particularly not those that include U.S. citizens. On the other hand, it is
very good at attacking and destroying enemy armies. U.S. space forces and
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ground troops will therefore begin focusing on the possibility of confronta
tion with the massed forces along the Mexican border.
A meeting between the two presidents will defuse the situation, as it will
be clear that no one really wants a war. In fact, no one in power will have
wanted the crisis in the Southwest. But the problem is this: during these ne
gotiations, however much both sides want a return to the status quo ante,
the Mexican president will, in effect, be negotiating on behalf of American
citizens of Mexican origin who are living in the United States. To the extent
the crisis is defused, the status of Mexicans in the Mexican Cession is being
discussed. From the moment the discussion turns to defusing the crisis, the
question of who speaks for the Mexicans in the Mexican Cession will be de
cided: it is the president of Mexico.
While the crisis of the 2080s will subside, the underlying issue will not.
The borderland will be in play, and while the Mexicans will not have the
power to impose a military solution, the American government will not
have the ability to impose a social and political solution. The insertion of
American troops into the region, patrolling it as if it were a foreign country,
will have changed the status of the region in the mind of the public. Mexi
can negotiations on behalf of the people of the region will have extended
that change. A radical secessionist movement in the region, heavily funded
by Mexican nationalists, will continually irritate the situation, especially
when splinter terrorist groups begin carrying out occasional bombings and
kidnappings—not only within the Mexican Cession but throughout the
United States. The question of the Mexican conquest will be opened up yet
again. The region will still be part of the United States, but its loyalty will be
loudly questioned by many.
Expelling tens of millions of people will not be an option, as it would be
logistically impossible and would have devastating consequences for the
United States. At the same time, however, the idea that in the region those
who are of Mexican origin are simply citizens of the United States will break
down. Many will no longer see themselves that way, and neither will the rest
of the United States. The political situation will become increasingly radi
calized.
By about 2090, radicals in Mexico will have created a new crisis. In a
change to the Mexican constitution, Mexicans (defined by parentage and
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culture) who live outside of Mexico, regardless of citizenship, will be now
permitted to vote in Mexican elections. More important, Mexican congres
sional districts will be established outside of Mexico, so that Mexicans living
in Argentina, for example, can vote for a representative in the Mexican con
gress, representing Mexicans living in Argentina.
Since so many voters will qualify in the United States—the whole point
of the change after all—the Mexican Cession will be divided into Mexican
congressional districts, so that there might be twenty congressmen from Los
Angeles and five from San Antonio elected to Congress in Mexico City.
Since the Mexican communities will pay for the elections out of private
funds, it is unclear whether this will violate any American law. Certainly,
while there will be rage in the rest of the country, the federal government
will be afraid to interfere. So the election to Congress will go forward in
2090—with Mexicans in the United States voting for both the Congress in
Washington and the Congress in Mexico City. In a few cases, the same per
son will be elected to both congresses. It will be a clever move, putting the
United States on the defensive, with no equivalent countermeasure avail
able.
By the 2090s, the United States will be facing a difficult internal situa
tion, as well as a confrontation with a Mexico that will be arming itself furi
ously, afraid that the United States will try to solve the problem by taking
military measures against it. The Americans will have a tremendous advan
tage in space, but the Mexicans will have an advantage on the ground. The
United States Army won’t be particularly large, and controlling a city like
Los Angeles still will require the basic grunt infantryman.
Groups of Mexican paramilitaries will spring up throughout the region
in response to the U.S. occupation, and will remain in place after the troops
withdraw. With the border heavily militarized on both sides, the possibility
of lines of supply being cut by these paramilitaries, isolating U.S. forces
along the border, won’t be a trivial matter. The United States will be able to
destroy the Mexican army, but that doesn’t mean it could pacify its own
Southwest, or Mexico for that matter. And at the same time, Mexico will
begin to launch its own satellites and build its own unmanned aircraft.
As for the international reaction to this situation, the world will stand
aside and watch. The Mexicans will hope for foreign support, and the
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Brazilians, who will have become a substantial power in their own right, will
make some gestures of solidarity with Mexico. But, while the rest of the
world will secretly hope that Mexico will bloody its neighbor’s nose, no one
is going to get involved in a matter so fundamentally critical to the United
States. Mexico will be alone. Its strategic solution will be to pose a problem
on the American border while other powers challenge the United States
elsewhere. The Poles will have developed serious grievances against the
Americans, while emerging powers like Brazil will be stifled by the limits
placed on them by the United States in space.
The Mexicans won’t be able to fight the United States until they can
reach military parity. Mexico will need a coalition—and building a coalition
will take time. But Mexico will have one enormous advantage: the United
States will be facing internal unrest, which, while not rising to the level of
insurrection, will certainly focus U.S. energies and limit U.S. options. In
vading and defeating Mexico would not solve this problem. It might actu
ally exacerbate it. America’s inability to solve this problem will be Mexico’s
major advantage, and the one that will buy it time.
The U.S. border with Mexico will now run through Mexico itself; its
real, social border will be hundreds of miles north of the legal border. In
deed, even if the United States could defeat Mexico in war, it would not
solve the basic dilemma. The situation will settle into a giant stalemate.
Underneath all of this will be the question that the United States has had
to address almost since its founding: what should be the capital of North
America—Washington or Mexico City? It had appeared likely at first that it
would be the latter. Then centuries later it appeared obvious that it would
be the former. The question will be on the table once again. It can be post
poned, but it can’t be avoided.
It is the same question that faced Spain and France in the seventeenth
century. Spain had reigned supreme for a hundred years, dominating At
lantic Europe and the world until a new power challenged it. Would Spain
or France be supreme? Five hundred years later, at the end of the twenty-
first century, the United States will have dominated for a hundred years.
Now Mexico will be rising. Who will be supreme? The United States will
rule the skies and the seas, but the challenge from Mexico will be on the
ground, and—a challenge only Mexico will be positioned to make—inside
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the borders of the United States. It is the kind of challenge that U.S. mili
tary power will be least suited to fight. Therefore, as the twenty- first century
draws to a close, the question will be: North America is the center of gravity
of the international system, but who will control North America?
That is a question that will have to wait until the twenty- second century.
E P I L O G U E
I
t might seem far-fetched to speculate that a rising Mexico will ultimately
challenge American power, but I suspect that the world we are living in
today would have seemed far-fetched to someone living at the beginning
of the twentieth century. As I said in the introduction to this book, when we
try to predict the future, common sense almost always betrays us—just look
at the startling changes that took place throughout the twentieth century
and try to imagine using common sense to anticipate those things. The
most practical way to imagine the future is to question the expected.
There are people being born today who will live in the twenty- second
century. When I was growing up in the 1950s, the twenty- first century was
an idea associated with science fiction, not a reality in which I would live.
Practical people focus on the next moment and leave the centuries to
dreamers. But the truth is that the twenty- first century has turned out to be
a very practical concern to me. I will spend a good deal of my life in it. And
on the way here, history—its wars, its technological changes, its social trans
formations—has reshaped my life in startling ways. I did not die in a nu
clear war with the Soviets, though I did witness many wars, most of them
unforeseen.
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