The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective

The Implicit and the Implied in a Written Constitution 

123

legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for pro-

posing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and 

purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of 

three fourths of the several states . . . [etc.].

Evidence of original intent confirms an inference of exclusivity.

51

 But this 

must be implicated, because it is difficult to regard the provision as elliptical: 

there is no natural space where a qualification such as ‘only’ or ‘exclusively’ 

could be understood as implicit. Rather than such a word completing the 

express content of the clause, a distinct implicature seems required.

As for rights, the inclusion of the Ninth Amendment in the American 

Constitution was motivated by the fear that in its absence, the enumeration of 

certain rights in the proposed new Bill of Rights might imply that ‘the people’ 

had no other rights. As James Wilson said,

If we attempt an enumeration, everything that is not enumerated is pre-

sumed to be given [to the federal government]. The consequence is, that an 

imperfect enumeration would throw all implied power into the scale of the 

government; and the rights of the people would be rendered incomplete.

52

In other words, an enumeration might give rise to an implicature of the 

expressio unius kind, which the Ninth Amendment was adopted to preempt 

or cancel.

53

  It is a central feature of pragmatic theory that implications can be 

cancelled by express words.

54

As for powers, arguments about the existence of implied limits to 

Commonwealth legislative powers have often relied on that presumption. 

Section 51 of the Australian Constitution lists thirty-nine subject matters 

over which the Commonwealth Parliament is given legislative power; State 

Parliaments generally retain power over other subject matters. The High Court 

has had to grapple with the difficult issue of whether or not the carefully lim-

ited nature of some of the subject matters granted to the Commonwealth has 

implications for the interpretation of its other powers. An example is whether 

or not the grant of power by s. 51(i) only over ‘trade and commerce with other 

countries, and among the states’ – conspicuously withholding power over 

trade and commerce within the states – should, by implication, prevent other 

51 

E.g.,  H. P.  Monaghan, ‘We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional 

Amendment’ (1996) 96 Columbia Law Review 12; D. R. Dow, ‘When Words Mean What We 

Believe They Say: The Case of Article V’ (1990) 76 Iowa Law Review 1; J. R. Vile, ‘Legally 

amending the United States Constitution: The Exclusivity of Article V’s Mechanisms’ (1991) 

21 Cumberland Law Review 271.

52 

J. Wilson, quoted by Barnett, Supra note 49, 624; for full discussion, see Williams, Supra 

note 42, section II.

53 

L. Solum, Section 

3.6.4

. See also Section 

4.4.1

.

54 

Lycan, Supra note 41, 193.

---

124 

Jeffrey Goldsworthy

granted powers such as that over ‘trading corporations’ (s. 51(xx)) being used to 

regulate intra-state trade and commerce. The High Court has held that it does 

not. But as Michael Stokes has recently argued to the contrary:

the law normally draws negative implications from positive grants of power 

because failure to do so undermines the raison d’etre of limited grants of 

power. The law assumes that grantors of limited power, including constitu-

tional and legislative power, do not intend to give the recipient of the grant 

other unlimited powers, because to do so would render the grant of limited 

power unnecessary and otiose.

55

It has been argued that the ‘necessary and proper clause’ in the United States 

Constitution was inserted to preempt or cancel a possible implication that 

Congress’ enumerated powers were strictly exhaustive.

56