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The Four Steps to the Epiphany
home office market simply had no compelling need that made Front Desk a “must have,” especially
at a high price. FastOffice had a solution in search of a problem.
When Steve and his team realized that individuals were simply not going to shell out $1400 for a
“nice to have peripheral,” they needed a new strategy. Like all startups faced with this problem,
FastOffice fired its VP of Sales and came up with a new sales and marketing strategy. Now, instead
of selling to individuals who worked at home, the company would sell to Fortune 1000 corporations
who had a “distributed workforce”—salespeople who had offices at home. The rationale was that a
VP of Sales of a large corporation could justify spending $1400 on a high-value employee. The
thought was that the “new” product, now renamed HomeDesk, could make a single salesperson
appear like a large corporate office.
While the new strategy sounded great on paper, it suffered from the same problem as the first:
the product might be nice to have, but there was no compelling problem it was solving. Vice
presidents of sales at major corporations were not going to bed at night worrying about their remote
offices. They were worrying about how to make their sales numbers.
What ensued was the startup version of the ritualized Japanese Noh play I mentioned in
Chapter 1. Faced with the failure of Plan B, FastOffice fired the VP of Marketing and came up with
yet another new strategy. The company was now on the startup death spiral: the executive staff
changed with each new strategy. After the third strategy didn’t work either, Steve was no longer
CEO and the board brought in an experienced business executive.
What’s interesting about the FastOffice story is not that it’s unique but that it’s so common.
Time and again, startups focus on first customer ship, and only after the product is out the door do
they find out that customers aren’t behaving as expected. By the time the company realizes that
sales revenues won’t meet expectations, it’s already behind the proverbial eight ball. Is this the end
of the story? No, we’ll revisit FastOffice after we explain the Customer Discovery philosophy.
Like most startups, FastOffice knew how to build a product and how to measure progress toward
the product ship date. What the company lacked was a set of early Customer Development goals that
would have allowed it to measure its progress in understanding customers and finding a market for
its product. These goals would have been achieved when FastOffice could answer four questions:
• Have we identified a problem a customer wants solved?
• Does our product solve these customer needs?
• If so, do we have a viable and profitable business model?
• Have we learned enough to go out and sell?
Answering these questions is the purpose of the first step in the Customer Development model,
Customer Discovery. This chapter explains how to go about it.
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