51
i.e. import or export business, which is of importance for the national economy, or
if the relations between the two states
are tense of other reasons, an objection
might not be an alternative. The objecting state has to decide if whether the
objection is worth making, or not, considering the risks it involves. This is, though,
an issue one should consult the social science and/or economy scholars in order
to receive an adequate answer. What I have given are only a few ideas that to me
seem feasible deliberations of the objecting state during
the process of reaching a
decision on the matter.
I hope to have shown the three different aspects of articles 19-23 of the Vienna
Convention: compatibility, acceptability and the legal effects (of both reservations
and objections). To sum up, it must be assumed that any reservation is either
compatible or incompatible. State parties have
to react to any reservation, and
they have two alternatives: accepting it or objecting to it. The States will also have
to decide on the legal effects of their response to the reservation. Acceptance
(whether explicit or tacit) will lead to entry into force of the treaty between the
concerned states, while objection may or may not lead to entry into force,
depending on the will of the objecting state.
This all seems quite logical, but there are some complications.
For instance, it is
possible for States to object to reservations that are compatible with the object
and purpose of the treaty, as it is possible for the states to accept incompatible
reservations. The reasons for States to choose to accept some and object to
others are often extralegal, that is, often politically motivated.
194
Objections are
considered
to be unfriendly acts, which might make States "think twice" before
using it towards another state. Also, there are reasons such as states
misunderstand the meaning of a certain reservation and therefore does not object.
Finally, the time limit in article 20.5 VCLT (which gives states twelve months to
react on a reservation, otherwise the state is considered to have accepted the
reservation) can be an explanation to why a considerable
number of incompatible
reservations are left without reactions from other States.
By the state reports and through comments made by representatives for the
Swedish Government, it is easy to understand that Sweden not only finds it
necessary, but also worthwhile to stay active and examine the contents of
reservations to human rights treaties, and in
cases of deemed inadmissible
reservations, object to them. Fortunately, Sweden is not the only active
“objector”, and it is a well-known fact that the more states that take an interest in
these issues, the more pressure can be placed upon the undesired behaviour. The
Nordic countries have, by means of their “No Benefit” Approach,
if not found the
solution to this difficult and complex issue, introduced a new idea in the debate.
Any such new influence must be seen as a positive step forward in the process,
and welcomed as a petition /notion/ in the quest for the final solution, if such
solution really exists.
194
Clark, pp. 304 and 307 and Ruda, p. 190.