Naval postgraduate school monterey, california thesis approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the effects of the U.S. strategy towards militias in three 
different areas of Iraq between 2003 and 2007. The analysis shows a consistent 
correlation between high levels of conflict and instability and a U.S. strategy of non-
engagement toward militias. From the beginning of the invasion, U.S. policy endorsed 
the existence and operation of the Kurdish Peshmerga, and they have proven an effective 
partner, consistently maintaining peace and stability and even facilitating prosperity 
during tumultuous periods of instability since 2003. More recently, the U.S. decision to 
197
Ned Parker, “U.S. Seeks Pact with Shiite Militia,” Los Angeles Times, 
http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/fairenough/latimesB92.html (accessed November 28, 2007). 
198
Parker. 
199
Ibid
. 
200
Ibid
. 

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endorse Sunni militias in the Anbar province has resulted in one of Iraq’s most dangerous 
provinces becoming one of its safest in a matter of months. In both instances, 
engagement has led to improved security, governance and economic performance.
Evidence from the Shia areas suggests that a strategy of engagement would likely have 
similar effects there as well. Overall stabilization has little hope of success if the U.S. 
engagement policy with respect to militias is not implemented fairly and equally towards 
the major Sunni, Shia and Kurdish militias.

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III. 
CASE STUDY- THE PALESTINE MANDATE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
During their occupation of Palestine from 1917 to 1948, the British tested a 
number of different strategies vis-à-vis indigenous militia forces. This chapter provides a 
within case analysis much as the previous chapter did for Iraq. The next chapter will then 
present a comparative analysis of the two cases. In the early years of the occupation, the 
British used strategies of engagement toward militias and later changed course and 
adopted a strategy of non-engagement that ultimately resulted in the inability of the 
British to maintain a stable environment. The chapter shows that the policy of 
engagement ultimately allowed the Jewish community to establish an effective and 
organized government, which allowed the United Nations to transfer responsibilities for 
security to Jewish militias after Great Britain relinquished responsibility for the Palestine 
Mandate. 
As in the previous chapter, this chapter begins with the historical background 
necessary to understand the occupation in general. This is followed by a section 
analyzing the effects of engagement strategies employed by the British military on 
stability in Palestine, and then a section analyzing the effects of polices of non-
engagement employed from 1945 to 1948 on stability and Britain’s ability to govern 
Palestine. Lastly, the chapter assesses the impact of United Nations policy towards 
militias in Palestine during the transition to sovereignty on Jewish militias and the 
establishment of a functioning Israeli government and military.