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 Middle East 
Journal 
57, no. 4 (2003): 551-552. He is one of the surviving sons of Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr (Sadr II) 
who was the cousin of the martyred revolutionary Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (Sadr I). Al-Sadr II advocated 
an Islamic state based on the Iranian teachings of Ruhu’llah Khomeini and Sadr I. Sadr II was much more 
radical in his interpretations of an Islamic state than Sadr I. Sadr II continued to press for an Iraqi state that 
would be governed by strict clerical jurisprudence until his assassination in 1999. He focused on the slums 
of eastern Baghdad because their impoverished conditions. Radical teachings regarding that would change 
the status quo included a transition to a theocratic state similar to Iran appealed to the younger and 
impoverished Shia. His assassination created a list of martyred Shia revolutionaries that Moqtada al-Sadr 
could later use to gain popularity with the Shia population which falls in line with the historical track 
record of Shia religion dating back to the martyred death of Hussein Ali in 680. Liam Anderson and 
Gareth Stansfield, 
The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?
1
st
ed. (New York, N.Y.: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 120. Hussein was a direct descendent of the Prophet Muhammad who was 
killed in a revered battle against a larger army commanded by Yazid, a Sunni caliph who eventually 
succeeded the Prophet Muhammad. 
134
Cole, 554-555. Al-Sadr colluded with Shia rivals such as the followers of the Grand Ayatollah 
Sistani and the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) to expel Baathists from Sadr City.
They also took control of massive stockpiles of weapons and equipment in Baath Party weapon depots, a 
move which allowed them to enforce their regulations. Control of weapons and terrain were major triggers 
that caused the U.S. coalition to label the Mahdi militia as an impending threat.

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April 2003.
135
This appealed to the younger generation of Shias because they were 
attracted to the idea that Sadr was there to challenge the moderate stance of other Shiites, 
and his reputation was based on challenging the U.S. occupation and CPA. Sadr gave the 
young Shia generation something to believe in and fight for. During a Mahdi Militia 
insurrection in 2004, a foot soldier stated, “I’m defending our country, our holy 
places….What is making America so crazy is that we are fighting for our religion.”
136
The base of al-Sadr’s support consists of impoverished Shias who were violently 
suppressed during Saddam’s reign.
137
However, the U.S. conducted a number of tactical 
military operations that spelled defeat for the Mahdi Militia and caused Sadr to shift from 
an armed struggle to politics and future national elections. However, decades of decrepit 
conditions imposed upon the Shia population made it impossible for the United States 
military to establish better living conditions in a short period of time. This allowed Sadr 
to build more legitimacy in the eyes of the impoverished Shia population through the 
failures of the CPA. His base of support allows Moqtada al-Sadr to distance himself 
from occupation forces. Many impoverished Shia expected United States military troops 
to immediately free them from oppression and torture experienced under the Sunni Baath 
party.
138
Sadr’s militia created security patrols for the Shia population, returned stolen 
products and distributed food aid to the local populace. Sadr’s anti-American sentiment 
135
Cole, 556. At the time, he capitalized on his Iraqi lineage, distinguishing himself from powerful 
Shia religious leaders like the moderate Sistani and Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, the former 
leader of
SCIRI, both of whom are of Iranian descent. Al-Sadr’s rhetoric specifically targeted both. He 
“insisted that leadership of Iraqis should be invested in Iraqis” and criticized SCIRI’s leader Muhammad 
Baqir al-Hakim by stating that “[r]eligious people who went into exile should not have left.” It continues 
to be characterized by “Puritanism, militancy, and intolerance that was very different from the genteel 
Najaf tradition.” Al-Sadr’s hard line approach and strict code of moral conduct attract the younger, 
impoverished generation who approve of retribution against violators of Sharia law.
136
Tatar, 
Emergence of Nationalist Identity in Armed Insurrections: A Comparison of Iraq and 
Nicaragua,
188. 
137
Sadr City, Najaf, Karbala, Basra, Kut and Nasiriya are among the major cities with religious 
significance that attract Moqtada al-Sadr’s followers. They are filled with young unemployed men seeking 
economic opportunity and a chance to join to a powerful organization recognized throughout the country, 
motives that have swelled the ranks of the militias. Estimates have ranged from 10,000 to 60,000. These 
estimates vary depending on levels of what defines their levels of support and influence within the 
organization. 
138
However, decades of decrepit conditions imposed upon the Shia population made it impossible for 
the United States military to establish better living conditions in a short period of time. This allowed Sadr 
to build more legitimacy in the eyes of the impoverished Shia population through the failures of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). 

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sought to gain greater power by establishing himself as an alternative to the moderate 
Shia voice that was accepting of the U.S. coalition presence and the creation of a U.S. 
backed government. Al-Sadr’s presence and political strength will continue to grow. He 
has a loyal following among the Shia population. The Mahdi army is more organized and 
well entrenched in the political arena, controlling of 32 of the 275 seats in the 
parliament.
139