Preface to the second edition

of Pakistan
55. Ibid.
56. N.V. Gadgil, Government from Inside, p. 12.
57. Ibid., pp. 16-7.
58. Incidentally, it may be poined out that after Independence, it was not Prime Minister Nehru, but the Home Minister Patel, who remained in charge of the Services. This was, in a way, a continuation of the pre-Independence position, when under the British Viceroy, the Home Member was in charge of the Services. In Pakistan, Establishment Division (as well as Intelligence Bureau) was soon taken over by the Prime Minister from the Home Minister, but in India the old position continued with the result that except for matters which came up to the Cabient-and there also Patel had his ’•group” membeis (e.g. Gadgil) to support his point of view-Patel rather than Nehru had the effective control of the administrative machinery. Little wonder that Ranadive, the communist leader, told Kanji Dwarkadas on 9 January 1948 that the ”Nehru Government had gone very weak and that Vallabhbhai was in sole charge” and added, ”Nehru is now only a mask for Vallabhbhai” (Kanji Dwarkadas, Ten Years to Freedom, p. 260). The actual position was even worse. As Dwarkadas brings out in connection with the puzzling behaviour of the Indian authorities after one attempt at Mahatma Gandhi’s assassination had been made and details of conspiracy had become known, that ”the R S.S. had infiltrated inside the Central Government’s and Bombay Government’s police” (ibid., p. 270) and that ”Delhi’s Deputy Commissioner who was primarily responsible for Gandhi’s safety was notorious for his pro-R.S.S. inclinations. It is also known that R.S.S men had entered into the police ranks in Delhi in very large numbers (ibid., p. 271). The Deputy Commissioner of Delhi and many police officers-particular!} in the Intelligence Branch -were Sikhs from the Punjab, who were particularly bitter regarding the Partition and its aftermath. These people were Patel’s ”eyes and ears” and the ”indomitable Sardar” was, in a way, the instrument of these embittered, hate-driven bureaucrats until Mahatma Gandhi’s assassination gave him a shock from which he never really recovered.
59. Gadgil, op. cit., p. 17.
60. Campbell-Johnson, op. cit., p. 70. It is true that at this stage Mount batten wanted ”that the representatives of Pakistan and Hindustan should come together on the basis of parity” and said, ”My object is to create the effect of the two sovereign states or separate blocks negotiating at the Centre rather than having a system of majority vote” (p. 71).
61. Ibid., p. 132.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid. p. 23.
64. Campbell-Johnson’s version is riddled with contradictions. His own narrative shpws that the Quaid made his own counter-proposal for three governors-general in May (p. 115). Still he talks of ”Jinnah’s last minute
Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad All Jinnah
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rejection of the joint governor-generalship” (p. 258) and to crown all, in (he Epilogue of his book, makes the astounding statement, ”Provision was made in the [Indian Independence] Act on Mr. Jinnah’s suggestion [italics ours], for Lord Mountbatten to be Governor-General of both Dominions” (p. 355). The statement is manifestly incorrect. (To the same category belong the statements he attributes to the Quaid in favour of Mountbatten on the basis of hearsay in the footnote at page 230 of his book. The Quaid’s assessment of Mountbatten was manifest in May 1947, when he politely and indirectly refused to have him as Governor-General of Pakistan.)
65. Mounlbatten left New Delhi for London on 18 May and returned on

31 May.
66. Rushbrook-Williams, op. cit., p. 30.

67. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnab, Speeches as Governor-General of Pakistan, 1947-48, p. 34.
68. Ibid., p. 59.
69. Menon, op. cit., p. 418.
70. Ibid., p. 419. K.L. Panjabi, the biographer of Patel, builds on the foundation laid by Menon. but adds another story. After mixing up the sequence of events like Menon, and linking, like G. D. Khosla, the postPartition trouble with events at ”Calcutta, Noakhali, Bihar, Lahore, Amritsar and Rawalpindi” (relating really to March 1947, or much earlier), he says, ”In this explosive atmosphere a fresh spark was lighted by the Radcliff Award, defining the boundary between India and Pakistan and allotting Gurdaspur to India. Pakistan screamed that this was vile injustice perpetrated by a conspiracy between Radcliff and Mountbatten. ’Let us have our revenge,’ said the mob. Widespread trouble broke out in West Punjab. Hindus and Sikhs fled from the villages to the cities but could find no protection. They were looted, tortured and killed like helpless sheep under the knife of a butcher. The news of these atrocities flashed to East Punjab where the Hindus reacted with equal ferocity” (vide K. L. Panjabi, The Indomitable Sardar, p. 127).
71. This is not the only instance of tendentious and misleading statements made by Menon. John Connel refers to his ”biased and inaccurate” reasoning in another connection (Connel, op. cit., p.’,883). Penderel Moon gives an instance in which Menon disowned a statement which he had made in presence of Moon and other witnesses, as it did not suit Government of India. (See footnote at p. 177 of Divide and Quit.) CampbellJohnson’s book contains a gist of Menon’s advice to Mountbatten on several points (e.g. at p. 191) and his bias is easily visible. It is also worth noting that although at the end of 1946 or the beginning of 1947, this Constitutional Adviser to the Viceroy worked out arrangements with Patel destructive of
the Cabinet Mission Plan, which then held the field officially, neither he njo Patel informed Nehru of this step. (See Connel, op. cit., p. 883.)
72. Mosley, op. cit., p. 235.

