
“The
Red Army, swollen by Muslim recruits, embarked upon an intensive propaganda
campaign among the population, presenting the Basmachis as brigands-brigands who
were weak and doomed to imminent defeat”.
276
The policy aimed to propaganda
among Muslims against Basmachis, gaining reliance of Muslim public through these
Muslim legions. The real aim was to benefit from Turkestan Muslims in terms of
propaganda among public against rebels.
277
The Soviet policies after the suppression
for Basmachi revolts in Muslim regions developed a different method for softening
relations with the peoples in Central Asian Muslim lands. The Turkic Bureau of the
Russian Communist Party Central Committee and the Turkic Commission made
some reforms for winning the Muslim communities back. The confiscated waqf
lands were returned to the religious charities, the madrasas and religious schools
were allowed to open again.
278
“In economic terms, the New Economic Policy (NEP)
made it possible to relax the situation of the Muslims; private business was
reestablished; and the requisition of cotton and foodstuffs that had enraged the
Muslim was ended.”
279
After these appeasement policies of the Soviets in early
1920s, the tension decreased and revolts began weakening in spite of not ending
completely. But, after 1923 it gave signs that the rebels’ endeavor to struggle was
lessening and people came to the position of quitting resisting against the ruling
275
Hayit, Baymirza
, Basmacilar: Turkistan Milli Mucadele Tarihi (1917-1934),
(Turkiye Diyanet
Vakfi Yayinlari,1997), 311-312.
276
Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans.,
Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in
Central Asia
, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 179.
277
Hayit, Baymirza
, Basmacilar: Turkistan Milli Mucadele Tarihi (1917-1934),
(Turkiye Diyanet
Vakfi Yayinlari, 1997), 312.
278
Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans.,
Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in
Central Asia
, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 180.
279
Ibid, 180.
105
authority anymore, thus the region was in process of integration with the Soviet
Union.
280
As a conclusion, the importance of the Basmachi movement was its creation
of common epic for all Central Asian Muslims which enabled all the elements of
Turkistan including the tribes of Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazakh and Kirghiz, the
intellectuals, Afghans and West Turk officials like Enver and Jemal for a single aim,
an over-all resistance against the Soviets despite comprising varied groups. It was
even a fact that an over-all and common resistance like that had not broken out since
the Shaibani Khan’s time in the 16
th
century. On the other hand, the movement
created disadvantage for Central Asians, because of causing Russians armies to
discover, take control and penetrate every part of the region in the Red Army’s
military operations, from the mountains of eastern Bukhara to the regions along the
Chinese and Afghan frontiers.
281
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