The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective



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The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective by Rosalind Dixon (editor), Adrienne Stone (editor) (z-lib.org)

Patrick Emerton

in favour of the conclusion that I must be unexpressed. If the legal rules of 

inference are stated with sufficient flexibility and informality that they are 

able to govern inferences in which they themselves figure (e.g., if they state 

certain principles of analogical reasoning, or state certain principles for the 

application of general terms to particular cases, etc.), then it seems that any 

concrete application of them to validate L could not be a case of simply apply-

ing expressed rules of legal inference, but rather would require generation (by 

application of principles of interpretation, principle for reconciling conflict-

ing considerations, etc.) of something unexpressed from the expressed rules 

of legal inference.

I therefore conclude that there is good, though not definitive, reason to 

think that – on the ‘thick’ picture of validation – the rules of legal inference, 

or at least some of them, must be unexpressed.



5.3.3.  The ‘Local’ Character of Rules of Legal Inference

If rules of inference are not premises in our arguments, then how are they 

known to us so that we may apply them? The answer given within the con-

ventionalist tradition is that grasping the rules for the use of key logical and 

mathematical concepts – e.g., such concepts as conjunctionnegationaddi-

tion, etc. – includes, or even consists in, grasping the permissible inferences to 

which they give rise. Coffa explains the idea this way:

Logic is radically different from every other type of knowledge because its 

‘justification’ [ie the rules of inference that underpin logical argumentation] 

lies not in how things stand but in the understanding of language. As I under-

stand the language in which A and B and not-A are formulated, I ipso facto 

recognize that whatever A and B might be, if those two statements were true, 

B would also be true . . .

The basic point is that . . . the focus is not the ‘seeing’ of a certain very 

general and a prior truth but on the recognition of certain meanings, on 

understanding  . . .

These ‘truths’ emerge not from the acknowledgement of facts . . . but 

through the recognition of meaning.

26

A. J. Ayer, in Language Truth and Logic, puts forward the same idea as an 



account of the necessary truth of propositions of mathematics and logic:

[W]e say that a proposition is analytic when its validity depends solely on the 

definitions of the symbols it contains . . . If one knows what is the function 

26 


Coffa, Supra note 21, 165–7.


 

The Centrality and Diversity of the Invisible Constitution 

157


of the words ‘either’, ‘or’, and ‘not’, then one can see that any proposition 

of the form ‘Either p is true or p is not true’ is valid . . . Accordingly, all such 

propositions are analytic . . .

[A]lthough [analytic propositions] give us no information about any 

empirical situation, they do enlighten us by illustrating the way in which we 

use certain symbols . . . [I]n saying that if all Bretons are Frenchmen, and all 

Frenchmen Europeans, then all Bretons are Europeans, I am not describing 

any matter of fact. But I am showing that in the statement that all Bretons are 

Frenchmen, and all Frenchmen Europeans, the further statement that all 

Bretons are Europeans is implicitly contained. And I am thereby indicating 

the convention which governs our usage of the words ‘if’ and ‘all’.

27

On the ‘thick’ Hartian picture of validation, it seems natural to suppose that 



the rules of legal inference would similarly be implicit in the meanings of 

key terms occurring in the rule of recognition: this would explain where they 

come from, and how they come to be validated. Because these key terms 

are likely to be different across different legal systems (at least in principle –  

in practice, broader socio-historical processes may produce a degree of 

homogenisation), that suggests that the relevant rules of legal inference may 

themselves be different across legal systems, and hence ‘local’ or ‘parochial’. 

Wittgenstein expresses this sort of idea very forcefully (and generalises it across 

larger swathes of language than those with which this paper is concerned) 

when he says that

to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life . . . [T]he speaking of a 


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