446 ] Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan

73. Ibid., p. 211.
74. Ibid., pp. 216-7.
75. P. Moon, op. cit., p. 116.
16. Pyarelal, op. cit.. Vol. II, p. 384.
77. Moon, op. cit., p. 31.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid., pp. 279-80. For an authoritative exposition of Master Tara Sing’s strategy, see the leading article in the (Akali newspaper) A jit, Amritsar,

22 December 1947. The concluding lines confirm Pendrel Moon’s thesis.

80. Campbell-Johnson, op. cit., pp. 174-5.
81. Pyarelal, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 386.
82. Possibly this dual strategy was adopted to provide a basis for ”a Sikh state to be carved out of two dominions” (1967).
83. G.D. Khosla, Stern Reckoning, p. 290.
84. As an example of elaborate arrangements made in Sikh villages in the Muslim areas, see the statement of Lambardar Sant Singh on pp. 158-9 of Khosla, op. cit.
85. In relation to happenings in East Punjab names of General Mohan Singh aad Col. Niranjan Singh Gill were freely mentioned. The latter told Andrew Roth, a foreign correspondent, that a civil war to prevent the Muslim secession would have been preferable to acceptance of Partition. ”The United States fought a civil war to prevent the secession of the South,” he added.
86. Khosla, op. cit., p. 128.
87. For an elaborate tribute to Agha Abdul Hamid by a Sikh eye-witness, see Balwant Singh Anand’s Cruel Interlude, pp. 66-7, etc.
88. We failed to get confirmation of a statement he makes about an alleged post-Partition incident at Sialkot, and trustworthy observers have contested much of what G.D. Khosla has accepted, on the basis of the refugees’ statements. Such statements were also recorded by an organisation set up by West Punjab Government with regard to happenings in East Punjab but have not been published. It is said that Prime Minister Nehru was opposed to the publication of the material used by G.D. Khosla.
The Sikh version of the events, compiled by Principal Gurbachan Singh Talib is entitled Muslim League Attack on Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab,

1947. The basic pattern is that of Khosla’s Stern Reckoning, with some additional statements and arguments. No attempt has been made to deal with the accounts of the foreign correspondents and neutral observers. Perhaps, a more fruitful approach might have been to show that the entire community was not infected by the criminal madness of the period. Indeed, this side of the picture has been totally ignored by the agencies set up in India and Pakistan ”to collect data”. (The only exception we have come across is an Urdu book Angaron Men Phool by Bhagat Ishar Das Seth, now of Chandigarh [Punjab, India] who has described the happenings in Dera
Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad All Jinnah
[ 447
Ghazi Khan very objectively and has done full justice to the efforts made by the British Deputy Commissioner, the Muslim Superintendent of Police and other police officials and Muslim gentry to protect every Hindu in the town, of Dera Ghazi Khan and to effectively deal with all attempts at lawlessness in distant places.) And yet even now some glimmers of light are visible in the murky darkness. To take the case of the Sikhs, in the biography of Maulana Habib-ur-Rahman Ludhianavi one comes across two names which deserve to be mentioned with respect. One was Prabha, daughter of Dr Mitter Singh, Medical Officer, Ludhiana, who visited Maulana’s family in their hour of peril, offered every help and undertook the safe custody of the ”sacks” of Maulana’s correspondence files, which contained much material of his»orical importance (pp. 310-1). The other was Babu Bachan Singh, Advocate, who worked so energetically to curb the mob violence and protect the Muslims that bis own life was in danger and on the request of his Muslim friends he had to be evacuated from Ludhiana to Delhi (p. 303). No less honourable was that unnamed Sikh of Amritsar who warned his leftist friend Sufi Ghulam Muhammad Turk about the impending attack on the huge Muslim refugee camp in Sharifpura (Amritsar), and made it possibleto take precautionary measures and frustrate the attempt (vide Ghulam Qadir Farrukh, Khun ki Holi, pp. 65 and 67).
89. Entitled Rais-ul-Ahrar Maulana Habib-ur-Rahman Ludhianvi aur Jangi-Azadi by Aziz-ur-Rahman Ludhianavi.
90. Mosley, op. cit., pp. 189, 215-6, 245-6.
91. Ibid., pp. 219-20.
92. Ibid., p. 203.
93. Ibid., p. 225.
94. Pyarelal, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 362.
95. Ibid., p. 363.
96. Penderel Moon, op. cit., p. 77. It seems to have escaped genera* notice that Sikhs had been making preparations for succeeding the British in the Punjab from a much earlier date-in fact, from 1940! A post-Partition Urdu publication, Sikh-Muslim Tarikh, issued by the Institute of Islamic Culture, Club Road.’Lahore, reproduces (pp. 167-8) a statement of Master Tara Singh which appeared in the Punjabi journal, Panj Dariya, in December 1945, He said, ”When in 1940, France was defeated by Germany, there was nervousness here; people thought that the British too would be defeated. I also had this possibility before me. . . . With this idea we used to discuss things amongst us. We organised Jathas, and made arrangements by which Sikhs could gather quickly at some places. In our plans Lahore occupied a speci u place. We felt that there would not be much difficulty in taking possessi a of the city of Amritsar, and made arrangements so that Jathas of Sikhs cculd simultaneously attack Lahore from all four directions.” He added (>at absconding and armed murderers were being given shelter in the Sikh Gurdawaras so that ”in case there was disorder in the country, these 448 ] Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan

peradoes may prove useful,” and said, ”The second charge against Akalis was of giving shelter to Sardar Harbans Singh, and it was correct, but its •object wai the same, viz. to save Punjab from falling under Muslim domination” (translated from Urdu).
97. Khosla, op. cu., p. 100.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid., p. 101.
100. Penderel Moon, op. cit., p 71.
101. Ibid., p. 73.
102. Hugh Tinker, Experiment with Fieedom, p. 97.
103. Abdul Wahid Qureshi, Tarikhi Faisla, pp. 246-8.
104. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Final Phase of the Struggle for Pakistan, pp. 94-5.
105. Penderel Moon, op. cit., p. 212.
106. This friend of the Sikhs, after thirty years,’ service in trie Punjab, could not correctly spell ”Giam” or for the matter of that, ”Kartar Singh,” which he consistently spelt ”Khartar Singh” (vide Mosley, op. cit., p. 205).
107. Quoted by Mosley, op. cit., p. 212.
108. Quoted by Ian Stephens, op. cit., p. 173.
109. Mosley, op. cit., p. 215.
110. Ismay was not the only prominent Englishman to find fault with the handling of affairs in the Punjab. Lt. General Tuker, G.O.C. Eastern Command, presumably bearing in mind the beneficial results of firm measures adopted in Calcutta in 1946 wrote, ”Military Government of even a limited area would have saved the Punjab in 1947” (op. cit., p. 130). A more detailed criticism appeared in the Manchester Guardian dated 31 August 1947. It has been reproduced at length by Tuker in his above-named book, pp.

450-1.
111. Mosley, op cit., pp. 215-6.

