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8.2.3. Biomedical emotion modulation and moral review
A further question to be raised is the question of whether biomedically-induced
strong inclinations specifically abolish moral review. I do not think that the mere
presence of a strong impulse or inclination does so, and so one cannot justifiably
infer from the presence of a strong and even behaviourally effective impulse that
the moral review is impaired. I have argued that for those MB attempts that would
indeed induce strong compulsions, the argument that MB abolishes moral review
in
virtue of
its compulsion-inducing effects fails.
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Despite my best and prolonged effort to find such data.
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However, there are two further arguments to consider before we conclude that
biomedical MB does not threaten moral review to an unacceptable degree. The first
argument may be derived especially from the observation that strong passions
profoundly distort our view of things if they are strong. In anger or jealousy, for
example, when the red mist comes down over the eyes, and we can feel the blood
pulsing in our temples, things look other than the way they are and our emotions
can mislead us profoundly. In his treatise on anger,
De Ira
, Seneka warned about
the potential outcome of intense emotions in general and anger specifically:
‘Anger, I say, has this evil: it refuses to be governed. It rages
at truth itself, if truth appears to conflict with its wishes.
With shouting, turmoil and a shaking of its entire body, it
makes for those whom it has earmarked, showering them
with abuse and curses.’ (Seneca, 1995, 19.1).
But perhaps it is not the kind of emotion, but rather its strength, that clouds
judgement and precludes the agent from acting according to reason. Could then MB
lead to agents who, although moved to action by a benevolent emotion, are in the
red (or perhaps… pastel pink?) mist of empathy? Chan and Harris, for example,
have argued that if oxytocin or serotonin induced strong feelings, they would impair
judgement (Chan and Harris, 2011).
But what are we concerned about here exactly? We regularly experience emotions
clouding our judgement in the moment. In Wordsworth's (1815)
Surprised by Joy
,
the narrator recalls emotions evoked by a memory of his deceased child:
Surprised by joy – impatient as the wind
I turned to share the transport – Oh! With whom
But thee, long buried in the silent tomb,
That spot which no vicissitude can find?
Love, faithful love, recalled thee to my mind –
But how could I forget thee? - Through what power,
Even for the least division of an hour,
Have I been so beguiled as to be blind
To my most grievous loss? – That thought's return
Was the worse pang that sorrow ever bore,
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Save one, one only, when I stood forlorn,
Knowing my heart's best treasure was no more;
That neither present time nor years unborn
Could to my sight that heavenly face restore.
As the narrator is experiencing ‘the worse pang of sorrow ever bore,’ we probably
would not ask him to make decisions that require calm reasoning at that moment.
But he is not incapacitated in his life for having experienced that feeling once or
even regularly. In fact, the feelings of joy, guilt and sorrow reveal something about
what is important to the narrator. Save for the times when grief is overpowering
over a long period, the presence of temporary strong emotions simply speaks to
what we care about and does not make us generally incapable of rational action or
pursuing our life plans. It might lead to re-evaluation of priorities but does not
preclude self-governance.
Even if MB produced pangs of temporarily incapacitating empathy as its side
effect, that would not be to the absolute peril of rational agency. Perhaps we would
ask ourselves ‘through what power … have I been so beguiled as to be blind’ to the
suffering of the starving and dying millions. I do not say that such pangs are what
morality is all about, nor even that it would necessarily produce the behavioural
effects that Savulescu and Persson (2008) hope for. In the end, as Rousseau pointed
out, the pity aroused by a tragic drama can be nothing more than a ‘transitory and
fruitless emotion, which lasts no longer than the emotion producing it. … A barren
compassion indulging itself in a few tears but never productive of any act of
humanity’ (p. 34) and so can be the pangs of biomedically induced sympathy or
compassion. But should we decide for other reasons that emotion modulation is
something we wish to pursue, perhaps the impairment of rationality coming as a
result of occasionally ‘clouded judgement’ as side effect is not something to be
gravely concerned about, and, to the extent that the feelings are endorsed, perhaps it
would bring our attention to something we do – or perhaps even ought to – care
about.
MB cannot have the strong ‘vice abolishing’ effects that Savulescu and Persson
(2008, 2012) are after, in part because most commonly even strong emotions can be
regulated and acted against. But this also means that the arguments against the
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ethical permissibility of MB lose some of their edge – the effects of MB are also
subject to the regulation of affect and even strong affect and presence of
compulsions can leave the ability for offline moral review and rational agency
intact. If MB is proposed to indeed act though by-passing judgment and regulation
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