|
Palestine and The Great Powers, 1945-1948,
(Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1982), 251.
88
vision. The military strategy of engagement with the militias was effectively undermined
by this policy decision. As a result, they were forced to increase troop levels to from
50,000 to 80,000 in the last three months of 1945 intended to fight Jewish immigration,
reduce violence by marginalizing the UR and reestablish order by exhibiting a greater
visual presence. This troop increase proved insufficient and an additional 20,000 troops
were deployed, bringing the total to 100,000, or ten percent of their total force. This
further strained an already exhausted forced that had returned from fighting Nazi
Germany less than a year before and was now required to fulfill a three year obligation in
Palestine. For example, the Sixth Airborne Division participated in the beach landings at
Normandy on June 6, 1944 and continued to fight Axis powers in both Europe and the
Far East for the next year, and was then deployed to Palestine less than six months after
World War II.
259
Unfortunately, the strategy that spelled victory in World War II paradoxically led
to withdrawal in Palestine. The British strategic policy of limiting Jewish immigration
resulted in so-called tactical victories included the “repeated spectacle of immigrants,
many of them former concentration camp inmates with numbers still tattooed on their
arms, being manhandled, wounded, and sometimes killed by troops who sought to
transfer them to prison camps,” which led to a global public relations disaster.
260
Even
more damaging was the demoralization of British troops after Winston Churchill accused
them of “not knowing how to behave like men.”
261
Over 170 operations similar to
Agatha were conducted, with “25 percent bringing no results at all and only exposing
troops to false accusations of brutality or looting.”
262
Ultimately, the British strategy of
non-engagement put them in a position were they were “damned if they ‘lost’ and twice
damned if, as usually happened, they ‘won’ and ‘succeeded’ in restoring order, arresting
259
Cohen,
Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945-1948
, 74, 95.
260
Martin L. Van Creveld,
The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force
,
61.
261
Van Creveld, 62.
262
Ian F. W. Beckett,
Insurgency in Iraq: A Historical Perspective
(Carlisle, PA: United States Army
War College, January 2005), 12.
89
suspects, and even stopping immigrants from reaching their destination.”
263
The British
military was not trained to conduct what were essentially policing operations, and tended
therefore to use conventional military tactics that were inappropriate and thus produced
tactical successes that were strategic failures.
During the last three years of occupation, British security forces placed greater
emphasis on operations designed to stop militia violence against them than to provide
local security to the Yishuv (Jewish communities). Therefore, it became incumbent upon
the Haganah to ensure their communities were protected. The leader of the Jewish
Agency, Ben-Gurion divided the militia accordingly. While the Haganah continued to
serve as a local self-defense force for Jewish neighborhoods, the Palmach, the elite unit
within the Haganah continued to perform offensive operations aimed at disrupting British
security forces that interfered with the flow of Jewish immigrants into Palestine.
The Jewish militias placed a much greater emphasis on providing local security for
themselves after the British dissolved policies of engagement were essentially abandoned
after the election of the British Labour Party in the fall of 1945. This led their unparalleled
support by the Yishuv (Jewish community) British security forces could no longer be trusted.
Thus the Jewish Agency immediately enacted a policy of conscription for all “Jewish senior
school children aged 17-18” whereas before it was optional for teenagers who had either
completed or left school.264 These measures forced a much closer relationship with Jewish
communities and their militias that actually resulted in a period where there were no major
incidents of violence until the November 30, 1947, when the UN voted to partition Palestine.
The vote was immediately followed with bouts of chaotic uprisings by the Arab community.
In response to David Ben-Gurion’s assertion that British security forces failed to “prevent
Arab incursions from neighboring states and, on occasion, of having prevented the Haganah
from coming to the aid of Jews under attack,” British officials stating that “Arabs had been
263
Martin L. Van Creveld,
The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force
,
62.
264
Mitchell G. Bard, “The Jewish Virtual Library,” American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise,
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/anglo10.html2007) (accessed October 28, 2007).
90
provoked by Jewish
celebrations.”
265
The lack of engagement ironically prepared the
Haganah to succeed in what would escalate in to a full-blown civil war with the Arabs
after the British occupation.
It was also clear that the British did not have enough troops, equipment, and
political support to sustain their presence, and further troop increases were not possible.
The United Nations recommendation, in late 1947, to partition the country was
unacceptable to the Arab population, causing further violence, which the British were
unable to quell now that they had abandoned the strategy of engagement with the Jewish
militias. Thus, on December 11, 1947, the British announced the withdrawal of its
forces and termination of its mandate in Palestine.
266
In 1948, the Jewish Agency led by
Ben-Gurion began to assume responsibility for the future Israeli government. As the
British departed, the Haganah filled the security and governance voids, while dismantling
the Irgun and Stern Gang. The Haganah military strategy shifted in preparation for the
impending battles against Palestinian Arabs and the surrounding countries sympathetic to
the Palestinian cause. The change from low-level, small units mounting surprise attacks
to more conventional, larger scale attack capabilities coincided with the transition from a
militia force designed to defend the Yishuv to the Israeli Defense Force, which officially
occurred on May 26, 1948.
Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: |
