Uppsatsmall doc

7. Concluding Remarks
International law, including human rights law, is primarily applicable to states
rather than to individuals. Consequently, these international rules generally
become a source of domestic legal obligations for a state’s officials and of
domestic rights for that nation's citizens only through their incorporation in some
manner into the state’s own internal law.
International treaties are the most important source of international law, but
treaties are only binding when in force, and only with respect to the nations that
have expressly agreed to become parties to them. The state has also a possibility
of picking and choosing which provisions it wants to be bound by. So, even if five
of the six major human rights treaties are ratified by three-quarters of the UN
member states, these figures conceal the fact that there are hundreds of
reservations to these treaties, which purport to limit the scope of the actual
obligations of the ratifying state.
195
Reservations are to a certain extent the price to
be paid for drafting the human rights treaties in the UN, the price for striving for
universality. Drafting of these instruments takes place on the basis of consensus.
States may not want to disagree with the final result, in spite of disagreeing about
a particular provision. Reservations are the result of the drafting process based
upon the political wishes of majority and compromises.
The Islamic states, for example, that have ratified the human rights treaties, often
only do so with the caveat that assumed obligations must be compatible with the
Islamic law, the Shariah. Criticism against states that have objected to these
reservations have been raised, and the objecting states have been accused of
objecting as a pretext for doctrinaire attacks on Islam, cultural imperialism and
religious intolerance.
196
The Bangladeshi reservation to article 2 of CEDAW is a
“good” example of a reservation lodged by a Muslim state. Such reservations
negate the treaty’s central purpose of identifying overriding international human
rights standards. This widespread practice of states making reservations to
fundamental provisions in the instruments is apparently tolerated, as is the failure
of states generally to fulfil their obligations under the instruments. The international
human rights community has emphasised universal ratification as the primary goal.
Reservations have been tolerated in order to achieve that goal.
195
For example, there are 167 state parties, but 119 reservations and declarations (from 47
States) to CEDAW and 148 state parties, but 166 reservations and declarations (from 48
States) to ICCPR. Source: “Status of Ratifications of Principal International Human Rights
Treaties As of 28 March 2001”, <
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf
> (23 April 2001, at
17.45).
196
Clark, pp. 284 and 288. I have no specific knowledge regarding this, but sincerely hope
that this is not the case.

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53
However, eighty-five percent of all existing multilateral agreements have no
reservations entered, and of the 15 percent that do, most do not relate to
substantive provisions but to dispute resolution provisions. The comparatively high
reservations rate of human rights treaties therefore justifies 
sui generis
treatment
in assessing the reservations regime of the Vienna Convention.
197
Derogations, made possible by the subjective application of the compatibility
criterion, i.e. the states’ right to decide for themselves what reservations they wish
to object to, is a problem, as it strikes at the very purpose of a standard-setting
instrument. The function of legislative treaties is to contribute to world order by
providing regulation and consistency in specific areas. If derogations are
numerous, or if individual derogations are extensive, this function is impaired.
Derogations from human rights instruments are serious because there is no
sanction attached, other than criticism by other states, and therefore no great
disincentive to derogate. In making reservations to reciprocal rights treaties,