were in actual combat. Morgan watched in shock as one soldier after another broke down in
tears. “I was amazed at that,” Morgan said. “It was hard for me to figure out.”
Well, I [had] thought, these are all really tough people—that it’ll be kind of like a game. And
I hadn’t anticipated seeing people that distressed or crying. And it wasn’t because of a
physical pressure. It’s not because somebody’s manhandling you.
These were soldiers—organized, disciplined, motivated—and Morgan realized that it was the
uncertainty of their situation that was unsettling to them.
Many [of them had] always operated by, “I should know the rules of the book so I know what
to do.” And I think much of the stress, as I got to know it over time, was largely driven by an
internal sense of real alarm, like, “I don’t know what the right answer is.”
Then he decided to have the SERE students do what is called the Rey-Osterrieth Complex
Figure drawing test. You’re given this:
First you have to copy it. Then the original is taken away and you have to draw it from memory.
Most adults are pretty good at this task, and they use the same strategy: they start by drawing the
outlines of the figure, then fill in the details. Children, on the other hand, use a piecemeal
approach: they randomly do one chunk of the drawing, then move on to another bit. Before
interrogations, the SERE students sailed through the test with flying colors. Being able to quickly
memorize and reproduce a complex visual display, after all, is the kind of thing Green Beret and
Special Operations soldiers are trained to do. Here’s a typical example of a Rey-Osterrieth figure
drawn from memory by one of the soldiers before interrogation. These guys are good.
But just look at what the soldier drew fifteen minutes after interrogation:
In one version of the experiment, Morgan says, after stressful questioning, 80 percent of the
sample would draw the figure piecemeal, “like a prepubescent kid, which means your prefrontal
cortex has just shut down for the while.”
For anyone in the interrogation business, Morgan’s work was deeply troubling. The point of
the interrogation was to get the subject to talk—to crack open the subject’s memory and access
whatever was inside. But what if the process of securing compliance proved so stressful to the
interviewee that it affected what he or she could actually remember? Morgan was watching
adults turn into children.
“I had just been in the compound collecting spit from all the different students,” Morgan says,
remembering one incident from early at his time at SERE:
And I went back out because they had now opened the gates, the family [members] are there.
They all say hello. And I walked up to a couple of students: “So, it’s nice to see you when no
longer under those conditions.”
And I remember some of them went, “When did you get here?” And I was like, “What do
you mean, when did I get here? I actually collected spit from you twenty minutes ago. I had
you fill out—”
“I don’t remember that.”
And I said, “And I saw you the other night when you were being interrogated.”
And they’re like, “No, got nothing.”
I looked at one of the instructors and I said, “That’s crazy.” And he said, “Happens all the
time.” He goes, “They don’t even remember me, and I’m the guy who was yelling at them
thirty minutes ago.”
Morgan was so astonished that he decided to run a quick field test. He put together the
equivalent of a police lineup, filling it with instructors, officers, and a few stray outsiders.
“The physician for the unit had come back. He’d been on vacation.…I said, ‘You’re going in
the lineup today.’ We put him in.”
Then Morgan gave his instructions to the soldiers: “We’re really interested in the person who
ran the camp and ordered all your punishments. If they’re there, please indicate who they are. If
they’re not, just say, ‘Not here.’” He wanted them to identify the commandant—the man in
charge.
“Out of the fifty-two students, twenty of them picked this doctor.…And he goes, ‘But I
wasn’t here! I was in Hawaii!’”
2
If one of the soldiers had gotten it wrong, it would have been understandable. People make
mistakes. So would two misidentifications, or even three. But twenty got it wrong. In any court
of law, the hapless physician would end up behind bars.
After 9/11, Morgan went to work for the CIA. There he tried to impress upon his colleagues
the significance of his findings. The agency had spies and confidential sources around the world.
They had information gathered from people they had captured or coerced into cooperating. These
sources were people who often spoke with great confidence. Some were highly trusted. Some
gave information that was considered very credible. But Morgan’s point was that if the
information they were sharing had been obtained under stress—if they had just been through
some nightmare in Iraq or Afghanistan or Syria—what they said might be inaccurate or
misleading, and the sources wouldn’t know it. They would say, It’s the doctor! I know it was the
doctor, even though the doctor was a thousand miles away. “I said to the other analysts, ‘You
know, the implication of this is really alarming.’”
So what did Charles Morgan think when he heard what Mitchell and Jessen were up to with
KSM in their faraway black site?
I told people—this was before I was at the CIA, and I told people while I was there—“Trying
to get information out of someone you are sleep-depriving is sort of like trying to get a better
signal out of a radio that you are smashing with a sledgehammer.…It makes no sense to me at
all.”
5.
KSM made his first public confession on the afternoon of March 10, 2007, just over four years
after he was captured by the CIA in Islamabad, Pakistan. The occasion was a tribunal hearing
held at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. There were eight people present in
addition to KSM—a “personal representative” assigned to the prisoner, a linguist, and officers
from each of the four branches of the U.S. military service.
KSM was asked if he understood the nature of the proceedings. He said he did. A description
of the charges against him was read out loud. Through his representative, he made a few small
corrections: “My name is misspelled in the Summary of Evidence. It should be S-h-a-i-k-h or S-
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