Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

prima facie
reason to discuss the 
potential for biomedical modification for the purposes of making better moral 
agents. 
Chapter 3 considered whether or not biomedically increasing pro-social emotions 
and attitudes such as empathy would likely better moral agency. I argued that 
biomedical modification of affective capacities and reactions, such as increasing 
empathy or decreasing anger, is not sufficient to make us better moral agents. The 
equivocation of the moral and the pro-social is unjustified for three main reasons. 
Firstly, anger and empathy are multi-purpose and a modification in each can lead 
both to morally desirable and undesirable outcomes. For example, modification of 
empathy could be conducive to moral outcomes but could also lead to empathetic 
distress, a state rarely conducive to good outcomes and harmful to the agent. 
Secondly, even where biomedical emotion modulation would lead to better moral 
outcomes, it does matter that the behavioural change relates in a right way to the 
moral reasons we have. As a result, creating moral agents requires that the change 
of abilities is appropriately embedded in agents’ reflection about the good.
Chapter 4 enquired about the way in which the presence of moral disagreement 
affects the application of MB. If moral enhancement aimed at aiding moral agency 
needs to be connected to agent’s moral reasons and ideas of the good, and since 

---

232 
agents’ beliefs of what is good may differ, one can raise an objection that moral 
disagreement undermines the moral enhancement project. Section 4.1 explored the 
limitation of the scope of the argument that MB may be implausible in the presence 
of moral disagreement. In section 4.3 I examined the implications of fundamental 
moral disagreement for MB and argued that although moral disagreement may pose 
a challenge for evaluation of MB applications, there is no reason to favour the 
status quo 
in the outcome of this deliberation.
After looking at the sources of moral disagreement and implications of fundamental 
moral disagreement for the MB project, I argued that even the presence of 
fundamental moral disagreement does not mean that we should abandon out moral 
beliefs and pursue our moral projects. The axiological difference may create some 
problems in evaluation of whether a purported improvement in moral agency 
indeed achieves this goal, but on practical level such differences are usually 
accommodated by the political process. Moreover, there is no good reason to favour 
the 
status quo, 
as the same disagreement can exist about the current level of traits 
potentially modifiable by MB. I concluded that although moral disagreement may 
pose a challenge for evaluation of MB applications, it does not give us a strong 
reason to forgo MB generally, and enhancing moral agency using biomedical 
means specifically,
Further chapters explored concerns that even if effective MB is plausible, it is not 
desirable. Chapter 5 examined objections related to medicalization and asked 
whether using specifically biomedical means of moral modification gives rise to a 
strong ethical reason to forgo using MB. After examining arguments brought 
forward by critics of medicalization, I argued that the process of medicalization is 
in itself normatively neutral, and only acquires meaning on the basis of what 
medicalization allows us to do and what costs it brings with it. To provide some 
counterweight to the outlined criticism, I discussed the benefits of seeing a problem 
as medical and argue that medicalization of an issue is desirable where it better 
allows us to get what we want. I concluded that the general critique of 
medicalization fail to give us a strong reason to forgo MB, and that the assessment 
of whether medicalizing a certain trait of function should be done on case-by-case 
basis.

---

233 
Chapter 6 explored the concerns raised in relation to identity and aimed to examine 
whether or not narrative identity theories can ground a strong ethical objection to 
MB. I examined Schechtman’s objection to deep brain stimulation and argued that 
her account is insufficient to ground the critique she makes. In search of another 
account that better outlines what is specifically ‘narrative’ about narrative identity, I 
examined the potential of Ricoeur’s theory to ground ethical evaluation of MB. I 
concluded that the same what makes Ricoeur’s narrative identity specifically 
narrative, the criterion of homophony, problematically relates to claims about what 
we should (ethically speaking) do. I extended this examination to a more general 
critique of the 
strong ethical narrative
thesis and concluded that narrative identity 
theories face serious problems in providing ethical action-guiding reasons.
The last two chapters discussed the impact of MB on freedom and agency. Chapter 
7 asked to what extent issues raised in relation to freedom in the discussion of 
Savulescu and Persson’s (2012a) thought experiment called the God Machine call 
the desirability of MB into doubt. Using a series of thought experiments to tease out 
exactly in what way the God Machine could endanger freedom (various cases of 
overdetermination of agents actions), in sections 7.3-7.5 I have argued that the main 
problem with the God Machine is that it breaks the link between agents own 
reasons for action and the outcome in the world. Section 7.3 explicated the issues in 
relation to moral luck and prise and blame, section 7.4 used Frankfurtian analysis in 
order to argue that an important aspect of the God Machine’s threat to freedom lies 
not in endangering free will generally but rather by undermining specifically the 
ability to form a 
will of our own
. In section 7.5 argued that the problem does not 
necessarily lie in the fact that the God Machine is a case of overdetermination, and 
that the more plausible uses of MB that involve overdetermination would be 
significantly less problematic. In section 7.6 I examined Sparrow’s (2014) objection 
in the context of freedom as non-domination and argued that non-domination theory 
of freedom is ill fitted to ground a robust critique. In section 7.7 I used an analysis 
of the application of Mill’s harm principle and argued that the God Machine would 
be an undesirable way of achieving a morally better world because it might 
adversely affect the way the desires and inclinations for action are formed. This 
discussion shed light on the factors that are to be considered when evaluating the 
impact of MB on moral agency. However, I have argued that the conclusions taken 

---

234 
from the consideration of the God Machine thought experiment can only bring our 
attention potentially important aspects, but due to the degree of abstraction and 
important differences between the God Machine and MB, the arguments related to 
the God Machine should be transferred with much caution to the ethical assessment 
of real-world MB. I have concluded that the arguments raised in relation to the God 
Machine thought experiment fail to call the desirability of real world, hopefully 
voluntary and agent led MB into doubt.
Chapter 8 discussed issues arising in plausible applications of MB in order to 
examine whether real-world MB would endanger or could also facilitate moral 
agency. In order to answer this question, I critically examined Harris’ (2011) 
objection that MB would be beyond moral review. Using the example of obsessive-
compulsive disorder, I argued that even biomedically induced compulsions would 
not necessarily be beyond online and, more importantly, offline moral review. 
Consequently, real-world MB would likely allow further moral deliberation about 
the effects of MB. Further, I considered MB in the context of an Aristotelian 
framework, and argued that the limitations of self-control mean that effective moral 
agency could be aided by the modification of dispositions. In so far as MB offers 
the possibility to modify dispositions and emotions and would be embedded in 
appropriate moral reflection, it can result in enhancing moral agency. 

---

235