Neg for Venezuela Practice Debate

A-to Nuclear Terrorism

Frontline

( ) No nuclear terrorism – tech barriers.

Chapman ‘12

(Stephen, editorial writer for Chicago Tribune, “CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely,” May 22, http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html)

A layperson may figure it’s only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard’s Graham Allison, in his book “Nuclear Terrorism,” concludes, “On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable.” But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.” The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it probably won’t bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen.

( ) No nuclear terror – counter to the goals of terror groups.

Kapur ‘8

(S. Paul; Associate professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21^st Century Asia. pg. 32)

Before a terrorist group can attempt to use nuclear weapons, it must meet two basic requirements. First, the group must decide that it wishes to engage in nuclear terrorism. Analysts and policy makers often assume that terrorist groups necessarily want to do so (Carter 2004; U.S. Government 2002). However, it is not clear that terrorist organizations would necessarily covet nuclear devices. Although analysts often characterize terrorism as an irrational activity (Laqeuer I999: 4-5), extensive empirical evidence indicates that terrorist groups in fact behave rationally, adopting strategies designed to achieve particular ends (Crenshaw I995: 4; Pape 2003: 344). Thus whether terrorists would use nuclear weapons is contingent on whether doing so is likely to further their goals. Under what circumstances could nuclear weapons fail to promote terrorists' goals? For certain types of terrorist objectives, nuclear weapons could be too destructive. Large-scale devastation could negatively influence audiences important to the terrorist groups. Terrorists often rely on populations sympathetic to their cause for political, financial, and military support. The horrific destruction of a nuclear explosion could alienate segments of this audience. People who otherwise would sympathize with the terrorists may conclude that in using a nuclear device terrorists had gone too far and were no longer deserving of support. The catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons could also damage or destroy the very thing that the terrorist group most values. For example, if a terrorist organization were struggling with another group for control of their common homeland, the use of nuclear weapons against the enemy group would devastate the terrorists' own home territory. Using nuclear weapons would be extremely counterproductive for the terrorists in this scenario.

( ) No nuclear terror – they’ll choose conventional weapons.

Mueller ‘8

John Mueller, political science professor at Ohio State University, “The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood” Jan. 1 http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF

Meanwhile, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all (thus far, at least) have relied on conventional destructive methods--there hasn't even been the occasional gas bomb. In effect the terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al-Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: "Make use of that which is available...rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach" (Whitlock 2007). That is: Keep it simple, stupid. In fact, it seems to be a general historical regularity that terrorists tend to prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones (Rapoport 1999, 51; Gilmore 1999, 37; Schneier 2003, 236). Indeed, the truly notable innovation for terrorists over the last few decades has not been in qualitative improvements in ordnance at all, but rather in a more effective method for delivering it: the suicide bomber (Pape 2005, Bloom 2005).

( ) US won’t use nuclear retaliation against non-state nuclear terror.

Washington Post ‘7

(Thursday, August 2, 2007 – “Obama says no nuclear weapons to fight terror” – http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/02/AR2007080201375_pf.html)

Presidential hopeful Barack Obama said Thursday he would not use nuclear weapons "in any circumstance" to fight terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan, drawing criticism from Hillary Rodham Clinton and other Democratic rivals."I think it would be a profound mistake for us to use nuclear weapons in any circumstance," Obama said, with a pause, "involving civilians." Then he quickly added, "Let me scratch that. There's been no discussion of nuclear weapons. That's not on the table."

( ) No miscalc impact – US-Russian safety systems check conflict.

Morrison ‘7

(James Morrison, formerly served as an assistant foreign editor for the Washington Times. Mr. Morrison returned to the Foreign Desk in 1993 to launch the Embassy Row column, a diplomatic news column primarily focusing on foreign ambassadors in the United States and U.S. ambassadors abroad. The column is the only one of its kind in U.S. journalism. The Washington Times, September 25, 2007, Sentinels on Guard, lexis)

Despite growing foreign-policy disputes, Moscow and Washington have prevented an accidental nuclear disaster with extensive communication links through Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs), Russian Ambassador Yuri Ushakov said in a review of 20 years of the program established under President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. "The NRRCs have proved their efficiency as an instrument of transparency and confidence-building," he said in a speech last week at the State Department. "Moreover, they have become a reliable mechanism designed to diminish and eliminate the very potential threat of an accidental nuclear disaster."

