Introduction to Geopolitics

lebensraum
(or living space) of the German people (Smith, 1986).
But territorial expansion within Europe was not the only element of Germany’s
geopolitical code. The acquisition of new colonies was also paramount, hence the need
for a new fleet of battleships. Germany believed that it was “owed” colonial possessions
to the same degree as Britain and France, and the new emergent industrialists in 
Germany promoted this policy of 
Weltpolitik
in its attempt to secure markets and
resources. However, it should be noted that geopolitical codes are contested. Germany’s
landed aristocracy favored the acquisition of new agricultural land through expanding
Germany’s European borders through policies of 
lebensraum
, while the industrialists
favored the 
Weltpolitik
strategy of securing colonies (Abraham, 1986). The twin aspects
of Germany’s geopolitical code of world leadership challenge enabled Great Britain to
secure a coalition of support both across its Dominion possessions as well as traditional
European rivals France and Russia.
Geopolitical codes of the US as world leader
But what of the emerging, though not pre-determined, world leader across the Atlantic?
Recovering from a bloody civil war, impressively urbanized and industrialized in 
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some parts, and “undeveloped” in others, the notion of expansion became a key issue
in American geopolitics. Despite much political debate, control of the Caribbean and
the Pacific became the focus of the United State’s geopolitical code. Rear-Admiral
Alfred Thayer Mahan was the theoretical light behind the US’s move to globalism.
Especially, he noted that sea-power was the basis for world power, but was also careful
to caution that any expansion of US influence would have to be done in a way that did
not interfere with Great Britain’s agenda and provoke war.
US national ideology was, and still is, based upon the rhetoric of anti-colonialism
and national self-determination from British rule. Hence, especially at the beginning 
of the process of achieving world leadership, there was much domestic accusation 
that the country was embarking upon a policy of European-style imperialism unsuitable
for the United States. But expansion did follow, and key geopolitical achievements 
were the defeat of Spain, control of Cuba, Hawaii, and the Philippines, and the construc-
tion of the Panama Canal. Related was reinforcement of the Monroe Doctrine that
defined the US’s hemispheric sphere of influence across Central and South America,
but also delineated, at a time of world-leadership transition, that Great Britain and 
the United States each had distinct and exclusive realms of control across the globe
(Smith, 2003).
Such geographic limitations were unsuitable ingredients for a geopolitical code once
the United States had achieved world leadership status. In the face of the ideological
and territorial challenge of the Soviet Union, the new world leader had to create an
unabashedly global geopolitical code. Table 3.1 illustrates how in 1947 the United States
was including countries across the globe in its geopolitical calculations. In addition,
policy toward particular countries was a function of “national security” and the new
world leader’s “mission” to counter Communism.
NSC-68, written under the administration of President Harry S. Truman in 1950 is
the key document outlining the geopolitical code of United States world leadership 
(the National Security Council was established by President Truman to serve as a forum
to advise the president on foreign policy). It is useful in showing the geographic imper-
atives a world leader must address, as well as showing the similarities with the foreign
policy of President George W. Bush, when the world leader was facing a challenge from
organized terrorism.
NSC-68 outlines the goals of world leadership, but it had to do so in the face of the
geopolitical challenge of the Soviet Union and its ideological alternative, Communism.
The document is oft-quoted for its claim that “[t]he assault on free institutions is 
world-wide now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of 
free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere” (Section IV, A). The geopolitical
implication of this statement is that all parts of the globe held equal strategic import-
ance—the world leader had to assert its authority in all countries. The Soviet system
was a value system “wholly irreconcilable with ours” (IV, A), and its influence was
preventing the establishment of “order” in the international system. Remember that
“order” is a key component of Modelski’s model: in the words of NSC-68, the conflict
with the Soviet Union “imposes on us, in our own interests, the responsibility of world
leadership” (IV, B).
1111
2
3
41
5
6
7
8
91
10
1
2
31111
4
5
6
7
8
9
20
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
30
1
2
3
4
51
6
7
8
9
40
1
2
3
4
5111
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