33
children. It’s not that I encourage my son to hate Americans. It’s not that I make him
want to join the resistance. Americans do that for me.”
96
Other Sunni insurgents report
similar treatment.
There have been some that say ‘hello’ or ‘peace be unto you’
in Arabic to
me…but others treat us like dogs. I saw one put his boot on the head of an
old man lying on the ground [during a raid]. Even Saddam would not
have done such a thing. It was then I realized that they had come as
occupiers and not as liberators. So we began to meet and plan. We met
with others and have tried to buy weapons. None of us are afraid to die,
but it is hard. We are just men, workers, not soldiers…
97
Unfortunately, this type of conventional ‘one size fits all’ tactical
strategy that permeated
most military engagements was employed instead of engaging local militias to assist
national police forces with local security responsibilities.
The U.S. endorsement of a strong central government also encouraged Sunni
militias to resist the Coalition. Sunni tribes have always resisted a strong central
government because it is antithetical to tribal culture. It was even difficult for Saddam
Hussein to deal with Sunni militias, despite the fact that his power base was in the Sunni
areas. For example, members of the Dulaim tribe (of 750,000)
based out of the city of
Ramadi in the heart of the Anbar province, attempted to rebel against Saddam in 1992
and 1995, but were quickly suppressed by Saddam’s praetorian security forces. Yet,
because many members of the Dulaim tribe were integrated in the Baath party, Saddam
was obligated to acknowledge their existence and compromise with them to forestall a
major tribal rebellion.
98
U.S. refusal to recognize Iraqi tribal structures increased support
for the insurgency. Tribal sheiks authority over the tribes rests upon their ability to
provide financially for members of the tribe.
Saddam recognized this, and used the
sheiks as intermediaries between his government and the masses. When the U.S. failed
96
Hashim,
Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq
, 101.
97
Hashim, 20.
98
Hashim, 105.
34
to engaged the sheiks, the sheiks authority was undermined. As a result, military age
males “joined criminal gangs or the insurgency” because the
sheiks were no longer able
to exercise authority over their actions.
99
Much of the same continued from 2003 to 2006. Both stability and security
continued to decline in Anbar. Combat operations dominated the agenda for Anbar in
2004. The city of Fallujah was witness to one of the largest military offensives since the
invasion of Iraq. By April 2004, Fallujah had become a terrorist haven for both foreign
fighters and terrorists such as Zarqawi. U.S. officials attempted to allow the newly
formed Iraqi forces to take over security but would later succumb to insurgent violence.
Thus a U.S. military offensive to regain the city of 300,000 commenced in the fall of
2004 leaving most of the city abandoned and destroyed. Since
the majority of Sunnis
felt that Iraq’s budding political establishment was illegitimate, the elections that
occurred in 2005 further exacerbated levels of instability in Sunni dominated areas such
as Anbar. Moderate Sunni political groups such as the Iraqi Islamic party, the largest
Sunni party, withdrew arguing that high levels of violence would prevent a “free and fair
vote,” while conservative Sunni groups continued to boycotted
elections on the grounds
that they were endorsed by the United States.
100
Further isolation of the Sunni
population led to increased support for the insurgency which led to greater sectarian
conflict. Many Sunni’s later felt that the Iraqi government was not truly reflective of the
Anbar province due to low voter turnout. By 2006, Anbar was embroiled in conflict with
little to no hope for increased stability. The U.S. continued to pursue a strategy that
placed greater emphasis on the development of Iraqi security forces represented by the
government while virtually ignoring the employment of local tribes and their militias for
local security. Levels of security and stability were so low that
Brigadier General Carter
Ham, the deputy director for regional operations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that
Ramadi (the capital for Anbar), a city of approximately 450,000 is “probably the most
99
Hashim,
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