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CHAPTER 2 – HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
68 
scheme was in its demonstration of the enduring blight of the national schism even 
in the face of national disaster and of the conviction among its partisans that the 
gains of Venizelos had been thrown away by Constantine. It led to no action in Asia 
Minor; but it was the germ of the revolution which immediately followed the 
disaster.
The only military initiative taken by the Greeks in the summer of 1922 was a half-
cocked move to occupy Constantinople in July; the intention, absurdly, was for 
success to force the powers to impose a peace settlement but the attempt was 
abandoned as soon as the powers declared their intention to resist
142
. Otherwise the 
Greek army sat immobile behind its over-extended lines. Even though some, such as 
Prince Andrew, had been able to see that the choice would be between an orderly 
withdrawal and a rout
143
, the government acted in the belief, in which it was 
encouraged by its new commander in chief, that the army was capable of holding its 
lines against a nationalist attack, while attempts to find a settlement continued
144
. 
The nationalists had indeed been preparing an attack since the autumn of 1921 but 
even in March 1922 the army was not considered ready for an offensive
145
. A 
statement by Mustafa Kemal to the assembly on 6 May clearly indicates in curious 
terms (“today only war will create the nation”) an intention to use force
146
, even 
though the diplomatic tide was now strongly flowing the nationalists’ way. The plan 
142
Llewellyn Smith, 277-280 
143
Andrew, 238 
144
Gawrych, 190; Llewellyn Smith, 274-5, 277 
145
Gawrych, 183-184 
146
Gawrych, 184 

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CHAPTER 2 – HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
69 
to concentrate the attack on the Greeks’ weak salient at Afyon was largely settled in 
July when preparations for it were ordered to be complete by 15 August
147
. The start 
date of 26 August was set only a few days before
148
. 
The offensive was brilliantly successful. The Greek lines were broken by the second 
day and by 1 September the Greek withdrawal had become a rout with the army 
fleeing westwards in a whirlwind of destruction
149
. The troops bypassed Smyrna and 
headed for the Erythrae peninsula whence they would all have embarked for Greece 
by 16 September
150
; nationalist forces entered unopposed on 9 September and 
Mustafa Kemal followed the next day. Instances of looting and killing appear to have 
begun almost at once; the great fire which over five days destroyed the Christian 
quarters started on 13 September
151
; 
Meanwhile from the northern end of the front the Greeks were able to conduct a 
more orderly but still destructive withdrawal in the direction of the Sea of Marmara. 
The last Greek soldiers embarked from Bandırma for Thrace on 18 September
152
. 
The military focus then moved to the Straits. Lloyd George had already declared on 
15 September that Mustafa Kemal had to be stopped; an influential portion of the 
British Cabinet was ready to use force, if necessary. But the country had no more 
appetite for war than the French and the Italians; the press opposed it, while the 
Dominions, irked anyway by reading Churchill’s proclamations in the newspapers 
147
Gawrych, 191 
148
Gawrych, 193 
149
Gawrych, 196-206; Llewellyn Smith, 288-300 
150
Llewellyn Smith, 311 
151
Llewellyn Smith, 306-311; Mango, 344-347 
152
Gawrych, 205 

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