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plies and transport them great distances, siphoning off manpower and lim
iting the size of the force available for direct combat.
The American way of war has thus always focused on multiplying the ef
fectiveness of each soldier on the battlefield. Historically it did this by using
both technology and masses of weapons. After World War II, however, the
emphasis was increasingly on technological multipliers rather than mass.
The United States had no choice in the matter. If it was going to be a global
power, it would need to maximize the effectiveness of each soldier by wed
ding him to advanced weaponry. It has created a culture of war in which
smaller forces can defeat larger ones. As the
use of technology increases, the
size of the force needed decreases until ultimately what is required is a re
markably small number of extremely well- trained and sophisticated war
riors. It is important to see how the weapons culture created by the United
States parallels its demographic shift. With an aging and contracting popu
lation, the maintenance of mass forces becomes difficult, if not impossible.
The key to warfare in the twenty- first century, then, will be precision.
The more precise weapons are, the fewer have to be fired. That means fewer
soldiers and fewer defense workers—but more scientists and technicians.
What will be needed in the coming decades is a weapon that can be based in
the United States, reach the other side of the world in under an hour, ma
neuver with incredible agility to
avoid surface-to-air missiles, strike with
absolute precision, and return to carry out another mission almost immedi
ately. If the United States had such a system, it would never again need to
deliver a tank eight thousand miles away.
Such a weapon is called an unmanned hypersonic aircraft. The United
States is currently engaged in the development of hypersonic systems capa
ble of traveling well in excess of five times the speed of sound. Powered by
what
are called scramjet engines, the craft have air- breathing, not rocket,
engines. Their range currently is limited. But as scramjets develop during
the twenty- first century—along with new materials that can withstand ex
tremely high temperatures caused by friction with the air—both their range
and speed will increase.
Imagine: Traveling at eight thousand miles per hour, or Mach 10, a mis
sile fired from the east coast of the United States could hit a target in Europe
in under half an hour. Increase this to Mach 20, and a strike could be com
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pleted in less than fifteen minutes. The American geopolitical need to inter
vene rapidly, with sufficient strength
to destroy enemy forces, would be met in
time to make a difference. Building enough hypersonic missiles to devastate
a potential enemy would be extremely expensive. But considering the sav
ings on the current force structure, it would be manageable. I would also
note that this system would reduce the need for huge stockpiles of petro
leum to fuel tanks, planes, and ships at a time when the hydrocarbon energy
system will be in decline.
The result of deploying hypersonic systems will
be to reverse the trend in
warfare that has been under way since before Napoleon. The armies of the
twenty- first century will be much smaller and more professional than previ
ous forces, and highly technological. Precision will also allow the reintro
duction of a separation between soldier and civilian: It will not be necessary
to devastate entire cities to destroy one building. Soldiers will increasingly
resemble highly trained medieval knights, rather than the GIs of World War
II. Courage will still be necessary, but it will be the ability to manage ex
tremely complex weapons systems that will matter the most.
Speed, range, and accuracy—and a lot of unmanned aircraft—will sub
stitute for the massed forces that were required to
deliver explosives to the
battlefield in the twentieth century. Yet these talents will not solve a core
problem of warfare, occupying hostile territory. Armies are designed to de
stroy armies, and precision weapons will do that more effectively than ever
before. But the occupation of territory will remain a labor- intensive activity.
It is, in many ways, more akin to police work than to soldiering. A soldier’s
job is to kill an enemy, whereas a policeman’s job is to identify a lawbreaker
and arrest him. The first
requires courage, training, and weapons. The latter
requires all of these plus an understanding of a culture that allows you to
distinguish enemies from law- abiding civilians. That task will never become
easier and will always be the Achilles’ heel of any great power. Just as the Ro
mans and British struggled with their occupation of Palestine, even as they
easily
defeated enemy armies, so too the Americans will win wars and then
suffer through the aftermath.
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