68
T H E O R Y
mer turns to Emmanuel Levinas, who provides warrant for the second,
unhkeiy possibility that the novel is a defense o f difference, a defense of
the view that presuming to contain or “to understand the Other willfully
ignores the mystery o f his Saying.” The structure o f the novel, by allowing
that saying, “holds out a hope: the possibility o f recognition— on a read
ing from this geographic remove— even if the promise is betrayed by the
man called Vargas Llosa.”’ *
How striking that to permit a reading o f this book as a novel with
political implications rather than the political statement o f the man Vargas
Llosa, Doris Sommer requires what she suddenly names as a “geographic
remove,” the move with which the novel begins! All the more reason to
think, as the opening o f the novel itself suggests, that the reader the book
addresses is not, perhaps, the educated Peruvian intent on evaluating the
political statement or reading it like a newspaper but the reader at some
geographic remove, who picks up a new novel by a well-known novelist.
V
In the chapter on Vargas Llosa in The Spectre o f Comparisons Ander
son summarizes his original hypothesis about the historic role o f the novel:
In Imagined Communities I argued that the historical appearance of the novel-as-
popular-commodity and the rise of nation-ness were intimately related. Both na
tion and novel were spawned by the simultaneity made possible by clock-derived,
man-made “homogeneous empty time,” and thereafter, of Society understood as
a bounded intrahistorical entity. All this opened the way for the human beings to
imagine large, cross-generational, sharply delineated communities, composed of
people mostly unknown to one another, and to understand these communities as
gliding endlessly towards a limitless future. The novelty of the novel as a literary
form lay in its capacity to represent synchronically this bounded, intrahistorical
society-with-a-future {Spectre, 334).
His basic claim, he reminds us, was based on the form o f the novel. But
this linking o f novel and nation led to the assumption “that the novel
would always be capable o f representing, at different levels, the reality and
truth o f the nation”— an easy assumption since, for instance, “Balzac’s La
Comédie humaine (which is really, if the expression be excused. La Comédie
38. Ibid., 130.
The Novel and the Nation
6
9
jrançaise), the huge oeuvre o f Zola, and even that o f Proust, provide us
with incomparable accounts o f the France o f their time” {Spectre, 334). He
then lists various reasons why, in the second half o f the twentieth century,
the affinities between novel and nation become strained, including the di
vision o f the novel into subgenres— gothic, crime novel, etc.— “each with
its own conventions and audiences which are by no means necessarily the
fellow nationals o f the author” {Spectre, 335). Anderson is scrupulous in
distinguishing between the formal argument about the formal representa
tion o f time and space in the novel and the fact that, at “different levels,”
particular traditional novels provide a convincing representation o f the so
ciety o f a nation. But his own choice o f examples, Rizal and Balzac, with
their national content, has encouraged critics to assume that the decisive
factor is the novel’s representation o f the nation.
Anderson’s own remark about subgenres and national audiences
shows how easy it is to pass without noticing it from one sort of argument
to another— to a different argument that may be highly contestable. It is
only from the vantage point o f a twentieth- or twenty-first-century reader
that the nineteenth-century novel looks “unified” in a national way, with
out subgenres and without international audiences. Just by way o f indica
tion— this is a subject that would require much fuller discussion and doc
umentation— Franco Moretti’s lively brief chapter on “Narrative Markets”
notes the dominance in nineteenth-century Europe o f the subgenres o f the
historical novel, the sensation novel, and the sentimental novel, whose au
diences were international:
the great successes of the nineteenth century: Scott, Bulwer-Lytton, most of Dick
ens, and sensation novels from the British sample; sentimental novels, Dumas, Sue
and Hugo from the French one. It is a regular and monotonous pattern: all of Eu
rope reading the same books, with the same enthusiasm, and roughly in the same
years (when not months). All of Europe unified by a desire, not for “realism” (the
mediocre fortune of Stendhal and Balzac leaves no doubts on this point)— not for
realism but for . . . “the melodramatic imagination” : a rhetoric of stark contrasts
that is present a bit everywhere and is perfected by Dumas and Sue, (and Verdi),
who are the most popular writers of the day.^^
39.
Moretti, Atlas o f the European Novel, 176-77. In fact, this quotation (“all
of Europe reading the same books”) exaggerates what Moretti’s data show, for he
goes on to describe the uneven diffusion of British and French novels, for exam
ple. But the central points remain: niche markets are not a twentieth-century in
vention, and the audiences are international, not simply national.
70
T H E O R Y
When we are discussing the audience for novels, we need to avoid un
warranted presumptions about both the novels’ address— the readerly role
they construct— and their actual audiences. It seems to me very likely that
in both cases the link between novel and nation will prove weaker than
those who cite Anderson’s authority are inclined to assume.
The power o f Anderson’s thesis about the novel is to make the form
o f the novel— in particular its construction o f a narrative audience— a
condition o f imagining the nation: a structural condition o f possibility.
Critics, who are interested in the plots, themes, and imaginative worlds o f
particular novels, have tended to transform that thesis into a claim about
the way some novels, by their contents, help to encourage, shape, justify,
or legitimate the nation— a different claim, though one o f considerable in
terest. The fact that Anderson’s own examples involve some slippage from
one claim to the other helps to explain the critical reception but does not
excuse it. Literary critics in particular ought to be skilled at distinguishing
an argument about the implications and consequences o f a literary form
from claims about the effects o f particular sorts o f plots and thematic rep
resentations.
The distinction between the novel as condition o f possibility o f
imagining the nation (the form o f the novel as condition o f possibility of
the imagined communities that are nations) and the role o f novels in shap
ing or legitimating the nation needs to be maintained, not only for greater
theoretical rigor and perspicacity but also for the force o f the argument.
When there is slippage from an argument about conditions o f possibility
to one about the effects o f certain novelistic representations, the argument
may become richer and more specific in some respects but also consider
ably weaker, vastly more dubious.
If, for instance, we ask what made Britons “Britons,” it is more plau
sible to answer “war with France” than “Jane Austen.” The historian Lin
da Colley writes that “we can plausibly regard Great Britain as an invent
ed nation. . . . It was an invention forged above all by war.”'^“ “Imagining
the French as their vile opposites,” Britons “defined themselves against the
French as they imagined them to be, superstitious, militarist, decadent
and unfree.”'*' The differential construction o f identity makes the opposi
tions Protestant versus Catholic and British versus French into the princi-
40. Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, iyoi-18^1 (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1992), 5.
41. Ibid., 368, 5.
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