revo lu ti on i n en erg y
The American obsession with space will intersect another intensifying prob
lem: energy. During the war, the United States will invest huge amounts of
money to solve the problem of delivering power to the battlefield from
space. It will be uneconomical, primitive, and wasteful, but it will work. It
will power Allied forces in Poland in the face of the Turkish- German inva
sion. The military will see space- based power generation as a solution to its
massive logistical problem on the battlefield. In particular, the delivery of
energy to power new weapons involving intense energy beams will be a crit
ical problem. The military will be prepared, therefore, to underwrite the de
velopment of space- based power generation, as a military necessity, and
Congress will be prepared to pay for it. It will be one of the lessons learned
from the war—and it will instill a sense of urgency into the project.
There are two other episodes in American history that are instructive
here. In 1956, the United States undertook to construct the interstate high
way system. Dwight Eisenhower favored it for military reasons. As a junior
officer he had tried to lead a convoy across the United States—it took
months. In World War II he saw how the Germans had moved entire armies
from the eastern front to the west to launch the Battle of the Bulge using
their autobahns. He was struck by the contrast.
The military reasons for the interstate system were compelling. But the
civilian impacts were both unexpected and unintended. With the time and
cost of transportation reduced, land outside of cities became usable. A mas
sive decentralization of cities took place, leading to suburbs and the distri
bution of industry outside of urban areas. The interstate system reshaped
the United States, and without the military justifications it might not have
been built or seen as economically feasible.
A second example can be drawn from the 1970s, when the military was
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heavily engaged in research. It needed the means to move information
around among different research centers more quickly than it could by
courier or the mails—there was no FedEx. The Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) funded an experiment designed to create a net
work of computers that could communicate data and files to each other at a
distance. The creation was called ARPANET. It was developed at some cost
and effort for a highly specialized use. ARPANET, of course, evolved into
the Internet, and its essential architecture and protocols were designed and
administered by the Department of Defense and its contractors until well
into the 1990s.
As with the automobile superhighways, the information superhighway
might have come about on its own, but it did not. The basic cost of creating
it was a military undertaking designed to solve a problem the military was
experiencing. To push this analogy a bit, the energy superhighway will have
its origins in the same kinds of necessities. It will be built for the military,
and therefore its economics will make it more competitive than other en
ergy sources. Since the military will absorb the basic capital cost and will de
ploy the systems, the commercial cost of this energy will be enormously
lower than it might be otherwise. Cheap energy in the civilian sector will
be critical, particularly as robots become more and more prevalent in the
economy.
Military space programs will, quite literally, reduce the cost of commer
cial endeavors by piggybacking them. Advances in commercial launches
into space will reduce the cost of lifting payload but will never have the ca
pacity to handle a massive project such as the development of space- based
solar power generation. The military program of the 2050s and 2060s will
solve this problem in two ways. First, one of the important parts of the proj
ect will be reducing the cost per pound of payloads. The United States will
be putting a lot of stuff into space and will need to dramatically lower the
price of a launch. Partly through new technology and partly through the
sheer volume being launched, cost will begin to decline dramatically, even
over that of commercial vehicles developed earlier.
Second, there will be surplus capacity built into the system. One of the
lessons of the war will be that not having spare space- lift capacity left the
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United States scrambling to deal with the initial attack. That will not be al
lowed to happen again. So the nation will have a huge surplus of usable lift
capacity. Private sector utilization of the project will be essential to reduce
costs.
The period when the interstate highway system and the Internet came
into being was a period of explosive economic growth. The interstate high
way system stimulated the economy by employing armies of construction
crews and civil engineers, but it was the entrepreneurial spin- offs that really
drove the boom. McDonald’s was as much a creature of the interstate high
way system as was the suburban mall. The Internet’s construction involved
a lot of Cisco servers and PC sales. But the real boom came with Amazon
and iTunes. Both had massive entrepreneurial consequences.
NASA has been involved in research on space- based energy since the
1970s, in the form space solar power (SSP). In the war of the 2050s the
United States will really start using this new system. And in the space- based
energy project of the 2060s, it will become a feature of everyday life. Vast
numbers of photovoltaic cells, designed to convert solar energy into electric
ity, will be placed in geostationary orbit or on the surface of the moon. The
electricity will be converted into microwaves, transmitted to the earth, re
converted to electricity, and distributed through the existing and expanded
electric grid. The number of cells needed could be reduced by concentrating
sunlight using mirrors, thus reducing the cost of launching the photovoltaic
arrays. Obviously, the receivers would have to be installed in isolated areas
on earth, since the localized microwave radiation would be intense, but the
risks would be far less than that from nuclear reactors or from the environ
mental effects of hydrocarbons. One thing that space has available is space.