Extensions – Too many tech barriers

( ) No Nuclear terror – too many tech bariers

Schwartz & Falk ‘3

(Yaron Schwartz, US office director of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, and Ophir Falk, Vice President of Advanced Security Integration Ltd., 2003”Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Terrorism” 5-13-2003 http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=487)

For a terrorist group to obtain a nuclear weapon, two principal channels exist: build a device from scratch or somehow procure or steal a ready-made one or its key components. Neither of these is likely. Of all the possibilities, constructing a bomb from scratch, without state assistance, is the most unlikely. “So remote,” in the words of a senior nuclear scientist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, “that it can be essentially ruled out.” The chief obstacle lies not only in producing the nuclear fuel—either bomb-grade uranium or plutonium—but also the requirements for testing and securing safe havens for the terrorists.[16] Unlike uranium, a much smaller quantity of plutonium is required to form a critical mass. Yet to make enough of it for a workable bomb, a reactor is needed. Could terrorists buy one? Where would they build it? Could such a structure go undetected by satellites and other intelligence tools? That is all very implausible indeed. If making nuclear-bomb fuel is out of the question, why not just steal it, or buy it on the black market? Consider plutonium: if terrorists did manage to procure some weapon-grade plutonium, would their problems be over? Far from it: plutonium works only in an “implosion”-type bomb, which is about ten times more difficult to build than the more simple uranium bomb used at Hiroshima. Among a litany of specialized requirements is an experienced designer, a number of other specialists and a testing program. Hence, the terrorist’s chances of getting an implosion bomb to work are very low. An alternative to stealing plutonium is bomb-grade uranium. The problem with buying bomb-grade uranium is that one would need a great deal of it—around 50kg for a gun-type bomb—and nothing near that amount has turned up in the black market.[17] Even when considering a country like Pakistan, the only possibility for terrorists to lay their hands on that country’s uranium would be if its government fell under the control of sympathizers. Given that Pakistan’s army is by far the most effective and stable organization in the country, there is not much chance of that happening. Russia, again, is the terrorists’ best bet and therefore a potential target. It has tons of bomb-grade uranium left over from the cold war and, in addition to bombs, has used this material to fuel nuclear submarines and research reactors. With a reported history of smuggling attempts, there are definite prospects in Russia. If terrorists could strike the main deposit and get enough uranium for a bomb, they would be on their way. But it would still be a long journey: designing and building the bomb is anything but a trivial undertaking, as is recruiting the suitably skilled technician/s for the task. The main risk for terrorists is getting caught. Finding an isolated location for minimal risk of detection also would not be easy. Stealing or buying a complete bomb would circumvent the aforementioned obstacles. But this option presents other pitfalls which are even greater: all countries, including Russia and Pakistan (with US assistance), make ever greater efforts to safeguard their warheads and materials, and even rogue states—if they should get the bomb (as North Korea appears to staunchly pursue)—would be highly likely to do the same. Countries employ security measures specifically designed to prevent theft. Warheads are typically stored in highly restricted bunkers. Terrorists would have a very hard time trying to take over one of these and even if successful, it would be much harder to leave with the contents in hand.[18]

( ) Nuclear terror risk exaggerated – tech barriers block the process.

Mueller ‘10

John Mueller is Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University and the author of "The Remnants of War. Foreign Policy –JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 – http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/think_again_nuclear_weapons?page=0,2

"Fabricating a Bomb Is 'Child's Play.'" Hardly. An editorialist in Nature, the esteemed scientific journal, did apply that characterization to the manufacture of uranium bombs, as opposed to plutonium bombs, last January, but even that seems an absurd exaggeration. Younger, the former Los Alamos research director, has expressed his amazement at how "self-declared 'nuclear weapons experts,' many of whom have never seen a real nuclear weapon," continue to "hold forth on how easy it is to make a functioning nuclear explosive." Uranium is "exceptionally difficult to machine," he points out, and "plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed." Special technology is required, and even the simplest weapons require precise tolerances. Information on the general idea for building a bomb is available online, but none of it, Younger says, is detailed enough to "enable the confident assembly of a real nuclear explosive." A failure to appreciate the costs and difficulties of a nuclear program has led to massive overestimations of the ability to fabricate nuclear weapons. As the 2005 Silberman-Robb commission, set up to investigate the intelligence failures that led to the Iraq war, pointed out, it is "a fundamental analytical error" to equate "procurement activity with weapons system capability." That is, "simply because a state can buy the parts does not mean it can put them together and make them work." For example, after three decades of labor and well over $100 million in expenditures, Libya was unable to make any progress whatsoever toward an atomic bomb. Indeed, much of the country's nuclear material, surrendered after it abandoned its program, was still in the original boxes.

