Introduction to Geopolitics

CDI Russia Weekly
, from 
The Hindu
posted July 18, 2003.
www.cdi.org/russia/268–12.cfm—accessed January 14, 2005)
Extract 3
Quoting a report by the Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis: “The United States
should not allow itself to sort of get baited into a Cold War or a Great Game
perspective on its relationship with China and Russia,” Sweeney says. “Those
states have legitimate interests in seeing Central Asia stabilized and in defeating
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Islamic extremism. So as long as their actions don’t conflict with our core
objectives in the war on terrorism, we don’t need to be overly suspicious or
reactionary to Russian or Chinese moves in Central Asia.
“Last October [2003], Russia opened an air base at Kant in Kyrgyzstan to
provide an air component for a rapid deployment force that will operate under
the aegis of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The CSTO
is a partnership among Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan.
“Last year, members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—which
groups China, Russia, and four Central Asian republics—held joint military
exercises in Kazakhstan and China.
“In 2002, China and Kyrgyzstan conducted a joint military exercise on the
border areas of the two countries.”
(“Central Asia: Report Calls On US to Rethink its Regional Approach”
by Antoine Blua RFE/RL 
CDI Russia Weekly
, February 13, 2004. 
www.cdi.org/russia/13feb04–13.cfm—accessed January 14, 2005)
Extract 4
Visiting the Tajik capital Dushanbe last month [October 2004], Russian pres-
ident Vladimir Putin surprised his audience by pledging substantial financial
investment in the Central Asian republic.
“The Russian side—both its state structures and private companies—intends
to invest some $2 billion in the Tajik economy within the next five years . . .”
Putin said.
And Tajikistan was not the only Central Asian country to receive promises
from Moscow in October. Uzbekistan and, to a lesser extent, Kyrgyzstan, have
been promised investment by Russia.
(“Central Asia: Russia Comes on Strong (Part 1)” RFE/RL 
CDI Russia Weekly
, November 19, 2004—accessed 1/14/05.
www.cdi.org/russia/331–17.cfm)
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Activity
From the extracts, pick out the web of alliances that is being created in Central Asia
and the potential tensions. As a starting point, one may want to look at the actions
of Kyrgyzstan and the potential tensions between China, Russia, and the US. 
• What means of generating allies are being used in this situation? 
• In what way is the context enabling and constraining the actions of the coun-
tries involved? 
• In what way is Modelski’s (1987) model of world leadership useful in consid-
ering the structure or context? 
• In what way is the model useful in explaining the geopolitical dynamics in the
Caspian Sea basin?

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Geopolitical codes and the dynamics of world leadership
The global geopolitical context is the aggregation of the geopolitical codes of all coun-
tries. Of course, some geopolitical codes are more influential than others; the United
States’ actions define the global political scene to a greater degree than those of, 
say, Belize. If Modelski’s model is correct, during a phase of world leadership the
geopolitical agenda of other countries will be most strongly influenced by the world
leader. It follows that the model predicts phases of deconcentration and global war to
be times when the ability of other countries to pose geopolitical questions increases. By
placing the geopolitical codes of particular countries within the phases of Modelski’s
model we can have an understanding of the opportunities and constraints that the global
geopolitical context defines.
The period of global war that ended in 1945 was waged between the declining world
leader, Great Britain, and its chief challenger Germany. However, as we noted in the
previous chapter, it was Britain’s key ally, the United States, that claimed the mantle
of world leader. In this period, we can distinguish three important geopolitical codes:
Great Britain’s attempt to arrest decline; Germany’s attempt to defeat Britain; and the
United States’ realization of world leadership.
Geopolitical codes of declining world leadership and challenge
British geographer and geopolitician Sir Halford Mackinder, introduced in Chapter 1,
was intent in maintaining his country’s supremacy, he identified a German threat, and
thought the maintenance of the British Empire was the appropriate means. In his mind,
the British Empire would secure Britain’s economic power, and its global presence.
Mackinder is noted for his identification of conquest of Eurasian “Heartland” as a means
to control the world. He feared that Germany was utilizing the “new” railway tech-
nology to mobilize resources in Eurasia and challenge Great Britain. Mackinder’s
response was “sea-power,” or more accurately a system of global reach built upon empire
that required a large navy.
Senior British politicians were also able to make the linkage between control of
Europe and world domination. In practice, their geopolitical code, in an echo of
Mackinder’s concerns, required a united empire and battleships. In a 1911 conference
on imperial defence, Sir Edward Grey (Foreign Secretary) stated:
So long as maintenance of Sea Power and the maintenance and control of 
the sea communications is the underlying motive of our policy in Europe, 
it is obvious how that is a common interest between us at home and all the
Dominions.
(Quoted in James, 1994, p. 342)
His audience agreed, and there was cross-party support for a campaign to build four
Dreadnought battleships a year. The naval arms race between Great Britain and Germany
saw plans for Germany to construct 61 battleships between 1898 and 1928.
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The material aims of maintaining the British Empire to secure world leadership were
represented in a way that emphasized a civilizing mission. War was a personal and
national “duty” couched in religious language—personal loss was for a higher goal than
national self-interest: in 1911 a National Service League pamphlet proclaimed “war 
is not murder, as some fancy, war is sacrifice—which is the soul of Christianity,” and,
remarkably, “fighting and killing are not of the essence of it [war], but are accidents”
(quoted in James, 1994, p. 334). In other words, when the geopolitical code of the
declining world leader required preparation for war, it required a representational politics
of sacrifice for the benefit of all humanity. Walk around an old British church, and read
the gravestones and plaques on the wall—one can see the loss of life suffered by the
population of the world leader memorialized, and the losses given meaning in a mixture
of nationalist and religious sentiments. Of course, what of the greater suffering of those
subjugated under British imperialism? Representations of such losses are less readily
available to most of us, producing a slanted and partial understanding of the “costs” and
experiences of British world leadership.
The geopolitical code of a challenger is, by definition, aggressive. Germany felt
“under-sized”; it did not possess the territory that it deserved given the status of the
German culture. The expansionist geopolitical code of the Kaiser Wilhelm II was given
a theoretical basis by the geopolitical theories of Rudolf Kjellen and Friedrich Ratzel
(also introduced in Chapter 1). They emphasized the organic nature of the state, the state
was an organism that would “naturally” grow (or increase the extent of its boundaries).
Which state would control which territory was also justified through a biological
analogy—the geographic realm. In other words, the “superior” culture would best
manage the land and hence have the geopolitical right to possess it. Ratzel’s allusions
to American seizure of “Indian” territories was translated into the, for him, obvious
benefits of German culture controlling the Slavic lands of Eastern Europe, to increase
the