Naval postgraduate school monterey, california thesis approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq
, 92-124; W. B. Slocombe, “Iraq’s Special 
Challenge: Security Sector Reform ‘Under Fire’,” 
Bryden and Hänggi
(2004), 6-8. 
94
Hashim, 
Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq
, 92, 104. 
95
John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan, “Toward Postconflict Reconstruction,” 
The Washington 
Quarterly
25, no. 4 (Autumn, 2002), 90 (accessed November 20, 2007). 

---

33
children. It’s not that I encourage my son to hate Americans. It’s not that I make him 
want to join the resistance. Americans do that for me.”
96
Other Sunni insurgents report 
similar treatment. 
There have been some that say ‘hello’ or ‘peace be unto you’ in Arabic to 
me…but others treat us like dogs. I saw one put his boot on the head of an 
old man lying on the ground [during a raid]. Even Saddam would not 
have done such a thing. It was then I realized that they had come as 
occupiers and not as liberators. So we began to meet and plan. We met 
with others and have tried to buy weapons. None of us are afraid to die, 
but it is hard. We are just men, workers, not soldiers…
97
Unfortunately, this type of conventional ‘one size fits all’ tactical strategy that permeated 
most military engagements was employed instead of engaging local militias to assist 
national police forces with local security responsibilities. 
The U.S. endorsement of a strong central government also encouraged Sunni 
militias to resist the Coalition. Sunni tribes have always resisted a strong central 
government because it is antithetical to tribal culture. It was even difficult for Saddam 
Hussein to deal with Sunni militias, despite the fact that his power base was in the Sunni 
areas. For example, members of the Dulaim tribe (of 750,000) based out of the city of 
Ramadi in the heart of the Anbar province, attempted to rebel against Saddam in 1992 
and 1995, but were quickly suppressed by Saddam’s praetorian security forces. Yet, 
because many members of the Dulaim tribe were integrated in the Baath party, Saddam 
was obligated to acknowledge their existence and compromise with them to forestall a 
major tribal rebellion.
98
U.S. refusal to recognize Iraqi tribal structures increased support 
for the insurgency. Tribal sheiks authority over the tribes rests upon their ability to 
provide financially for members of the tribe. Saddam recognized this, and used the 
sheiks as intermediaries between his government and the masses. When the U.S. failed
96
Hashim, 
Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq
, 101. 
97
Hashim, 20. 
98
Hashim, 105. 

---

34
to engaged the sheiks, the sheiks authority was undermined. As a result, military age 
males “joined criminal gangs or the insurgency” because the sheiks were no longer able 
to exercise authority over their actions.
99
Much of the same continued from 2003 to 2006. Both stability and security 
continued to decline in Anbar. Combat operations dominated the agenda for Anbar in 
2004. The city of Fallujah was witness to one of the largest military offensives since the 
invasion of Iraq. By April 2004, Fallujah had become a terrorist haven for both foreign 
fighters and terrorists such as Zarqawi. U.S. officials attempted to allow the newly 
formed Iraqi forces to take over security but would later succumb to insurgent violence.
Thus a U.S. military offensive to regain the city of 300,000 commenced in the fall of 
2004 leaving most of the city abandoned and destroyed. Since the majority of Sunnis 
felt that Iraq’s budding political establishment was illegitimate, the elections that 
occurred in 2005 further exacerbated levels of instability in Sunni dominated areas such 
as Anbar. Moderate Sunni political groups such as the Iraqi Islamic party, the largest 
Sunni party, withdrew arguing that high levels of violence would prevent a “free and fair 
vote,” while conservative Sunni groups continued to boycotted elections on the grounds 
that they were endorsed by the United States.
100
Further isolation of the Sunni 
population led to increased support for the insurgency which led to greater sectarian 
conflict. Many Sunni’s later felt that the Iraqi government was not truly reflective of the 
Anbar province due to low voter turnout. By 2006, Anbar was embroiled in conflict with 
little to no hope for increased stability. The U.S. continued to pursue a strategy that 
placed greater emphasis on the development of Iraqi security forces represented by the 
government while virtually ignoring the employment of local tribes and their militias for 
local security. Levels of security and stability were so low that Brigadier General Carter 
Ham, the deputy director for regional operations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that 
Ramadi (the capital for Anbar), a city of approximately 450,000 is “probably the most 
99
Hashim,