REINHARD KRUMM | EUROPE’S SECURITY GOVERNANCE AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
general had lost faith and respect for the Communist
Party’sabilitytogovern,todaytheRussianpeoplesup-
portthegovernment’sforeignpolicy.Thismarksacrucial
differencebetweennowandtheColdWar.Discontent
abouttheeconomicsituationisaspervasivenowasitwas
thenandinfact,thetraditionalinclinationofRussiansto
criticisethestateforfailingtodeliveroneconomicand
socialwelfaremightbeevenmorepronouncedthanin
Soviet times.
37
Citizens freely badmouth their daily cir-
cumstances–yetpraisethecountry’sleadership.Identity
trumpseconomics.
3.4CountriesoftheBUMAGAregion
»Georgiaiscommittedtotheprinciplethatallnations
havetherighttochoosetheirownstrategicpath
forfuturedevelopment,aswellasthealliancesthey
wanttojoin.«
(NationalSecurityConceptofGeorgia)
The six countries of the BUMAGA region are torn be-
tweentwodifferentintegrationmodels.Thiscompetition
symbolisesthebiggestchallengeforEuropeansecurity.
Thegoodnewsisthatnoconcertofpowerswilldecide
forthemwhattheycando.Thebadnewsisthatallsix
countriesareunabletochoosetheirownpathwithout
riskingtheirindependence.Thecountriesdivergeinthe
followingways:
a) Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have signed an AA
andaDCFTAwiththeEU.
b) BelarusisamemberoftheEEUandparticipatesin
theEU’sEasternPartnership.
c) ArmeniaisamemberoftheEEUbutisnegotiatinga
newagreementwiththeEUandparticipatesintheEast-
ernPartnership.
d) AzerbaijanparticipatesintheEasternPartnership.
According to the national security concepts of these
countries,theirmainobjectiveistostayindependentand
ensureterritorialintegrity.Thataloneposesachallenge
becausefiveofthesixcountries(allbutBelarus)haveon-
37.LookattheLevadawebsiteforitsweeklyopinionpolls:
www.levada.ru.
goingterritorialconflictsinwhichRussiaplaysacentral
role.Russiausestheseconflictstoputpressureonthe
governmentstoaugmentitssphereofinfluence.
The six countries have to tackle four more problems.
First are the restrictions they face with regard to their
optionsforobtainingcrediblesecurity.In2008Georgia
paidaheavypriceforitsattempttoresolvetheterritorial
conflictsinAbkhaziaandSouthOssetiaagainstRussia’s
wishes.TheKremlinusedthatasapretextforanarmed
interventionwhich,asIdiscussedabove,wasmeantto
conveytoNATOandtheUSthemessagethatRussiawas
determinedtokeepasmuchinfluenceaspossibleover
itsnearestabroad.Ukrainemadethesamemistakewhen
itignoredRussiaduringthetalkswithBrusselsaboutthe
AAandDCFTA.Brusselsalsofailed.GeorgiaandUkraine
wanttojointheEUandNATOnow,yetRussia’sinterven-
tionshaverenderedtheprospectquiteremote.
38
ThecountriesthathavesignedtheAAwiththeEUmay
eventually undergo a second economic and political
transformationthroughapproximationtoEUstandards
(at least this is the EU’s ambition). This new transition
may prove even harder than the transition from com-
munism to free market in the 1990s, if the social and
economichardshipsassociatedwiththereformprocess
further strain a society impatient for a better life. The
firsttransformationofthelast25yearsdidnotbuilda
suitablefoundationforthesecondone,sinceitwasnot
gearedtowardsWesternintegration.
Thirdly, the region is facing competition between two
integrationmodels,theEUandtheEEU.Oneofthecon-
sequencescouldbethattheseeconomicallyweakstates
willreceiveeitherEUorRussiansupportbutnotboth.
This would severely restrict the policy options at their
disposal,andturnthemintopawnsofabroaderconflict.
Finally,theyshouldalsobeawareofthelimitsofboth
RussianandEUsupport.TheEasternPartnershipisnot
apriorityfortheEUatthemoment,andaneconomi-
callystrugglingRussiahaslesssupportfortheEEU.What
shouldbeavoided–andmustbeintheinterestsofall
countries involved – is a new dividing line. A confron-
tationalapproachbetweenthetwointegrationmodels
wouldbecounterproductivetotheEU’sgoalofachieving
38.ForGeorgia:www.mfa.gov.ge/MainNav/ForeignPolicy?NationalSecur
ityConcept.aspxandforUkraine:www.president.gov.ua.
11
Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: |