( ) non-State actors can’t pull it off.

Mueller ‘8

(John, political science professor at Ohio State University, “The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood” Jan. 1 http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF)

More than a decade ago Allison boldly insisted that it would be "easy" for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material (Allison et al. 1996, 12).13 Atomic scientists, perhaps laboring under the concern, in Langewiesche's words, that "a declaration of safety can at any time be proved spectacularly wrong" (2007, 49), have been comparatively restrained in cataloguing the difficulties terrorists would face in constructing a bomb. But physicists Wirz and Egger have published a paper that does so, and it concludes that the task "could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group" (2005, 501). They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint they "would most certainly be forced to redesign" (2005, 499-500). The process could take months or even a year or more (Pluta and Zimmerman 2006, 62), and in distinct contrast with Allison, they stress that the work, far from being "easy," is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements "in several fields verge on the unfeasible." They conclude that "it takes much more than knowledge of the workings of nuclear weapons and access to fissile material to successfully manufacture a usable weapon" (2005, 501-2).

Extensions – Will use Conventional Weapons

( ) Terrorist will use Conventional Weapons instead.

Hashmi ‘12

(Muhammad, author of “Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Myth of Reality,” and expert in defense and strategic studies, “Difficulties For Terrorists To Fabricate Nuclear RDD/IND Weapons – Analysis,” Jan 30, http://www.eurasiareview.com/30012012-difficulties-for-terrorists-to-fabricate-nuclear-rddind-weapons-analysis/)

Many believe that these threats of nuclear terrorism are inflated and have been overstated because technical hurdles still prevent terrorists from acquiring or building a nuclear device. Brain McNair argues that the threats of nuclear terrorism have been exaggerated by the world. As the matter stands today, the possibility of nuclear terrorism remains more a fantasy than fact. Furthermore, Shireen Mazari argues that Nuclear weapons would not be a weapon of choice for terrorists. Instead, she claims that “terrorists already have access to enough destructive capabilities with in conventional means, so their need for nuclear weapons is simply not there.” Analysts have endorsed the assessment that the threat of nuclear action by terrorists appears to be exaggerated. Similarly, religious cults and left-wing terrorists with their beliefs of certain prohibitions against mass murder are less likely by many estimates to use WMDs in a terrorist activity, even though there is not any guarantee that terrorists will use WMDs. It has also been witnessed that no terrorist group is known to have developed or deployed a nuclear explosive device, and the severity of the threat of nuclear terrorism remains disputed amongst international scholars. So it becomes too early to conclude that how grave the threats of nuclear terrorism are. James kitfield concludes in an interview from security expert that: Seven years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, experts and presidential candidates continue to put nuclear terrorism atop their lists of the gravest threats to the United States. Yet Brian Michael Jenkins, a longtime terrorism expert with the Rand Corp., says that the threat lies more in the realms of Hollywood dramas and terrorist dreams than in reality. There has never been an act of nuclear terrorism, he notes, yet the threat is so potentially catastrophic that it incites fear — and that fear fulfills a terrorist’s primary goal. In nutshell, we can say that it takes much more than knowledge of the workings of nuclear weapons and access to fissile material to successfully manufacture a usable weapon. Current safety and security systems help ensure that the successful use of a stolen weapon would be very unlikely. Meaning, it remains, thankfully, an incredibly challenging task for terrorists to practice their idea in a successful way to meet their objectives.

Extensions – No Nuclear Retaliation

( ) Obama won’t retaliate with nuclear weapons

Crowley ‘10

(Michael Crowley, Senior Editor the New Republic, “Obama and Nuclear Deterrence”, Jan 10^th – http://www.tnr.com/node/72263)

The Los Angeles Times ran an important story yesterday about the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review, which evaluates U.S. policy towards the use of nuclear weapons. Apparently there's a debate inside the administration--one that is splitting the civilians from the generals--not just about the size of our nuclear stockpile but also how we conceive of possible first-strike and retaliatory policies. A core issue under debate, officials said, is whether the United States should shed its long-standing ambiguity about whether it would use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, in hopes that greater specificity would give foreign governments more confidence to make their own decisions on nuclear arms. Some in the U.S. argue that the administration should assure foreign governments that it won't use nuclear weapons in reaction to a biological, chemical or conventional attack, but only in a nuclear exchange. Others argue that the United States should promise that it would never use nuclear weapons first, but only in response to a nuclear attack. As the story notes, some experts don't place much weight on how our publicly-stated doctrine emerges because they don't expect foreign nations to take it literally. And the reality is that any decisions about using nukes will certainly be case-by-case. But I'd still like to see some wider discussion of the underlying questions, which are among the most consequential that policymakers can consider. The questions are particularly vexing when it comes to terrorist groups and rogue states. Would we, for instance, actually nuke Pyongyang if it sold a weapon to terrorists who used it in America? That implied threat seems to exist, but I actually doubt that a President Obama--or any president, for that matter--would go through with it.

