allow
women entrance into the essential core of the military
would throw into confusion
all
men’s certainty about their male identity and
thus about their claim to privilege in the social order.
(Enloe, 1983, p. 15)
Combat defines the man, but man also defines the combat. In other words, by making
combat the definition of manliness, and making combat a male preserve, military combat
is the defining event of a patriarchal society and its members. “Women may serve the
military, but they can never be permitted to
be
the military” (Enloe, 1983, p. 15;
emphasis in original). The militarization of geopolitical codes is enhanced as it serves
individual goals—making society’s boys into men—while also facilitating a dominant
role for the military in the definition of a geopolitical code. In turn, those with “combat
experience,” by definition men, are also privileged in public affairs (Enloe, 2004), a
process very evident in US politics.
The militarization of society complements and intensifies the gender roles that are
defined by nationalist ideology. Furthermore, in patriarchal societies “combat” has an
essential role in the essential identity or purpose of men. Not surprisingly, war is a key
ingredient in national myths and interacts with the gendered understanding of public
and private roles. Not only are men the “defenders” of the nation, but actual defense is
necessary to make a man. With the militarization of society, in addition to the role of
“combat” in defining male identity, and the dominance of men, and the military, in public
affairs, it is hardly surprising that the necessary construction of
difference
by nationalist
ideology is readily “upgraded” into “hatred” and “threat”: in other words, war.
I N T R O D U C T I O N T O G E O P O L I T I C S
124
In the next section we discuss how different national histories can be related to
different geopolitical codes and hence the forms of conflict that particular nationalisms
may generate.
A typology of nationalist myths and geopolitical codes
The geopolitical codes of states rest upon the maintenance of their security. On the
whole, security is related to the territorial integrity of the state. In other words, geo-
political codes define ways in which the sovereignty of the state must be protected
or the state’s status and well-being enhanced. Perceived threat of attack upon the
citizens of the country requires a geopolitical code attending to boundary defense.
Enhancing the status and well-being of a state often requires identifying historic griev-
ances that have denied a country its “rightful” access to a particular set of resources.
Consequently, an aggressive geopolitical code may be written that requires the seizure
of territory.
Whether the code tends to be more defensive or aggressive, the concepts of sover-
eignty and territory remain central to the ideology used to justify the geopolitical code.
Three types of “historical-geographic understandings” that frame the specific justifica-
tions of particular countries have been identified (Murphy, 2005, p. 283):
1
The state is the historic homeland of a distinctive ethnocultural group.
2
The state is a distinctive physical-environmental unit.
3
The state is the modern incarnation of a long-standing political-territorial entity.
These categories are not deterministic, just because two countries possess a historical-
geographic ideology emphasizing, say, territorial integrity, does not mean that they are
likely to be equally aggressive. The benefit of this classification is that it shows that the
justification for geopolitical actions used by a government must be grounded in a national
ideology that resonates with the population: it must “make sense.”
For example, the continuing conflict between Turkey and Greece is focused upon
islands off the west coast of Turkey as well as the divided island of Cyprus. An inter-
pretation of geopolitics emphasizing material pursuits would point to the oil reserves
under Turkey’s western continental shelf. But what about the justification for the
conflict? The Greek government’s response to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974
is replete with allusions to modern Greece’s unbroken connection to the ancient Greek
Empire. In the words of the Greek Foreign Ministry:
The name of Cyprus has always been associated with Greek mythology (mostly
famously as the birthplace of the goddess Aphrodite) and history. The Greek
Achaeans established themselves on Cyprus around 1400 B.C. The island was
an integral part of the Homeric world and, indeed, the word “Cyprus” was used
by Homer himself. Ever since, Cyprus has gone through the same major histor-
ical phases as the rest of the Greek world.
(Quoted in Murphy, 2005, p. 285)
1111
2
3
41
5
6
7
8
91
10
1
2
31111
4
5
6
7
8
9
20
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
30
1
2
3
4
51
6
7
8
9
40
1
2
3
4
5111
E M B E D D I N G G E O P O L I T I C S W I T H I N N A T I O N A L I D E N T I T Y
125
The connection between Greek gods and an estimated 225,000 refugees may appear
tenuous to a neutral and objective observer. The point is that going to war could be
justified to the Greek public, and gain support, through the usage of this widely held
belief in the national history of the country.
