Of religion in conflict

 
law, and third is a Muslim 
women’s movement that sought to ‘rearticulate Sharia
 
to accommodate 
indigenous feminism’ (Jacoby 1999, 521). According to Hasso (1998), 
the Palestinian Federation of Women’s Action Committees, an affiliate 
of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, with its anti-
religious Marxist roots, was the largest and most influential women’s 
organisation during the First Intifada
. 
However, in recruiting women, 
they had to de-emphasise their anti-religious beliefs. The rise of Hamas 
in the second year of the First Intifada
 
and their imposition of the hijab
 
on women in Gaza then created difficulties for the progressive women’s 
movement (Berkovitch and Moghadam 1999). This created a space 
for the Islamist women’s groups to provide ‘an “authentic” space for 
women … to organise without having to worry about violating social 
norms’ (Berkovitch and Moghadam 1999, 650). Jacoby (1999) notes 
the complexity between feminism, nationalism and religion in Palestine, 
suggesting that the motivations for joining the women’s nationalist 
struggle in the First Intifada
 
came from a spectrum of religious beliefs 
that highlighted different roles for women in the conflict. 
While religion may not be a shared driving force for Israeli and 
Palestinian women seeking to change the status quo and work towards 
peace, it has been argued that their identity as women has enabled 
them to transcend the Israeli-Palestinian/Jewish-Muslim-Christian 
divides and connect more easily than men. Their shared experience of 
gender oppression has helped them to cross the national and religious 
boundaries (Sharoni 1995). According to Kaufman, Salem and Verhoeven 
(2006), during the Second Intifada, joint Israeli-Palestinian activities in 
general declined but this decline was not as significant for joint activities 
of women’s organisations. 

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6. 
Case study II: Mali
6.1. Background
Mali has experienced a long history of conflict between the centre and 
its periphery. Tuareg rebellions in northern Mali, which pitted parts of the 
population in the north of the country against the central government 
in the capital Bamako and the population in the south have shaken this 
West African country for decades. There have been numerous attempts 
at conflict resolution, including some by the international community. 
None of those has led to sustainable peacebuilding. In 2012, another 
Tuareg rebellion brought to the fore the rising influence of the Tuareg 
national liberation movement (MNLA: 
Mouvement national pour la 
libération de l’Azawad
). Benefitting from a power vacuum of the central 
government due to a coup d’état, these non-state armed actors took 
control of major population centres in northern Mali, including Timbuktu, 
Gao and Kidal. This essentially secular Tuareg movement saw its 
power rapidly decline due to the advent and rise of Islamic extremist 
movements aiming to take control over large parts of North and West 
Africa and create an Islamic state. These were: Ansar Dine (Defenders 
of the Faith), a Malian Tuareg movement; the Movement for Oneness 
and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), and; Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb 
(AQIM). These movements rapidly established their terrorist rule in 
northern Mali until they were dislodged by French and African military 
intervention in January 2013, although cells and attacks continue to 
date. Peace negotiations between the Tuareg groups (and other groups 
from northern Mali) and the Government of Mali, with mediation by 
the international community, are ongoing at the time of this writing 
(August 2015). 

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58
The Role of Religion in Conflict and Peacebuilding
// British Academy
6.2. Concepts
Three main concepts are used by the relevant actors in Mali to denote 
their relationship with religion.
1. 
The Malian state and society apparently embraced the French ideal 
of state secularism or laicity (‘laïcité
’
in French), with an evident 
separation of religion and the state.
2. 
A moderate version of Islam, mixed with cultural traditions, 
is prevalent among the Muslim population in Mali. 
3. 
Extremist and fundamentalist interpretations of Islam are apparent 
among Ansar Dine, MOJWA and AQIM. Although local religious 
groups do not use fundamentalist and radical interpretations of 
Islam, the media often frame this conflict as being connected to 
religious extremism and fundamentalism, even with regard to laic 
Tuareg groups.
6.3. Actors 
The