( ) Nuclear retaliation won’t happen.

Bremmer ‘4

(Ian Bremmer is the president of Eurasia Group, the leading global political risk research and consulting firm. Bremmer has a PhD in political science from Stanford University (1994), and was the youngest-ever national fellow at the Hoover Institution. He presently teaches at Columbia University, and has held faculty positions at the EastWest Institute and the World Policy Institute, 9-13-2004, New Statesman, “Suppose a new 9/11 hit America”)

What would happen if there were a new terrorist attack inside the United States on 11 September 2004? How would it affect the presidential election campaign? The conventional wisdom is that Americans - their patriotic defiance aroused - would rally to President George W Bush and make him an all but certain winner in November. But consider the differences between the context of the original 9/11 and that of any attack which might occur this autumn. In 2001, the public reaction was one of disbelief and incomprehension. Many Americans realised for the first time that large-scale terrorist attacks on US soil were not only conceivable; they were, perhaps, inevitable. A majority focused for the first time on the threat from al-Qaeda, on the Taliban and on the extent to which Saudis were involved in terrorism. This time, the public response would move much more quickly from shock to anger; debate over how America should respond would begin immediately. Yet it is difficult to imagine how the Bush administration could focus its response on an external enemy. Should the US send 50,000 troops to the Afghan-Pakistani border to intensify the hunt for Osama Bin Laden and 'step up' efforts to attack the heart of al-Qaeda? Many would wonder if that wasn't what the administration pledged to do after the attacks three years ago. The president would face intensified criticism from those who have argued all along that Iraq was a distraction from 'the real war on terror'. And what if a significant number of the terrorists responsible for the pre-election attack were again Saudis? The Bush administration could hardly take military action against the Saudi government at a time when crude-oil prices are already more than $45 a barrel and global supply is stretched to the limit. While the Saudi royal family might support a co-ordinated attack against terrorist camps, real or imagined, near the Yemeni border - where recent searches for al-Qaeda have concentrated - that would seem like a trivial, insufficient retaliation for an attack on the US mainland. Remember how the Republicans criticised Bill Clinton's administration for ineffectually 'bouncing the rubble' in Afghanistan after the al-Qaeda attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in the 1990s. So what kind of response might be credible? Washington's concerns about Iran are rising. The 9/11 commission report noted evidence of co-operation between Iran and al-Qaeda operatives, if not direct Iranian advance knowledge of the 9/11 hijacking plot. Over the past few weeks, US officials have been more explicit, too, in declaring Iran's nuclear programme 'unacceptable'. However, in the absence of an official Iranian claim of responsibility for this hypothetical terrorist attack, the domestic opposition to such a war and the international outcry it would provoke would make quick action against Iran unthinkable. In short, a decisive response from Bush could not be external. It would have to be domestic. Instead of Donald Rumsfeld, the defence secretary, leading a war effort abroad, Tom Ridge, the homeland security secretary, and John Ashcroft, the attorney general, would pursue an anti-terror campaign at home. Forced to use legal tools more controversial than those provided by the Patriot Act, Americans would experience stepped-up domestic surveillance and border controls, much tighter security in public places and the detention of a large number of suspects. Many Americans would undoubtedly support such moves. But concern for civil liberties and personal freedom would ensure that the government would have nowhere near the public support it enjoyed for the invasion of Afghanistan.

( ) The U.S. won’t retaliate with nuclear weapons—it makes no sense

Spring ‘1

(Baker, Research Fellow at Heritage Foundation, Heritage Backgrounder 1477, Sept 20, http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/BG1477.cfm)

Nuclear retaliation is not appropriate for every kind of attack against America. Some opponents of missile defense believe that the United States has an effective nuclear deterrent that, if necessary, could be used to respond to attacks on the homeland. But no responsible U.S. official is suggesting that the United States consider the use of nuclear weapons in response to the horrific September 11 attacks. In most cases of attack on the United States, the nuclear option would not be appropriate, but a defense response will almost always be appropriate. The United States needs to be able to resort to defensive options.