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Conclusions
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financial instability. Meanwhile, proximate causes relate to factors that trigger the materialisation
of these risks (see figure below).
Risks to financial stability are broadly considered as risks to financial intermediation, or risks that
threaten the flow of capital from investors to users of funds.
The impacts of risks are magnified as a result of multipliers. These include size and inter-
connectedness particularly. That is, the larger the institutions involved, the bigger the effect of any
risk to financial stability materialising. Similarly, the more inter-connected the institutions involved
the bigger the effect insofar as there are likely to be a greater number of institutions involved.
Regulatory features can also act as a multiplier.
The following NBFI segments are examined in greater details: money market funds, private equity
firms, hedge funds, pension funds, insurance undertakings and central counterparties. All these
types of institutions face credit or counterparty risk and to a different degree liquidity risks,
redemption risks, and fire sales risk in the case of a general deterioration in market conditions.
The report also addresses the risks arising from a number of activities that are frequently
undertaken by NBFIs. These activities include securitisation, securities lending and repos.
Regarding securitisation, the major risk, in addition to the typical credit and market risks, is the
agency risk arising from a potentially very significant misalignment of the incentives faced by the
various players in the securitisation value chain.
Repos are a critical source of short-term liquidity for financial institutions and experience has
shown that the repo market can easily dry up in an environment of heightened concern about
credit and counterpart risk, thus risking destabilising the financial sector as a whole.
In the case of securities lending, securities lenders face the risk that the borrower may be unable
to return the security and that the collateral and the indemnity provided by the intermediary in
the securities lending value chain are insufficient to acquire the non-returned security in the
market place. Therefore, extensive and robust counterparty monitoring is typically undertaken by
securities lenders. Cash collateral presents a particular risk as its investment by the lender may
result in a loss and the shortfall has to be covered by the lender when the securities are returned
by the borrower. Another key risk resulting from securities lending is that institutions having
borrowed securities are under no obligations to provide information on their balance sheets on
the extent to which the securities shown in their balance sheet are subject to a legal claim by a
securities lender. This reduces the value of the balance sheet information for market transparency
and makes the assessment of counterparty risk more complex and risky.
The report also focuses on exchange traded funds (ETFs) which, as a result of the rapid growth and
growing complexity of synthetic replication schemes, have attracted considerable policy attention.
The threats to financial stability arising from ETFs include the grouping of tracking error risk with
trading book risk by the swap counterparty, which could compromise risk management, collateral
risk triggering a run on ETFs in periods of heightened counterparty risk, materialisation of liquidity
risk when there are sudden and large investor withdrawals and increased product complexity and
options on ETFs undermining risk monitoring capacity.
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