Politics Disad – Jackson-Vanik

***AT Impact Turns***

JV Good—AT Weakness Turn

Repeal won’t be appeasement

Adamonis 3/15

Mark, 25-year old writer based in Washington DC who holds degrees in Russian studies from both Harvard and Oxford, It's Time to End the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2012/03/15/its-time-to-end-the-jackson-vanik-amendment/

But in the hysterically ideological world of democracy promotion, things are quite a lot more complicated. As David Kramer, the head of Freedom House, said at an event sponsored by the Foreign Policy Initiative: “Politically, in light of the environment in Russia, which has been deteriorating, to simply lift Jackson-Vanik without some replacement would be viewed in Moscow and Russian leadership as a sign of weakness on the part of the United States — again, that we need this relationship more than they do. And if we don’t replace it, then we would, in their minds, be rewarding them despite their bad behavior by not going after them. To me, this has to be a package deal.” This is, to put it mildly, a rather curious mindset. Jackson-Vanik is a self evidently absurd law: if we’re going to keep it on the books we might as well have sanctions against Italy for its cruel occupation of Abyssinia or Japan for its misbehavior in Manchukuo. It is worth re-emphasizing, again, that Jackson-Vanik is designed to remedy a malady that no longer exists. The Soviet Union’s strict control over emigration is on history’s ash heap and Russian citizens are today perfectly free to emigrate if they so desire.* How is it “weakness” to repeal a law that everyone, even hard-core Putin opponents like Garry Kasparov, Alexey Navalny, and Boris Nemtosv, agrees is absurd? How is it “weakness” to recognize that American interests are better served by sustained economic engagement with Russia as opposed to needless confrontation? How could normalized trade relations and marginally expanded bilateral economic activity, the results of Jackson-Vanik repeal, possibly weaken Russian civil society and the middle class which is increasingly an opponent of Putin and his regime?** Rather than “weakness” the Obama administration’s decision to push for the repeal of Jackson-Vanik demonstrates an admirable clarity of purpose and an even more admirable willingness to ignore the opinions of people like David Kramer. Kramer has been opposed to the reset from the very beginning, and he never misses a chance to argue for a Russia policy that prominently features intransigent demands and hectoring lectures. Kramer wants tensions with Russia because, from his perspective, Russian interests are basically illegitimate. It’s thus not at all surprising to see that he is doing his very best to scuttle what could very easily be a win-win situation that would move the US Russian relationship onto a slightly stronger foundation.

AT HR Impact Turns

Jackson Vanik is irrelevant to solve Human Rights concerns, other mechanisms solve.

Borschchevskaya, 11

Anna Borshchevskaya 12/16/11 “What's Next for Russia and Putin?“ is Assistant Director, Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council. http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/12/16/whats-next-for-russia-and-putin/#ixzz1iKsOy33R

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is expected to approve Russia’s bid for entry during its conference at the end of this week (December 15-17). While the United States can benefit from Russia’s WTO accession, it can only do so if it grants Russia normal trade relations status. This requires repealing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment which, since 1975, has required freedom of emigration in Russia in order for the United States to offer Russia most favored nation status— equal treatment in trade. Congress should repeal Jackson-Vanik, but embrace its spirit, and exert pressure on Russia to address its human rights problems through other mechanisms, and do this publically. This could include, for example, passage of legislation sanctioning senior Russian officials responsible for human rights abuses by freezing their U.S. assets, and publically naming these officials. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s call for full investigation after Russia’s Duma election results were announced, and her denunciation of the elections were “neither free nor fair” was the right response. A similar response should come from President Obama. Linking aid to human rights reform could be another tool. The United States has given Russia billions of dollars in aid since 1992 and continues aid in tens of millions each year. Jackson-Vanik was one of the most powerful "soft power" tools of the Cold war, and its success showed that human rights advocacy can advance U.S. interests; but Jackson-Vanik has lost much of its relevancy after the Cold War. Every U.S. president since Bill Clinton has supported repealing it, as Russia’s emigration policies had changed after the Cold War. The White House therefore regularly granted Russia a waiver from the Amendment’s provisions after an annual review, which certified that Russia meets minimal emigration standards. Today’s Russia is not the Soviet Union, and Russia no longer restricts the emigration of its citizens the way it did in the Soviet era. However, human rights are still poor in Russia—this has not improved since the Soviet era. The State Department’s annual human rights report criticizes the Russian government for severe corruption, torture, and lack of rule of law and due process. Russia continues to be one of the worst when it comes to press freedom.

Business benefits will trump congressional human rights concerns.

