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global impulse will be to block the United States,
but in practical terms that
will be easier said than done. Those who can avoid confronting the United
States will choose that path because the risks of confrontation will be too
high. Simultaneously, the rewards of collaboration will be substantial. These
crosscurrents will be settled in different ways by different powers.
Around 2040, the most contentious issue on the table will be the ques
tion of the future of the Pacific Basin. It will be addressed more narrowly as
a question of the northwest Pacific, and more narrowly still as Japanese pol
icy toward China and Siberia. The surface issue will be Japan’s increasingly
aggressive role on the mainland of Asia as it pursues its own economic
interests and interferes with other powers, including the United States. Ad
ditionally, there will be the question of Japanese respect for Chinese sover
eignty and the question of self- determination for maritime Russia.
On a
deeper level, the United States will be alarmed by Japan’s rapidly
growing maritime power, including sea- based and space- based military sys
tems. Japan, still importing oil from the Persian Gulf, will be increasing its
power in the South China Sea and in the Strait of Malacca. In the early
2040s, the Japanese will be concerned with the stability of the Gulf and will
begin to probe and patrol in the Indian Ocean in order to protect their in
terests. Japan will have well- established, close
economic ties with many of
the island chains of the Pacific, and will begin to enter into agreements with
them for satellite tracking and control stations. U.S. intelligence will suspect
that these will also serve as bases for Japanese hypersonic anti- ship missiles.
Hypersonic missiles move faster than five times the speed of sound—by the
mid-twenty-first century, they will travel in excess of ten times the speed of
sound, eight thousand miles an hour and faster. Hypersonics can be mis
siles, crashing directly into targets, or unmanned aircraft, releasing muni
tions on targets and then returning home.
The Japanese will share waters with the American Seventh Fleet and
space with the U.S. Space Command—by now
an increasingly independent
service of the American military. Neither side will be provoking incidents at
sea or in space, and both nations will be maintaining formally cordial rela
tions. But the Japanese will be exquisitely aware of America’s concern—that
its private lake, the Pacific, contains a power that it does not fully control.
Japan will be deeply concerned with protecting its sea lanes against po
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tential threats in the south, particularly in the waters of Indonesia, which
are the paths between the Pacific and Indian oceans. Indonesia is an archi
pelago consisting of many islands and many ethnic groups.
It is inherently
fragmented, and it has—and will continue to have—many separatist move
ments. Japan will play a complex game in backing some of these movements
versus others in order to secure the various straits in Indonesian waters.
Japan will also want to be able to keep the U.S. Navy out of the western
Pacific. Toward this end, it will do three things. First, it will build and de
ploy hypersonic anti- ship missiles in its home islands, able to strike deep
into the Pacific. Second, it will enter into agreements to allow sensors and
missiles to be based on Pacific islands it
already dominates economically,
like the Bonin Islands (which include Iwo Jima), the Marshalls, and Nauru.
The strategy here will be to create choke points that would potentially inter
dict U.S. transpacific trade and military transport. This, in turn, will create
predictability in American routing, making it easier for Japanese satellites to
monitor the movement of American ships. The most disturbing thing for
the Americans, however, will be the degree
of Japanese activity in space,
where not only military but commercial and industrial facilities will be un
der construction.
American policy will be complex, as always, and influenced by different
factors. The idea of a strong China threatening the Russian rear will become
an obsession in the U.S. intelligence and military communities in the 2010s
and 2020s. In the 2030s this fear will become an idée fixe in the State De
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