More specifically, we can use the historical-geographical understanding of a country’s
geopolitical situation to suggest broad relationships between national identity and
the content of a geopolitical code, though not in a deterministic sense (Murphy, 2005,
p. 286):
1
An ethnic distribution that crosses state boundaries is most likely to be a source of
interstate territorial conflict where the ethnic group in question is the focus of at
least one state’s regime of territorial legitimation.
2
A boundary arrangement is likely to be particularly unstable where it violates a
well-established conception of a state’s physical-environmental unity.
3
States with regimes of territorial legitimation grounded in a preexisting political-
territorial formation are likely to have particularly difficult relations with neighboring
states that occupy or claim areas that are viewed as core to the prior political-
territorial formation.
4
States that are not in a position to ground regimes in any of the foregoing terms
are less likely to have territorial conflicts with their neighbors unless there are strong
economic or political motives for pressing a territorial claim and state leaders can
point to some preexisting political arrangement or history of discovery and first use
that arguably justifies the claim.
The first point is the politics of nationalism discussed at the beginning of this chapter.
The second point is illustrated by one of the most puzzling contemporary geopolitical
tensions: the dispute between NATO allies Spain and Britain regarding the tiny terri-
tory of Gibraltar. Once of strategic importance, given its location at the mouth of the
Mediterranean Sea, Spain’s desire to gain control of Gibraltar is explained by the histor-
ical understanding of the physical extent of Spain; a physical geography currently
violated by Britain’s possession of just two-square miles of territory. The third point
was already exemplified in a discussion of the Turkish-Greek conflict over Cyprus. In
addition, China’s numerous territorial claims in East and Southeast Asia that rest upon
the geographic extent of the ancient Chinese Empire are a contemporary example of the
third point.
The final scenario of geopolitical conflicts illustrates an important point: many states
must legitimate their geopolitical codes without recourse to a national understanding of
political geographies of ethnicity, physical extent, or historical claims. The states of sub-
Saharan Africa are colonial constructs; they are recent creations with little basis in ethnic
homogeneity or physical legacies. Hence, there has been little cause for border conflicts
in this region of the world, instead the geopolitics has been a matter of which ethnic
group is able to seize control of the state apparatus, and not the geographical extent of
the state (Herbst, 2000). In contrast, the imposed borders of Latin America shifted over
the course of Spanish colonialism, creating opportunities for disagreement over their
“proper” course.
I N T R O D U C T I O N T O G E O P O L I T I C S
126
Geopolitical codes are not simply an objective or strategic calculation made by
foreign policy elites; it is not a matter of “statecraft” that excludes the majority of the
population. Everyone is implicated, to a certain degree, because geopolitical codes can-
not be enacted unless the majority of the population is acquiescent, at least tacitly. To
ensure that a geopolitical code resonates with its citizens, a country is careful to frame
its actions within the established political geographic sentiment of the nation’s history.
We have identified some broad categories with which we can interpret the major theme
of the national tradition being evoked.
We conclude this chapter by exploring the relationship between national identity and
state geopolitics (Dijkink, 1996). National identity frames the geopolitical acts of states
within its commonly understood history. Emphasis is placed upon the important role
that context plays in determining how and what people believe: “Identifying with a terri-
tory simply elicits certain views on the world, albeit in a contingent way, given certain
national challenges, historical facts, and ideals” (Dijkink, 1996, p. ix). In other words,
“to live within a territory arouses particular but shared visions (narratives) of the
meaning of one’s place in the world and the global system” (Dijkink, 1996, p. 1).
People are socialized within different territorial settings; what they hear, how they make
sense of the information they receive, and the possible responses are limited by geo-
graphically specific institutions (Agnew, 1987). Referring back to our discussion of place
in Chapter 1, it is the uniqueness of a country’s geopolitical location or strategic situa-
tion, coupled with the way history is interpreted through dominant institutions, which
formulates the particular ingredients of national ideology. Even in the age of satellite
communication technology, and “globalization,” information is distilled and interpreted
through local journalistic and government lenses (Dijkink, 1996, p. 3).
Visions of one’s country and its position in relation to other countries are formed
within particular national myths. These myths form the basis for geopolitical codes and
the means to represent and interpret these goals so that they obtain popular support.
Dijkink’s term is
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