REINHARD KRUMM | EUROPE’S SECURITY GOVERNANCE AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
Anequilibriumofsecurityinthepost-Sovietspacehasstill
notbeenreached,despitetheCSCEandOSCEprocess.
RussiaaccusestheUSofhavingconstantlychangedthe
rulesdominatingtheEuropeansecuritysystemin1990–
91bypromotingNATO’scentraleastwardenlargement,
andofhavingmadetheworldamoredangerousplace
through interventions in the Middle East. Meanwhile,
whatNATOanditsmemberstatescalledaggressionin
Georgia Russian expert Sergey Karaganov described as
self-defencewithan»ironfist«.
31
In between the events in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia
underPresidentDmitryMedvedevcameupwithpropos-
alsaimedatreshapingtheEuropeansecuritysystemso
that Russia would find itself, as his think tank INSOR
wrote, »surrounded by friends«.
32
The plan for a new
Europeansecuritysystemwasbasedontheideaofre-
negotiating Helsinki. According to Moscow, European
securityneededanewdirection,astheonemarkedby
NATO’senlargementhadmadeRussiaanoutsider.The
proposal was discussed within the OSCE in the frame-
workoftheso-calledCorfuprocess.Yettheresultsofthis
OSCE-leddebatedidnotgofartherthantherhetorical
commitmentincludedintheAstanaDeclaration,which
theCorfuprocesspresentedassustaining»thevisionof
a comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security
communitythroughoutoursharedOSCEarea«.
33
This was evidently not good enough for Russia. The
Kremlin took note of what it perceived as the West’s
unwillingnesstodiscussasubstantialrevisionoftheEu-
ropeansecuritysystem.Inthefollowingyears,itsstance
hardened.Russia’sNationalSecurityStrategyofDecem-
ber31,2015
34
clearlystatedthatcompetitionbetween
theWestandRussia–overgeopoliticalinterestsaswell
asvalues–wasagainthegameintown.TheStrategy
framed Russia as a global player with a rightful claim
to a sphere of influence and US policy towards Russia
ascontainment-driven.NATOwasexplicitlyindicatedas
athreat.Inresponse,theStrategycommittedRussiato
31.InterviewwithSergeyKaraganov:AnironfisttokeepNATOexpan-
sionatbay,Moscow2011,RussiainGlobalAffairs,http://eng.globalaf-
fairs.ru/pubcol/An-iron-fist-to-keep-NATO-expansion-at-bay-15130
32.Institute of Contemporary Development (INSOR): Attaining the Fu-
ture,Moscow2011,www.insor-russia.ru/files/INSOR_Attaining_The_Fu-
ture_final.pdf.
33.AstanaCommemorativeDeclarationTowardsaSecurityCommunity,
2.12.2010.
34.StrategiyanatsionalnoibezopasnostiRossiskoiFederatsii(Strategyof
NationalSecurityoftheRussianFederation),31.12.2015,https://publica-
tion.pravo.gov.ru.
modernisingitsarmyandbolsteringtroopdeployments
alongitswesternflank.ItisasignofRussia’sresolveto
play hardball with the West that it has determined to
pursueaconfrontational–andexpensive–courseata
timewhenitsenergy-driveneconomyissufferingfrom
lowoilandgasprices(ratherthanfromWesternsanc-
tions,whoseeffectshavebeenmodest).
Inspiteofitsshrinkingfinancialresources,Russiafeels
strong enough to have a decisive say in the European
securitysystem.Butitalsowantstosecureitsinterestsin
theEurasianzone.Oneoftheinstrumentsforachieving
thisistheEEU.ForRussiaitistheonlychancetohavea
sayinthecommonneighbourhoodfromLisbontoVladi-
vostok.MembershipintheEUorNATOisnotanoption;
neitherisbeingajuniorpartnerofChina.
Inarecentarticle,Russia’sforeignminister,SergeyLvov,
haslaiddownavisionofRussia’sglobalrolethatconnects
thecountry’sgeopoliticalinterestswithitsvaluesandhis-
tory.RussiawasneveranoutsiderinEurope,heargues,
justtheopposite.Ithasthereforenostructuralinterestin
permanentconfrontationwiththeEUandNATO.Onthe
contrary,Russiaaspirestobeabridgebetweenciviliza-
tions.LavrovagreeswithFrenchhistorianHélèneCarrère
d’Encaussethat»historyhasgrantedRussiathedestiny
tofulfilthegreatmissionofconnectingEastandWest«
35
.
But how believable are these words of a high-ranking
politician? The fundamental problem is the seemingly
unclearmotivationbehindRussianpolicy.Itisnotbased
onideologyanditisnotbasedoneconomicrationality.
ThemaindriverseemstobeRussia’sthreatperception.
Action is then triggered by events which can include
internal developments.
36
Demonstrations against presi-
dentPutinleadtoanevenmoredifficultrelationshipwith
theUS.HereliestheunpredictabilityofRussianforeign
policy.Preciselybecauseofthis,thedecisionmakersof
theEUandtheUSactasifanattackonNATO–which
nopreviousRussianorSovietleaderhaseverattempted
andwhichseemshighlyunlikely–couldstillbeseenasa
policyoptionfortoday’sRussia.
There is one more important factor. In contrast to the
finalyearsoftheSovietUnion,whenthepopulationin
35.SergeyLavrov:IstoricheskayaperspektivavneshneipolitikiRossii,in
Rossiyavglobalnoipolitike,Moskva2016,Nr.2,page8ff.
36.BoboLo:RussiaandtheNewWorldOrder,London2014,page35f.
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