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The Journal of Strategic Studies
29, no. 3
(June, 2006), 415-417 (accessed November 8, 2007).
83
Lundberg,
The Accidental Statesmen: General Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq
, 20
84
Lundberg, 20.
29
protect the fragile oil infrastructure, which U.S. planners hoped to use to pay for
reconstruction of the country. Furthermore, the U.S. used nearly 7,000 of the Peshmerga
as interrogators, perimeter security guards, neighborhood patrolmen and soldiers to track
down and destroy radical insurgent movements such as Ansar al Islam and al Qaeda,
which were determined to destabilize Iraq through a campaign of violence and terror.
The U.S. went as far as integrating members of the Peshmerga militia into U.S. Army
training exercises that were conducted in the continental United States. Fort Irwin,
California serves as a major training base where units validate their tactics, techniques,
and procedures against an opposing force (OPFOR) intended to replicate situations in
Iraq. Therefore the engagement of select members of Kurdish militia “adds to the
realism” during training exercises.
85
Given the heavy reliance upon and support of the Kurdish militia groups before,
during and after the invasion of Iraq, it was somewhat quixotic that the CPA (the de facto
U.S. government in Iraq) attempted to implement CPA Order 91 in June 2004, which
suddenly made militias illegal. Instead of augmenting nascent government security
forces by embracing the experienced Kurdish militias, the CPA decided to abolish all
militias in the country. Like the 101
st
initial, poorly informed, effort to sideline the
Peshmerga, this polarizing strategy of usurping control over proven security elements
such as the Kurdish Peshmerga had the potential to undo everything the U.S. Special
Forces had accomplished since January 2003. Fortunately for the U.S., Kurdish political
leaders recognized the futility of disbanding their militia in favor of nonexistent state
security force and chose to ignore the CPA Order.
86
Since the implementation of CPA Order 91 in 2004 the U.S. strategy of trying to
disband the Kurdish Peshmerga was officially abandoned after the approval of the
constitution in 2005 in favor of a return to the strategy of engagement and quiet
85
Lortz,
Willing to Face Death: A History of Kurdish Military Forces-the Peshmerga-from the
Ottoman Empire to Present-Day Iraq
, 69-70
.
86
Edward Wong, “Kurds Vow to Retain Militia as Guardians of Autonomy,” New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/27/international/middleeast/27militia.html?pagewanted=all&position=
(accessed February 27, 2007).
30
recognition.
87
And the strategy has continued to serve the U.S. well. “[N]ot a single
American soldier has been killed in Kurdistan since the start of the war in Iraq, and there
hasn’t been a major terrorist attack in Arbil since June 2005.”
88
The single most
important factor in the Kurdish region maintaining the highest levels of stability in Iraq
with the lowest number of U.S. troops has been the strategy of engaging militias.
According to a poll conducted in early 2007, less than four percent of Kurds interviewed
stated that they encountered any violence in Kurdistan compared to 41% of the
population interviewed around the rest of Iraq. The integration of the Peshmerga into
Iraqi security forces stationed in Kurdistan has also been well received by the civilian
population. For example, interviewees living in Iraqi Kurdistan were asked if they
perceived unnecessary violence by U.S./Coalition forces, local militias, police, and the
Army. U.S./Coalition forces received the least favorable response, with nine percent of
respondents saying that they use unnecessary violence – a very low number by Iraqi
standards. They were followed by local militia, with two percent, the Iraqi police with
one percent, and the Iraqi Army with an unbelievable zero percent.
89
According to a
March 2007 Department of Defense report measuring stability in Iraq, the four provinces
primarily controlled by the Kurdish Peshmerga, had the lowest levels of tension in the
country. On a zero to 10 scale, tensions within neighborhoods in the region scored a two.
This has also resulted in over 89% of the Kurdish population being satisfied with the
local area in which they live. These Kurdish provinces were among the top four with the
lowest levels of violence throughout Iraq when sampling the time period of November
2006 to February 2007.
90
Clearly, the engagement strategy that the U.S. has utilized with
87
Edward Wong, “Kurds Vow to Retain Militia as Guardians of Autonomy,” New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/27/international/middleeast/27militia.html?pagewanted=all&position=
(accessed February 27, 2007).
88
Andrew Lee Butters, “Where Iraq Works,” Time,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1606880-2,00.html2007) (accessed November 15,
2007).
89
Anthony Cordesman,
Iraq’s Sectarian and Ethnic Violence and its Evolving Insurgency
(Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies,[April 2, 2007]) (accessed November 17,
2006).
90
Cordesman.
31
the Kurdish Peshmerga since the invasion of Iraq has, at a minimum, contributed to
higher levels of stability in the Kurdish provinces.
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