What would be unbearably intrusive on earth (say, covering an area the size
of New Mexico with solar panels) is swallowed up by the limitlessness of
space. Plus there are no clouds, and collectors can be positioned to receive
continual sunlight.
These advances will lead to reduced energy costs on earth, and thus
many more energy- intensive activities will become feasible. The entrepre
neurial possibilities that emerge will be astounding. Who could have drawn
a line between ARPANET and the iPod? All that can be said is that this sec
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ond wave of innovations will transform things at least as much as the inter
state highway and the Internet did—and bring as much prosperity in the
2060s as the interstate brought in the 1960s, and the Internet in the 2000s.
The United States will also have created another foundation for its geo
political power—it will become the largest energy producer in the world,
with its energy fields protected from attack. Japan and China and most
other countries are going to be energy importers. As the economics of en
ergy shifts, other sources of energy, including hydrocarbons, will become
less attractive. Other countries will not be able to launch their own space-
based systems. For one thing, they will not have a military making the down
payment on the system. Nor will any country have the appetite to challenge
the United States at that moment. An attack on American facilities will be
unthinkable given the now vast imbalance of power. The ability of the
United States to provide much cheaper solar energy will create an additional
lever for the superpower to increase its international dominance.
We will see here a fundamental paradigm shift in geopolitical realities.
Since the start of the industrial revolution, industry has guzzled energy,
which was accidentally and haphazardly distributed around the world. The
Arabian Peninsula, which otherwise had little importance, became crucially
important because of its oil fields. With the shift to space- based systems, in
dustry will produce energy instead of simply consuming it. Space travel will
be the result of industrialization, and an industrialized nation will produce
energy at the same time as it fuels its industry. Space will become more im
portant than Saudi Arabia ever was, and the United States will control it.
A new wave of American- generated culture will sweep the world. Re
member that we define culture not simply as art, but in the broader sense of
how people live their lives. The computer was the most effective introduc
tion to American culture, far more profound than movies or TV. The robot
will represent the computer’s logical and dramatic conclusion. In a world
that needs economic growth but no longer has a surging population, robots
will become the driver of productivity, and with space- based solar systems
there will be ample electricity to power them. Robots, still primitive but de
veloping rapidly, are going to sweep the world, and will be particularly em
braced by the population- constrained advanced industrial world, and by
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countries that will be closing in on the first tier and nearing or passing pop
ulation peaks.
Genetics science will continue to extend life expectancy, and will eradi
cate or bring under control a series of genetic diseases. This will lead to in
creasing social instability. The radical shifts that have wracked Europe and
the United States, transforming the role of women and the structure of the
family, will become a worldwide phenomenon. Deep tensions—between
supporters of traditional values and new social realities—will become in
tense throughout the second- tier countries, and all major religions will be
wracked by them. Catholicism, Confucianism, and Islam will all be arrayed
with traditional understandings of family, sexuality, and the relations be
tween generations. But the traditional values are going to collapse in Europe
and the United States, and they will then collapse throughout most of the
rest of the world.
Politically, this will mean intense internal tensions. The late twenty- first
century will become a period in which tradition tries to contain a medically
and technologically driven upheaval. And since the United States will be the
originator of much of the controversial technology, and its model of internal
social chaos will be becoming the norm, it will become the enemy of tradi
tionalists everywhere. To the rest of the world, America will be seen as dan
gerous, brutish, and treacherous, but it will be treated with caution—and
envied. It will be a time of international stability, regional stress, and inter
nal unrest.
Outside the United States two powers will be thinking about space. One
will be Poland, which will be busy consolidating its land empire and still
smarting at its treatment under the peace treaty of the 2050s. But Poland
will also still be recovering from the war and surrounded by American allies.
It will not be ready for a challenge. The other country thinking about space
will be Mexico, which into the late 2060s will be emerging as one of the top
economic powers in the world. Mexico will see itself as a rival of the United
States, and will be stepping onto the continental and world stage, but it will
not yet have defined a coherent national strategy (and will be afraid of going
too far in challenging American power).
There will be other emerging powers whose economies begin to surge as
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population growth pressures decline. Brazil will be a particularly important
emerging power, a generation behind Mexico in population stability but
moving rapidly in that direction. Brazil will be considering a regional eco
nomic alliance with Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, all of whom will be mak
ing major strides. Brazil will be thinking in terms of peaceful confederation
but, as is often the case, will in due course entertain more aggressive ideas.
The Brazilians will certainly have a space program by the 2060s, but not a
comprehensive one, and not one linked to immediate geopolitical need.
Countries like Israel, India, Korea, and Iran all will have limited space
programs, but none of them is going to have the resources or the motivation
to make a play for substantial space presence, let alone try to deny the
United States space hegemony. Therefore, as happens at the end of global
wars, the United States will have a wide- open shot—and will take it. The
United States will be living in a golden moment, lasting at least until around
2070.
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