112. Campbell-Johnson, op. cit., p. 149. Curiously enough, Nehru’s name is not mentioned among the participants.
113. D. F. Karaka, Betrayal in India, p. 64. Probably L. Dhanwantari was the old revolutionary who was convicted in the Lahore Conspiracy Case (in 1928?). From an account of an interview which the representatives of Muslim refugees in Sharifpura camp had with Pandit Nehru during his visit to Amritsar on 23 August, 1947 in appears that Dhanwantri was responsible for saving the life of Dr Saif-ud-Din Kitchlu (vide Dastan-i-Turk by Sufi Gbulam Muhammad Turk, p. 94).
114. Punjab ki Khiini Dastan, p. 7. The Deputy Commissioner of Sheikhupura (C. H. Disney) was an Anglo-Indian. When the liberal leader, Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru, issued a statement alleging ”that a British officer had been responsible for not preventing a large number of casualties at Sheikhupura,” Mountbatten rang up Nehru and protested that the statement was ”both untrue and libellous”. Ultimately, Nehru was persuaded to issue a statement ”based on reliable evidence which categorically denies that the
Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad AH Jinnah
[ 449
culprit at Sheikhupura was of British nationality” (Campbell-Johnson, op. cit., p. 206). What Nehru stated was strictly and quantitatively a halftruth’. [Incidentally Superintendent of Police, Sheikhupura, was also an Anglo-Indian.]
115. Punjab ki Khuni Dastan, p. 8.
116. .Moon, op. cit., p. 72.
117. J. W. Spain, The Pathan Borderland, p. 197.
! 18. Khosla records instances of thib hippening elsewhere. He relates with regard to Jaranwala, where trouble broke ^ut on 8 September, ”The next morning the Muslims announced that the Sikhs would not be allowed to live in Jaranwala. On bearing this many Sikhs had their beards cut as they believed that a Hindu appearance would ensure their safety” (Khosla, op. cit., p. 167).
119. Punjab ki Khuni Dastan. pp. 8-9.
120. D.F. Karaka, op. cit., pp. 47-8.
121. Humphrey Evans, Thimayya of India-A Soldier’s Life, p. 250.
122. Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Millat Liaqaat All Khan (Research Society of Pakistan, Lahore, 1967), p. 209.
123. Mrs. Satya M. Rai, Partition of the Punjab, p. 62.
124. Not only did the general option given to the government officials leave the minorities unprotected, but the official exodus also stimulated general migration. It may be interesting to read the observations of Sri Prakasa, the first Indian High Commissioner in Pakistan. He says in his Pakistan-Birth and Early Days (p. 37) :
The partition of the country of 1947 presented the strange spectacle of such vast exoduses for political reasons for perhaps the first time in our history. It all began with the servants of the Central Government. They had been given the right to opt either for India or Pakistan. I do not know if those who agreed to this condition, realised that Central Government servants did not only consist of high officers-executive and judicial-but also the humblest peon in the office and the sweeper at the railway station.
125. Ian Stephens, op. cit. (1st Edn.), p. 183. After this the lives of the Muslim policemen were in danger, and in any case, they could give no help in maintaining law and order. Many of them must have taken early steps to escape to Pakistan. Judge Khosla blames these disarmed policemen for throwing the machinery of law and order ”completely out of gear, by largescale desertions” (op. cit., p. 278).
126. The administrative dislocation in the area constituting East Punjab may be judged by the fact that against its pre-Partition police force of 20,672, it had only 7185 ”effectives” (Satya M. Rai, op. cit., p. 95).
127. Penderel Moon, op. cit., p. 14.
128. Brecher, op. cit., p. 377.
129. Sunday Standard (Bombay), 26 April 1959. [The letter has now been reproduced in Kanji Dwarkadas, Ten Years to Freedom, pp. 207-8].
130. For a United India-Speeches of Sardar Patel, 1947-50 (Publ’cation

