Naval postgraduate school monterey, california thesis approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

C. 
AVENUES OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
While the evidence presented here suggests that a military strategy of engaging is 
likely to be an efficacious security and stability strategy in Iraq, there are other aspects of 
the question that require further study. In the long-term security realm, the integration of 
militias into the national security architecture presents the possibility of segregating the 
country along sectarian lines, if the government is unable to negotiate a relationship of 
cooperation that will benefit both militia and government. Thus, the engagement of 
militias by U.S. forces could engender a federalized system established along sectarian 
lines, which could have serious political and security implications. 
On the other hand, if U.S. policy succeeds in establishing a democratic regime in 
Iraq, this will necessarily mean the political dominance of the Shia population.
Numerically, Iraq is home to approximately 14 million Shia, which represents sixty 
percent of the population. Iraqi democracy would therefore rest upon the traditions, 
values and cultures of the Shia. Militias have traditionally been part of their social 
organization since the revolts against British occupation in the 1920s, as they have been 
for the Kurds and Sunnis of Iraq.
If instead Iraq’s government adopts a galvanizing strategy that alienates the non-
Shia population, the political atmosphere will not be much different from Saddam 
Hussein’s sultanistic regime. To maintain stability, the government will be forced to 
emphasize coercion rather than consensus, and local autonomy will be limited. However, 
in these circumstances militias are likely to continue to play a political and security role. 
Iraqi politics has long been based on central government negotiation with local 
strongmen, which results in a greater emphasis on services rendered at the local level by 
organized groups like militias. 

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Defeating conventional military forces in a traditional combat scenario is 
impossible for militias. The Mahdi Army attempted to defeat the Coalition during 
multiple uprisings in Najaf and Sadr City in the 2004 and was tactically defeated.
However, unlike conventional forces militias can switch back and forth between 
conducting military operations and assuming the role of victim in order to gain popular 
political support. As Tartar notes, whereas “armed civilians are people without long-term 
political goals who seek only to free themselves from a foreign oppressor…militias like 
al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army [are] operated by militants who are committed to the political 
goals of the group.”
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This is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.