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THE CHOICE BETWEEN CABLE AND HYDRAULICS
In the trajectory map of Figure 3.3, when hydraulics technology became capable of addressing the
bucket-size needs of sewer and piping contractors (and a similar trajectory could be sketched for arm-
reach), the competitive dynamics in the industry changed, and the mainstream excavation contractors
changed the criteria by which they purchased their equipment. Even today, the cable-actuated
architecture can attain much longer reach and greater lift than can hydraulic excavators: They have
roughly parallel technology trajectories. But once both cable- and hydraulics-actuated systems could
satisfy mainstream market requirements, excavation contractors could no longer base their choice of
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equipment on which had longer reach and greater bucket capacity. Both were good enough, and the fact
that cable was better ceased to have competitive relevance.
Contractors found, however, that hydraulic machines were much less prone to breakdowns than cable-
actuated excavators. In particular, those who had experienced the life-threatening snap of a cable while
hefting a heavy bucket embraced reliable hydraulics quickly, as soon as it was capable of doing the job.
Once both technologies were good enough in the basic capabilities demanded, therefore, the basis of
product choice in the market shifted to reliability. Sewer and piping contractors began adopting
hydraulic equipment rapidly beginning in the early 1960s, and general excavation contractors followed
later in the decade.
CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE HYDRAULICS ERUPTION
What went wrong within the companies that made cable-actuated excavators? Clearly, with the benefit
of hindsight, they should have invested in hydraulics machines and embedded that piece of their
organizations charged with making hydraulic products in the value network that needed them. But the
dilemma in managing the disruptive technology in the heat of the battle is that nothing went wrong
inside these companies. Hydraulics was a technology that their customers didn’t need—indeed,
couldn’t use. Each cable shovel manufacturer was one of at least twenty manufacturers doing
everything they could to steal each other’s customers: If they took their eyes off their customers’ next-
generation needs, existing business would have been put at risk. Moreover, developing bigger, better,
and faster cable excavators to steal share from existing competitors constituted a much more obvious
opportunity for profitable growth than did a venture into hydraulic backhoes, given how small the
backhoe market was when it appeared in the 1950s. So, as we have seen before, these companies did
not fail because the technology wasn’t available. They did not fail because they lacked information
about hydraulics or how to use it; indeed, the best of them used it as soon as it could help their
customers. They did not fail because management was sleepy or arrogant. They failed because
hydraulics didn’t make sense—until it was too late.
The patterns of success and failure we see among firms faced with sustaining and disruptive technology
change are a natural or systematic result of good managerial decisions. That is, in fact, why disruptive
technologies confront innovators with such a dilemma. Working harder, being smarter, investing more
aggressively, and listening more astutely to customers are all solutions to the problems posed by new
sustaining technologies. But these paradigms of sound management are useless—even
counterproductive, in many instances—when dealing with disruptive technology.
NOTES
1.
A summary of how this same mechanism might have affected a broader range of industries can be
found in Richard S. Rosenbloom and Clayton M. Christensen, “Technological Discontinuities,
Organizational Capabilities, and Strategic Commitments,” Industrial and Corporate Change (3), 1994,
655-686.
2.
This information and the data used to calculate the graphs in this section were provided by Dimitrie
Toth, Jr., and Keith Haddock, both National Directors of the Historical Construction Equipment
Association. The association has a wealth of information about the earthmoving equipment industry in
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its archives, and Toth and Haddock were most gracious in sharing their knowledge and information
with me. I am also indebted to them for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. Other
useful sources of information are Peter Grimshaw, Excavators (Poole, England: Blandford Press,
1985); The Olyslager Organisation, Inc., Earthmoving Vehicles (London: Frederick Warne & Co., Ltd.,
1972); Harold F. Williamson and Kenneth H. Myers, Designed for Digging: The First 75 Years of
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