David C. Speedie 2/3/12 Russia Bulletin, Issue 2 February 3, 2012 http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/russia_bulletin/00002

We've spoken of this before: the superannuated Cold War legislative relic that punished the Soviet Union for [a] being a non-free market economy and [b] restricting Jewish emigration. While both of these causes for sanction have manifestly disappeared (quite apart that the punitive measures now illogically apply to a different country, Russia) the Jackson-Vanik Amendment remains on the books, for unabashedly political, rather than economic reasons. What is remarkable here is that everyone on the political spectrum, from those to the left of the White House to arch-Cold warrior Richard Perle, agrees that Jackson-Vanik should be consigned to the rubbish heap of history. In one of the few references to Russia in his January 25 State of the Union address, President Obama called for "permanent normal trade relations with Russia," adding: "This Congress should make sure that no foreign company has an advantage over American manufacturing when it comes to accessing finance or new markets like Russia." So why the delay in doing the right thing? Ever alert to the possibilities for domestic political point scoring, some members of Congress are intent on playing the human rights card at Russia's expense. Thus, Jackson-Vanik repeal may be held hostage to a replacement law, as it were. This would be the Magnitsky Law, and would impose travel bans on Russian officials suspected of involvement in the mysterious death in prison of human rights lawyer Sergei Magnitsky. While one obviously hopes that this will be fully investigated-in, by, and for Russia-such questions arise as: Who are these officials? How wide is the net? And just a thought: if our elected representatives are thus stirred by human rights issues and their relation to trade, perhaps they should look into the case of Mr. Liu Xiaobo and seek similar sanctions on Chinese officials. In the end, Jackson-Vanik should be, and is, an economic, not a political issue. For this reason, the merits of the case must be argued by the business community and not be left entirely to our sage Congress. The U.S.-Russia Business Council has taken a welcome lead, enlisting such others as the Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in a full-court press to put the issue before the key Congressional committees.

Chechen terrorism eradicated

Rotar ‘9

Igor Rotar, “Extremist Agony”, Defense and Security, August 5, 2009, LN

The latest terrorist acts smear the image of the stable Chechnya the authorities go to great length to create. Grozny itself has been built anew. These days, it is probably the nicest republican capital in all of the Caucasus. Construction of skyscrapers is under way. Highways are built all over Chechnya. In fact, the colossal sums the federal center invested in restoration of the republic are having their effect. It is a rare Chechen who supports separatists, these days. According to Shatoi District Intelligence Chief Yuri Shatun, gunmen nowadays number only about 120 men, no more, and their bases are located high in the mountains. Shatun called the terrorist acts "agony". "Backbone of resistance in Chechnya is broken. It is not going to be an exaggeration to say that Chechnya will soon become one of the most tranquil regions in the Caucasus. Unfortunately, this is no cause for joy because the war is shifting to the nearby republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia," Shatun said.

No nuclear terror short of a Russian invasion

Bale ‘4

Jeffrey M. Bale, Senior Research Associate, Monterey Institute of International Studies, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, April 2004, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_47a.html

What, then, is the likelihood that Chechen fighters will carry out acts of radiological and nuclear terrorism, and which Chechens and/or foreign volunteers are most likely to do so? One potentially troubling scenario has been envisaged by Simon Saradzhyan. He believes that Chechen military leaders, perhaps irrespective of their ideological predispositions, might resort to carrying out radiological or (weapons of mass destruction) WMD attacks once they become sufficiently exasperated or desperate. Indeed, he seems to believe that they have already reached this state of mind.[23] According to this scheme, the most likely causative factor for future unconventional attacks would be the growing conviction among Chechen leaders like Basayev and Maskhadov that they will never be able to expel Russian troops through the use of conventional military tactics. In the absence of all other military options, they may therefore feel it necessary to up the ante. The problem with this scenario is that if they did so they would risk exposing themselves and indeed all of Chechnya to an unimaginably horrible retaliation by the Russians, possibly including an attack with tactical nuclear weapons. In the final analysis, how many Chechens would really be willing to risk total annihilation in order to hasten the departure of the Russians from their homeland? One could imagine them taking such a risky and extreme action if the Russians were already on the verge of annihilating them, but other than as an absolute last resort this scenario seems rather unlikely. One may object that the Russians were previously pressured to make concessions in the wake of high profile Chechen terrorist actions and military successes. After all, they agreed to negotiate with Basayev in Budennovsk and felt constrained to pull out of Chechnya following the sudden recapture of Groznyy by Maskhadov’s forces in 1996. On the other hand, the Russian government has adopted an even harder public line every time the Chechens have threatened to carry out acts of CBRN terrorism in Russian cities. Surely Basayev, who personally conveyed many of those threats, must be aware of how ineffective and counterproductive his prior nuclear and radiological blackmail efforts turned out to be. Any act of catastrophic terrorism on Russian soil by Chechens would likely infuriate the Russians and result in a devastating counterstrike against Chechnya, which may well suffice to dissuade normal Chechen patriots and nationalists from carrying out such an action.