s pac e wa r fa re
Regardless of the changes taking place in warfare, there is one thing that re
mains unchanged: the commander on a battlefield must have knowledge of
that battlefield. Even though the global battlefield may be radically different
from the traditional battlefield, the principle of the commander’s knowl
edge remains in place. On a global battlefield, command and control must
be tied together with knowledge of what the enemy is doing and how your
own forces are deployed. The only way to achieve this on a global battle
field, in real time, is from space. An essential principle of warfare has always
been to hold the high ground, on the theory that it provides visibility. The
same idea holds true in global war. The high ground permits visibility, and
here the high ground is space—the area in which reconnaissance platforms
can see the battlefield on a continuous, global basis.
Global war will therefore become space war. This is not by any means a
radical change. Space is already filled with reconnaissance satellites designed
to provide a large number of countries intelligence on what is happening
around the world. For some, particularly the United States, space- based sen
sors are already creating a global battlefield, identifying tactical targets and
calling in air strikes or cruise missiles. The weapons systems have not yet
evolved, but the platforms are already there and moving into maturity.
Space provides line of sight and secure communications. It also provides
clear tracking of hostile objects. Battle management will therefore move
from earth to space as well. There will be space stations—command plat
forms—at various distances out from the earth’s surface, tasked with com
manding robotic and manned systems on land and at sea as they evade
enemy attack, conduct operations, and attack enemy platforms.
Blinding one’s enemy, then, would mean destroying the space- based sys
tems that allow the enemy to select targets. In addition, there are naviga
tional systems, communications systems, and other space- based systems that
must be destroyed if an enemy’s capability to wage war is to be crippled.
Therefore, the destruction of enemy satellites will become an essential goal
of twenty-first-century warfare.
It naturally follows, then, that defending one’s own satellites will be crit
ical. The simplest way to defend a satellite is to allow it to maneuver out of
181
p r e p a r i n g f o r wa r
harm’s way. But this is not as simple as it sounds. First, it requires fuel to
maneuver a satellite, which is heavy and expensive to send into orbit. Sec
ond, maneuvering won’t save a satellite from an anti- satellite (ASAT) system
that can also maneuver, and certainly not from a laser beam. Finally, these
are orbital platforms, placed in a certain orbit in order to cover the necessary
terrain. Maneuvering shifts the orbit, degrading the satellites’ usefulness.
Satellites must be protected, whether by deflecting the attack or destroy
ing the attacker. By the middle of the twenty- first century this idea will have
evolved in the mode of other weapons systems in history, and the result will
be the satellite battle group. Like a carrier battle group, where the carrier is
protected by other vessels, the reconnaissance satellite will be protected by
auxiliary satellites with various capabilities and responsibilities, from block
ing laser beams to attacking other satellites. The problem of defending
space- based systems will escalate rapidly, as each side increases the threat
and thereby increases defense measures.
Weapons will also be fired from space to earth eventually, but it is more
complicated than it appears. A weapon in space is moving at many thou
sands of miles an hour, and the earth is rotating as well. Hitting a target on
the surface of the earth from space is a capability that will develop more
slowly than surveillance from space, but it will undoubtedly come to
fruition eventually.
A satellite costs several billion dollars. A space-based battle group will
cost even more. Currently, except for relatively rare instances, a damaged
or failed satellite is a total loss—no part of it is ever recovered. The more ex
tensively space is used, the more valuable platforms will become and the less
this total loss model will work. Particularly as space becomes a battleground,
the need to repair space platforms will become urgent. And, to repair com
plex, damaged systems, humans will have to go physically into space.
Launching them into space each time a repair has to be done is inher
ently inefficient, and launching spacecraft from earth will cost more than
moving spacecraft already in orbit. At a certain point it will make more
sense and become more economical to station personnel permanently in
space to carry out repairs. Obviously, they will become targets themselves—
and will have to have the capabilities to defend themselves. They will also be
able to manage and oversee the space- based systems.
182
t h e n e x t 1 0 0 y e a r s
The task of efficiently managing warfare from space is not limited to re
pairing multibillion- dollar satellites quickly. The communications link from
earth to space is complex, and subject to interference. Therefore, any enemy
will try the most logical, and economical, attack first—disrupting commu
nications between ground and space. This can be accomplished with low-
tech maneuvers—the simplest method might be the destruction of
earth- based transmitters with car bombs, for example. Launch facilities
might also be attacked. Assume that the two major U.S. launch facilities,
Kennedy Space Center and Vandenberg Air Force Base, came under attack
by enemy missiles, causing enough damage to shut down operations for
months. The United States would be unable to launch more equipment,
and whatever was already in space at the time of the attack would be all that
was available. Maintaining those systems could mean the difference be
tween victory and defeat. Therefore, having repair teams deployed in space
will be critical.
As we can see, space warfare is a tricky subject. The deeper we explore it,
the greater the risk of sounding like science fiction, but there is no doubt
that humans really will experience all this in the coming century. The tech
nology is there—as are the strategic and tactical advantages.
Space warfare, like naval warfare in the sixteenth century, will spread
outward. Geostationary orbit is strategic, and therefore it will be fought
over. But orbits will be only one strategic point of conflict. Another will be
the surface of the moon. As far- fetched as it sounds, bases on the moon will
provide a stable platform—not encumbered by an atmosphere—for observ
ing both the surface of the earth and any conflicts occurring in space. It
would take too long for a weapon on the moon to reach earth—probably
days. But a signal would be able to reach a hunter- killer satellite moving in
to destroy a repair facility in seconds. Sustaining and defending a base on
the moon will actually be easier than doing the same for orbiting systems.
Battles will be fought for control of low- orbit space, geostationary space,
libration points (stable points between the earth and the moon), and the
surface of the moon. The purpose of any battles, like all earthbound battles
that preceded them, will be to deny an enemy the ability to utilize these ar
eas, while guaranteeing a nation’s own military access to them. Treaties or
183
p r e p a r i n g f o r wa r
not, where humanity goes, war goes. And since humanity will be going into
space, there will be war in space.
Controlling the world’s oceans from space will be critical. Even today,
the U.S. Navy depends heavily on space- based surveillance for making the
fleet effective. Building fleets to challenge U.S. naval dominance is extraor
dinarily difficult, expensive, and time consuming. Mastering the technolo
gies and operational principles of aircraft carriers can take generations. Most
navies have abandoned any attempt to do so, and few will be in a position
to attempt it in the future. But in the twenty- first century, control of the sea
will be less dependent on oceangoing fleets than on space- based systems that
can see enemy ships and target them. Therefore, whoever controls space will
control the sea.
Let’s turn our attention for a moment to robots. While I expect humans
in space to maintain and command space- based warfighting systems, these
will have to be augmented by robotic systems. Keeping a human being alive
in space is a complex and expensive undertaking, and will remain so through
out the century. Autonomous systems, though, are already common, as are
remotely controlled systems. Unmanned space flight is routine. In fact,
space is where much of the pioneering work on robotics has been done, and
will continue to be done. The technology is sufficiently developed that the
U.S. Department of Defense already has fairly advanced projects in this
area. We will see—or are already seeing—robotic aircraft, repair modules
for satellites, intelligent torpedoes at sea. Toward the end of the century a
robotic infantryman for relatively simple tasks, such as rushing fortified po
sitions to avoid human casualties, is quite likely.
All of this leads to a vital change in warfare—actually, a reversion. Preci
sion means there is no need to devastate.
Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: |