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Figure 8.
 
Lieutenant Colonel Gary Luck Jr., Commander of Third Battalion, 
Fifteenth Infantry Regiment Shakes Hands with Sheiks from Sadr City
191
 
Al Sadr also suspended his militia activities for six months beginning in August 
2006 to help create a favorable environment for reconciliation talks. According to Sadr 
aide Sheik Hazim al Araji, the suspension was also intended to “rehabilitate [the militia] 
in a way that will safeguard its ideological image.”
192
The suspension of violence 
189
“Feuding Iraqis Meet for Secret Peace Seminar in Finland,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/09/0e22a4fb-8860-4bb4-8eff-9e3756ba9009.html (accessed 
November 28, 2007). 
190
“Al-Sadr for UN Troops in Iraq,” Indian Express, 
http://www.indianexpress.com/story/211645.html (accessed November 28, 2007). 
191
Photo taken by author on April 4, 2005 after members of Third Battalion, Fifteenth Infantry 
Regiment conducted a reconciliation meeting with sheiks of Sadr City, Iraq, who were affiliated with the 
Mahdi Militia. 
192
David Rising, “Al-Sadr Suspends Militia Activity in Iraq,” ABC News, 
http://www.abcnews.go.com/print?id=3536599 (accessed November 27, 2007).

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63
explicitly included U.S. forces. This highlighted Sadr’s willingness to cooperate with US 
forces to rehabilitate the Mahdi Militia so that it can return to protecting local 
communities, while expelling criminal and extremists elements “who had used the group 
as a cover for killings and other crimes.”
193
The plan, according to Qusay Abdul Wahab, 
an Iraqi politician and supporter of al Sadr, was that “those who do not obey the Sadr 
office will surface. The Iraqi security forces will go after them,” and it would be 
acceptable for U.S. forces to do the same. A Mahdi Militia street commander from Sadr 
City underlined the willingness to cooperate with the U.S. by stating that “anyone who 
fights the Americans now is not from the Mahdi Army. Moqtada al Sadr sent this order 
to freeze the Mahdi Army for just one reason: to distinguish between good and bad 
Mahdi Army members.”
194
Furthermore, Sadr demonstrated a willingness to actively 
pursue extremists who were destabilizing local communities by stating that “they [Mahdi 
Militia] recently captured 10 Iranians with Al Qaeda operatives in eastern Diyala 
province and punished them.” The militia commander then stated that his forces simple 
dealt with them, smiling and refusing to say what they had done, implies that the captured 
element had been executed.
195
Yet there is still no cooperation between the militia and 
U.S. forces, limiting the potential positive impact on stability of these initiatives.
However, this is some indication that the U.S. may finally be considering a 
change in strategy with respect to the Mahdi Militia. In his testimony to Congress on 
September 11, 2007 General Petraeus hinted at an opening vis-à-vis Shia militias when 
he said: “you’re not going to kill or capture all of the Sadr militia anymore than we are 
going to kill or capture all the insurgents in Iraq.”
196 
Debates have also arisen inside the 
White House over whether it should continue to pursue a defeat strategy or consider the 
feasibility of engagement. Given the increased number shootouts and bombings by 
members of militia splinter cells, the willingness to negotiate by both the U.S. military 
193
Ned Parker, “U.S. Seeks Pact with Shiite Militia,” Los Angeles Times, 
http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/fairenough/latimesB92.html (accessed November 28, 2007). 
194
Parker. 
195
Ibid
. 
196
Ibid
. 

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and militia moderates has grown.
197 
Finally, there are reports of small contingents of 
U.S. military and moderate militia members already negotiating. U.S. Army officials 
responsible for West Baghdad “have extended their hand to the Jaish al Mahdi [Arabic 
name for the Mahdi Militia].”
198
Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Patrick Frank, the officer 
responsible for initiating these negotiations asserted: “We have to craft a way ahead. We 
have to find a workable solution with the community leaders, religious leaders, and 
essentially the local political leaders within Jaish al Mahdi.”
199
One U.S. diplomat 
recognized that the same thing occurred with the Sunni’s although it took over a year and 
a half to achieve proven levels of stability that it has. And it paid off. According to LTC 
Franks there was a reduction of violence in his area of operations after both sides agreed 
to a limit in military operations. The street commander agreed to suspend attacks for two 
weeks in conjunction with an order by Moqtada al Sadr to suspend militia activities for 
six months (that was announced two weeks previously) and the U.S. military agreed to a 
reduction of raids in their district.
200
It remains to be seen whether LTC Frank’s strategy 
will be an exception to the rule, or whether it will be adopted and employed by the other 
U.S. military units that interact with Shia militias or even adopted as policy by the U.S. 
military and/or political leadership.