The Literary in Theory
39
So far I have approached my subject by discussing some forms that
the theorization o f the literary has taken in recent theoretical discourses.
But one could also argue that what has happened to the literary in theory is
that it has migrated from being the object o f theory to being the quality of
theory itself: what we in America call “theory”— after all, an American in
vention— is elsewhere the broad movement o f modern thought that takes
as its “other” instrumental reason and empirical science (some other names
for this other are the restricted economy o f utility, the logic o f enframing,
the logic o f reification and reifying rationality, the totalizing logic o f tech
nological efficiency, the binary logic o f the metaphysics o f presence, and so
on).*^ What if theory is the exfoliation, in the sphere o f thought in general,
o f the literary? Freud, notoriously, said that the poets had been there before
him; he tried to found a science on literary insights, and his critics have in
our day tried with some success to beat him back into the position o f failed
scientist and successful storyteller. More generally, one could say that in
sofar as thought seeks to find passages beyond the familiar, the known, the
countable, it is cognate with the literature, or at least the literary efforts, o f
romanticism and modernism.
One striking signal o f this is that philosophical texts have become lit
erary in the classic sense that, like poems, they are not supposed to be para
phrased. To paraphrase is to miss what is essential. People often say this o f
Derrida, o f course, but here is Adorno, a philosopher not usually identified
with the literary: In Negative Dialectics Adorno writes.
Instead of reducing philosophy to categories, one would in a sense have to compose
it first. Its course must be a ceaseless self-renewal, by its own strength as well as
in
friction with whatever standard it may have. The crux is what happened in it, not a
thesis or a position, the texture, not the deductive or inductive course of one-track
minds. Essentially, therefore, philosophy is not expoundable. If it were, it would be
superfluous; the fact that most of it can be expounded speaks against it.'®
17. I am indebted for some of these formulations, as for the quotations
from Adorno below, to a remarkable doctoral dissertation by Robert Baker, “Po
etic Form, Poetic Fiction, and the Way of Extravagance: Twentieth-Century In
ventions” (Cornell University, 1997). A radically revised version of this dissertation
was published as The Extravagant: Crossings o f Modern Poetry and Modern Philoso
phy (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), see esp. 33-38.
18. Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York;
Continuum, 1973), 33.
This is a literary way o f conceiving philosophy— philosophy as writing
that achieves literary effects This is not to imply that exposition o f such
texts is not necessary or desirable— only that such texts also require the
kind o f rhetorical readings and the contextual analysis as acts, as perfor
mances, that we take for granted when engaging literary works and, thus,
that the literary has migrated into theory.
Insofar as theory is the discourse that seeks the opening o f the sub
ject to the nonidentical, to alterity, the other, the indeterminate, or some
other site or event beyond instrumental reason, it inscribes itself in the lit
erary lineage o f post-Enlightenment poetry. An eloquent passage in M ini
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