Figure 10.
1947 United Nations Partition Plan of Palestine
273
F. CONCLUSION
Despite the British forces’ failed effort to defeat the Jewish militias in the years
immediately preceding Israeli independence, the military strategy of engaging local
militia forces to work in conjunction with the occupying military between 1936 and 1945
ultimately produced security forces to which British forces could hand responsibility for
local and national security. This allowed the occupying military to reduce its footprint as
the local militia forces gain in strength and responsibility. The Balfour Declaration
committed the British government to a Jewish homeland in Palestine, which tended to
reinforce the tactical strategy of engagement toward Jewish militias by the British
military, at least until the de facto rejection of the principles of the Balfour Declaration by
the Labour government in 1945. Nevertheless, the relationship between the British
273
"Maps - Palestine & Jerusalem," The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International
Affairs, http://www.passia.org/maps.htm (accessed January 4, 2008).
94
military and the militias was always complex. Despite its refusal to recognize the
Haganah officially, the British military realized its importance in providing security to
the Jewish community; something that the British military was not always able to
achieve. Therefore, the description of the Haganah as “a semi-illegal underground militia
with a limited operational spectrum and organizational structure” was vague enough for
the British military to employ the Haganah when they were overwhelmed
and
to call for
its dissolution when it was no longer needed.
274
Thus, Haganah did not emerge as a
capable, disciplined, fighting force because of overwhelming support from the British
occupation forces. Rather, it was to the advantage of British military strategies of
acceptance and engagement employed by the British military to make itself into such a
force. As a result, the Jewish militias were able to force the withdrawal of British forces
and
establish a legitimate national defense force based on its long term strategy of
community protection. On the other hand, the Labour Party government’s decision to
abandon engagement with militias and instead seek their defeat required it to increase
troop levels to quell the rising levels of instability, which ultimately led to the decision to
relinquish authority of Palestine to the United Nations. The United Nations then reversed
course, endorsing the use of militias as a legitimate security force. The transformation of
the Haganah into the Israeli Defense Force clearly shows that militias can evolve into a
functional state security apparatus, under the right circumstances.
274
David Tal, “Between Intuition and Professionalism: Israeli Military Leadership during the 1948
Palestine War,”
The Journal of Military History
68.3 (2004): 888.
95
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