29

450 ] Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan

Division, New Delhi), Revised Edition, 1967, p. 125.
131. Ibid., p. 127. .
132. Wilfrid Russel, Indian Summer (Thacker & Co.), p. 109.
133. A Manuben Gandhi, Last Glimpses of Bapu, p. 303.
134. Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan (published by Research Society of Pakistan, Lahore), p. 125.
135. Ibid., p. 126.
136. Ibid., p. 129.
137. Moon, op. cit., p. 14.
138. In spite of his many solid gifts and achievements, Sardar Patel was a man of amazingly narrow outlook. There is a well-known anecdote, giving his disdainful reference to Nehru’s interest in foreign affairs. ”Indonesia, Indonesia, let me see-where is Indonesia ? You better ask Jawabarlal about that” (Brecber, op. cit., p. 432). Patel was quite capable of saying, ”Iqbal ? Who is Iqbal?” In 1931 while presiding at the annual session of All-India National Congress, he said something, and proudly added, ”The foregoing shows you how uninterested I am in many things that interest the intelligentsia” (quoted by Brecher, op. cit., p. 392).
139. Menon, op. cit., p. 442.
140. John Connel, op. cit., pp. 920-4.
141. Penderel Moon, op. cit., p. 115.
142. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Speeches as Governor-General of Pakistan (1947-48), p. 23.
143. Ibid., p. 23.
144. Ibid., pp. 32-3.
145. See Arnold J. Toynbee, Between Onus and Jumna, pp. 153-9. His main conclusion after a study on the spot is, ”Pakistan does pursue a Forward Policy on the frontier, and a vigorous one, but its key-instruments are not weapons of war; they are dispensaries, hospitals, schools, sports, and above all, economic development” (p. 155).
146. M. S.M. Sharma, Peeps into Pakistan, p. 1.
147. ’Hugh Tinker, for example, writes, ”he [Jinnah] emerges as perhaps the greatest tactician of all, British, Hindu, or Muslim” (op. cit., p. 161).
148. Campbell-Johnson, op. cit., pp. 115, 116.
149. Ibid., p. 93.
150. Ibid., p. 94.
151. Ibid., p. 125.
152. One hears occasional complaints that Pakistan did not come to the aid of Hyderabad at the time of the so-called Police Action. Of course, the Quaid was not alive at that time. India waited for the news of his death before moving her troops, but.’the caution with which the Quaid made promises can be seen even in this case. K.M. Munshi, who was India’s Agent-General at Hyderabad at this time, quotes Nawab Ali Yavar Jang’s book, Hyderabad in Retrospect, to say that when in July 1947, the Nawab of Chhatari asked the Quaid whether
Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah
[ 451
Pakistan would ”come to the help of Hyderabad if it was faced by an ultimatum from India?” ”No,” said Mr Jinnah as emphatically as ever, ”Pakistan cannot help with material aid” (vide K.M. Munshi, The End of an Era, Hyderabad Memories, p. 54). Later, ”when the Ittehad leaders talked of making preparations to fight India, he [Nawab of Chhatari] again approached Mr. Jinnah to inquire whether he could spare any arms for Hyderabad. ’Not a gun,’ replied the Quaid-i-Azam” (ibid., p. 55).
153. Quoted in Jamil-ud-Din Ahmed, op. cit., p. 109.
154. Sir Mirza Ismail, My Public Life, p. 100.
155. M.S.M. Sharma, op. cit., pp. 134-5.
156. Ibid., p. 172.
157. Bolitho, op. cit., p. 95.
158. Sharma, op. cit., p. 182.
159. Sharma’s story appears substantially correct. Apart from the replies to our oral inquiries, we have come across a front-page story in the Dawn, Karachi, of 26 April 1947, which must have been inspired. The headlines were ”All-INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE TO BE WOUND UP, PAKISTAN NATIONAL LEAGUE, OPEN TO ALL, PROPOSED TO REPLACE IT.” The item was given as from Dawn’s Lahore correspondent, but that might have been possibly to cover up ihe true source. It is worth noting in this connection that East Bengal Muslim League leaders, with whom the editor of Dawn was closely associated, were opposed to the proposal. The Dawn for 7 December 1947 carried an item headed ”Bengal Muslim League’s Strong Protest Against AIML Dissolution” and contained the report of a meeting of the Working Committee of the Bengal Muslim League urging that ”no decision in favour of winding up the Muslim League Organization, especially in Eastern Pakistan, will ever be accepted by them”. This view prevailed at the League session. The Quaid, as a democrat, accepted the decision but as a statesman he realised that an organisation whose membership was not open to one crore of population could not become fully representative of the nation. While accepting the decision, he, therefore, kept the door open for the future. The Working Committee of the Bengal League had based its opposition on a ”study of the psychology of the Muslims of Eastern Pakistan”, but the first general election fought in the province-in 1954-showed how feeble was their hold over the province !
160. Dawn, 20 December 1947.
161. Hector Bolitho, op. cit., pp. 213-4.
162. Ibid., pp. 21-2.
163. Khaliquzzaman, op. cit., p 211.
164. The Memoirs of Ago Khan, p. 296.
165. Muslim League memorandum has been given by Khaliquzzaman at pp. 352-3 of his book, as also by Ram Gopal (p. 309). The latter has expressed keen regret that although now ”difference between the proposals of the League and the Congress was one of degree only,” the gesture from the

452 ] Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan

League was not reciprocated. ”The League had now to choose between the two alternatives, i.e. to have its truncated Pakistan, or to accept the Congress concept of the future constitution of India” (pp. 310-1).
166. Sharma, op. cit., p. 90.
167. John W. Wheeler-Bennet, King George VI, His Life and Reign, p. 708.
168. C.R. Attlee, op. cit., p. 215.
169. Menon, op. cit., p. 437.
170. Hector Bolitho, op. cit., p. 181.
171. Sachin Sen, The Birth of Pakistan, p. 192. Sen refers to the problems of minorities in ”the two countries, but if the relations between the two governments were on a statesmanlike basis, the position of the minorities would improve, and they could become a source of strength and a link in promoting Indo-Pakistan co-operation.
172. For the Quaid’s historic statement and Nehru’s observations, see Appendix II.
173. We are indebted for this quotation to Mr N. M. Khan who has collected much valuable material for a biography of H.S. Suhrawardy.
174. Sir Lovat Fraser, India Under Curzon and After, p. 384. Fraser also dealt with the question of common Bengali nationhood at p. 385 of his book. He said, ”The ’Bengali nation’ argument was, however, never worth considering ; the province of Bengal, as we have known it, was entirely the creation of the British; the very language in which literary Bengalis clothe their thoughts was created under the stimulus of British influence and modern Bengali prose is scarcely forty years old (p. 388).