sui generis
, and any theory
of Roman imperialism needs to be able to account for this war
as well as other, more straightforward episodes. Three points are
particularly worth noting. The first is the complexity of decision-
making in Rome, and hence the difficulty for modern historians in
divining the motives behind decisions. A straightforward narrative
of events in which ‘the senate decided’ or ‘the Romans resolved’
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22
ThE roman EmpIrE
conceals the extent to which there was debate, perhaps serious
debate, about the decision to undertake any particular war, and
about whether or not to annex a particular territory after victory.
In the case of the final war on Carthage we find an apparent conflict
between the assertions of Greek historians like Polybius and Appian
that ‘the senate’ had long since resolved to make war on Carthage
and was simply waiting for a pretext, and the account of Cato’s
role in obsessively promoting an anti-Carthaginian policy at every
opportunity. At the very least there seems to be a disagreement
about timing and tactics – Polybius suggested that ‘their disputes
with each other about the effect on foreign opinion very nearly
made them desist from going to war’ (36.2) – but perhaps there was
disagreement about more fundamental matters of strategy. The issue
of Roman motivation is complicated further by the complexity of
its political system, with different elements having different powers
and remits, each being able on occasion to press the others into
supporting their wishes:
Now the elements by which the Roman constitution was
controlled were three in number, all of which I have mentioned
before, and all the aspects of the administration were, taken
separately, so fairly and so suitably ordered and regulated through
the agency of these three elements that it was impossible even
for the Romans themselves to declare with certainty whether the
whole system was an aristocracy, a democracy or a monarchy.
In fact it was quite natural that this should be so, for if we were
to fix our eyes only on the power of the consuls, the constitution
might give the impression of being completely monarchical and
royal; if we confined our attention to the senate it would seem
to be aristocratic; and if we looked at the power of the people it
would appear to be a clear example of a democracy.
(Polybius,
Histories
, 6.11.11–12)
It should be noted further that while ‘the senate’ (or ‘the Roman
elite’) can often be thought of as a unified bloc dedicated to the
maintenance of its own power and interests against the mass of
the population, it was in practice riven with factions and rivalries.
Insofar as the senate showing any signs of coherent organisation,
rather than simply being a collection of individuals focused on
their own interests, the dividing lines were between ill-defined
groups connected by ties of kinship, friendship or advantage, not
between parties united around beliefs or political programmes. The
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ThE dynamIcs of roman ImpErIalIsm
23
study of Roman imperialism is not the study of the explicit and
univocal policy of a government or ruler, or of their concealed but
fully conscious ambitions, but of the structures that shaped the
decisions taken by the individuals in the senate, the magistrates and
the people of Rome over the course of centuries. The cumulative
result is clear enough, but it is entirely plausible that it developed
from a combination of different motives and interests, irrational
as well as rational, and that the eloquence of an individual speaker
might at times be as significant in determining the course of events
as the interests of a larger group. Under the Principate, the decision-
making process became simpler, resting on the judgement or whim
of an individual emperor under the influence of different advisors –
and it is striking that there is significantly less disagreement amongst
historians about the nature of Roman rule over the Empire than
about the process by which the bulk of the Empire was acquired.
The second significant point is the possibility that Roman
imperialism changed over time, and not simply with the end of
large-scale expansionism under Augustus. Certainly the Third Punic
War was interpreted by some contemporary Greeks as representing
a change in approach; Polybius reports them as ‘saying that far
from maintaining the principles by which they [the Romans] had
won their supremacy, they were little by little deserting it for a lust
of domination like that of Athens and Sparta’ (37.1). Some Roman
authors, looking back from the political disorder of the first century
BCE, saw the war as the moment when they had lost the favour
of the gods by acting unjustly. In more material terms, the success
of Roman imperialism changed the conditions under which future
wars took place. Their armies came to operate over increasingly
large areas and different sorts of terrain, creating new problems
of logistics, communication and the supervision of generals; they
encountered new kinds of opponents, from the city states of
southern Italy, Sicily and Greece to the empires of Carthage and
Macedon, and the disordered tribes of Spain, Gaul and Germany.
At the same time Rome itself changed, and thus the context of
decision-making: the influx of wealth altered the workings of the
political system and the balance between its different components,
while the relationship between Rome and her allies, and between
the citizen population and the army, were affected by dramatic
changes in the economy and society of Italy as it became the centre
of a Mediterranean-wide empire.
18
There were sufficient continuities
in the structures that shaped Roman imperialism to continue to
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ThE roman EmpIrE
think of it as a single phenomenon, as will be discussed below, but
it was never entirely uniform.
The third point relates to our sources. It is not simply that, as
in the history of many other empires, we have to rely primarily on
the accounts of the imperialists themselves with scarcely anything
from the perspective of the conquered and colonised; in the case
of the Roman Empire we have a significant number of important
accounts from Greek writers, who reached an accommodation with
Rome early on but nevertheless do offer an alternative perspective.
19
Rather, it is the fact that most accounts of the growth of Roman
power were written in retrospect, from the perspective of the crises
of the last century of the Republic or from the vantage point of the
new monarchical order established after the civil wars by Augustus.
Roman histories of their Empire are not simply or invariably
self-serving and justificatory – indeed, they offer some remarkable
denunciations of Roman imperialism that have been quoted by
opponents of empire ever since – but they do naturally interpret
the past according to present concerns and in the service of present
needs. Sallust’s account of Roman imperialism before and after the
defeat of Carthage, written around 42 BCE, offers an example:
And so the power of the republic increased through diligence and
justice. Powerful kings were vanquished, savage tribes and huge
nations were brought down; and when Carthage, Rome’s imperial
rival, had been destroyed, every land and sea lay open to Rome.
It was then that fortune turned unkind and confounded all of
Rome’s enterprises. To the men who had so easily endured toil
and peril, anxiety and adversity, the leisure and riches which are
generally regarded as so desirable proved a burden and a curse.
Growing avarice, and the lust for power which followed it, gave
birth to every kind of evil. Avarice destroyed honour, integrity
and every other virtue, and instead taught men to be proud and
cruel, to neglect religion and to hold nothing too sacred to sell.
(Sallust,
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